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Abstract
Polarization in the European Parliament has mainly been attributed to the ideological
dimension. The economic implications of bills have been only studied in relation to the
Council. However, after the ratification of the Lisbon treaty such questions have become
paramount for the Parliament. The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether legisla-
tive unity is lower for bills that would affect the budget in a way that, if passed, would
change the status quo allocation of resources. I propose that the impact of such budgetary
implications is dependent on the initial level of polarization within the European Parlia-
ment. In the absence of other polarizing factors, such as defections or splits within the
party of the rapporteur, budgetary implications are likely to decrease legislative unity.
Nonetheless, the negative effect of budgetary implications on legislative unity is mitigated
by defections on behalf of the party of the rapporteur.
In order to evaluate these propositions empirically I have collected data on final votes
in the 7th European Parliament. In contrast to datasets that the previous literature has
relied on, this dataset contains information on the budgetary implications of the bills.
Estimating a series of tobit regression models, I show that budgetary implications affect
the level of cohesion in the European Parliament, but this effect is conditional upon the
level of initial polarization as captured by defection from the party of the rapporteur. This
finding is relatively robust, thus shedding new light on voting patterns in the European
Parliament. Yet, some shortcomings remain, namely the differentiation at a theoretical
level between partisan and national interests, the small magnitude of the coefficients and
a potential endogenity problem. These caveats notwithstanding, it can be concluded that
the behaviour of legislators is affected by economic concerns, even if to a certain extent
such concerns are masked by ideological variables. It is likely that there is lower legislative
unity when bills aim to alter the existing budgetary status quo. Yet, conversely, when
both defection by the party of the rapporteur and budgetary implications are observed
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After the ratification of the Lisbon treaty the European Parliament has become a vital
player in the European Union. Understanding the factors that lie behind the legislator’s
voting decisions has become highly important in this context. In this thesis I choose to
focus on the economic determinants of voting. In many respects, the European Parlia-
ment resembles national legislatures. Much like national parliaments it is composed of
legislators representing different constituencies. In parliamentary democracies one ob-
serves a high overall level of cohesion and overall agreement (Diermeier and Feddersen
1998, Hix, Noury and Roland 2005, Persson and Tabellini 2005, Shugart 1998). Hence, in
many respects the European Parliament resembles national parliaments: it is composed
of legislators with divergent preferences, who represent different constituencies and who
are able to forge and maintain a high level of agreement in the plenary.
Despite the weak electoral connection between Members of the European Parliament
(hereon, MEPs) and national constituencies (Hix and Høyland 2011, Carey 2007), leg-
islators have strong incentives to satisfy the desires of their national constituencies. As
proposed by Fenno (1978) legislators have three main goals: re-election, power while in
office, and good policy.
The resemblance of the European Parliament (hereon, EP) to its national counterparts
has been supported by studies of the voting behaviour (McElroy and Benoit 2007; 2012,
Hix, Raunio and Scully 1999, Hix 2002, Hix and Noury 2009). The conclusion converged
upon by both quantitative and qualitative research is that the main determinant of conflict
has been the left-right ideological dimension, and national interests mainly play a role in
high-profile salient cases (McElroy and Benoit 2007; 2012, Hix, Raunio and Scully 1999,
Hix 2002, Hix and Noury 2009). Yet, is ideology everything?
The intergovernmentalist approach highlights the interests of member states in the
bargaining process (Moravcsik 1998). Recent studies focused on the Council have shown
the importance of the economic determinants of voting. Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins
(2005), and Mattila (2009) were among the first to focus solely on redistributive interests
in the Council. Recently, Bailer, Mattila and Schneider (2010) have shown that the
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interactions in the Council are influenced by economic factors, such as re-distributive
outcomes. Peltzman (1984) shows that ideological variables are likely to mask economic
ones, and that constituent interests affect the behaviour of legislators. For the European
Parliament the economic aspects of voting have however, not received much attention
in the existing literature. This is puzzling, as there is a large level of agreement in
recent scholarship that the Europan Parliament has become more similar to national
parliaments. This motivates the following research question: Do budgetary implications
impact cohesiveness in the European Parliament?.
1.1 Money makes the EU go round?
The findings of this thesis suggest that budgetary implications have an impact on the
overall legislative cohesion. The effects of budgetary implications have proven relatively
robust across model specifications. In the absence of other polarizing factors, budgetary
implications decrease legislative unity. When accounting for party positions, the results
suggest that legislators prefer to abstain or not to vote, instead of directly defecting.
However, in cases where there are other polarizing factors, for example defection by the
party of one of the rapporteurs, legislative cohesion is likely to increase, despite budgetary
implications. In other words, a high level of polarization in the European Parliament
before the final vote mitigates the effects of budgetary implications.
These findings hold across various model specifications, even if the effect of budgetary
implications is somewhat weaker when including dummies for party positions. In these
cases it becomes important to account for legislators that choose to abstain or not to
vote. It seems that ideology remains an important determinant of voting within the
European Parliament, even when controlling for economic interests. This is expected, as
Peltzman (1984) shows that ideological variables mask economic interests. One finding
that remains robust in all the models estimated in this thesis is that legislative unity is
likely to be higher in cases where the bill has both budgetary implications and where the
party of the rapporteur also defected. There is little doubt that European Party Groups
are strategic actors, thus they are likely to have strong incentives to use party pressure
in order to establish and maintain a cohesive behaviour in the plenary. Controlling for
policy areas or in other words, accommodating the model to the hierarchical structure of
the data, does not change the substantial relationship.
Nevertheless, caution is advised when interpreting the results, as the magnitude of the
coefficients is small. Furthermore, as defection is observed at the same time as legislative
unity, even if chronologically it is known before, instruments should have been employed,
in order to remedy this potential problem. Unfortunately, as discussed in section 5.1 such
an approach was not possible given the weak correlation between the instruments and
the variable to be instrumented.
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1.2 Structure
In the second chapter I will present a short overview of the literature on the European
Parliament and develop the theoretical framework and testable hypothesis. The third
chapter presents the data collection process and discusses several methodological choices
made, such as operationalization and the choice of model. The findings are presented
in the fourth chapter; the chapter is concluded by a discussion of model fit. In the
robustness chapter several other model specifications are presented and the shortcomings




In this chapter I develop the theoretical framework and derive a set of testable hypotheses.
The core argument is that the budgetary implications of bills have an implication for
the level of cohesion, yet these implications are contingent upon the presence of other
polarizing factors before the final vote. The mere presence of budgetary implications is
likely to reduce legislative unity. Nonetheless, Party Groups are likely to increase the
level of pressure on legislators when,for example the party of the rapporteur is split or is
going to defect on that set legislators. In these cases the effects of budgetary implications
are alleviated.
2.1 European Integration and national interests
The European Parliament is part of a complex network of institutions. When looking
at the main theoretical approaches that aim to explain the formation and perpetuation
of the European Union, such as neofunctionalism (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000), inter-
governmentalism, or neointergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1998) there is some ground to
expect that monetary gains, or concerns will affect the payoff and implicitly the behaviour
of legislators. For example, Moravcsik’s neo-intergovernmentalist approach highlights the
importance of member state’s interests in the bargaining process (Moravcsik 1998).
At a first glance this appears to apply less to the European Parliament given it’s weak
connection to the electorate (Carey 2007) and the rarity of national party defections
(Nordkvelle 2012). Nonetheless, the loyalty of MEPs is split, on the one hand they are
accountable to their national parties, which insure re-election, while on the other to their
European Party groups. It has been shown that national interests also play a role, espe-
cially in high profile cases (Hix, Noury and Roland 2006, Hix and Noury 2009), therefore
it can be argued that legislators are also interested in what their constituencies will gain
or loose after a legislation is implemented. This is further discussed in Section 2.2. Fenno
(1978) proposes that legislators will aim to satisfy the desires of their constituency in
order to insure their other goals. Even if Fenno’s (1978) theory was proposed for the US
8
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Congress there are limited reasons to doubt its applicability to the European Parliament,
as discussed in Section 2.3. One implication is that legislators are more willing to reject
proposals that are detrimental to their national constituencies. This is further discussed
in Section 2.3.
Furthermore, the importance of economic gains is given some attention in the neo-
insitutionalist approach (Schneider and Cederman 1994, Hug and Ko¨nig 2002). In simple
terms, the neo-insitutionalist approach highlights that intergovernmental negotiations are
a matter of who wins and who looses. This can be extrapolated to legislative politics as
well. (Bailer 2004), and Selck and Steunenberg (2004) highlight this. Bailer (2004) focuses
on the Council of Ministers and investigates how factors such as votes, economic strength,
position on policy area and agenda setting lead to success in bargaining situations. Her
findings highlight that exogenous factors, such as resources of power and number of votes
do not always bring about bargaining success, while patient negotiations seem to be more
important Bailer (2004). Her focus does not lie on the intrinsic characteristic of the bills,
but on the characteristics of those who vote. By focusing on the intrinsic characteristics of
a bill, namely its budgetary implications, this thesis hopes to make a minor contribution
to the existing literature.
The aim of this thesis is to investigate how legislative unity is affected by the structural
characteristics of a bill controlled for other exogenous factors such as party of rapporteur
and her seniority. Arguably, a natural starting point for the theoretical framework of
this thesis are several contributions contributions addressing the factors that impact the
behaviour of legislators (Hillman 1989, Peltzman 1984, Grossman and Helpman 1996,
Stigler 1971). Peltzman (1984), for example, shows empirically that in many cases eco-
nomic interests are masked by ideological variables. Peltzman (1984) mainly focused on
congressional voting, furthermore, given the similarities between the congressional voting
and the European Parliament it might be argued that his main finding can be translated
to the setting of the European Parliament. In the US Congress it has been shown that
economic interests are important determinants of the voting behaviour (Magee, Brock
and Young 1989).
Extrapolating theoretical expectations has some inherent advantages, first it allows
one to get more substantial insight in one area. Secondly, it has a methodological ad-
vantage, it allows one to make a contribution to the existing literature by employing at
least part of a design “designed for some purpose in one literature could be applied in
another literature to solve an existing but apparently unrelated problem” (King, Keohane
and Verba 1994: 17). Given that similar approaches have been employed in the Coun-
cil (Bailer, Mattila and Schneider 2010, Aksoy 2010, Kandogan 2000, Carrubba 1997) it
might be more interesting to investigate how re-distributive legislation with budgetary
implication affects legislative unity. Before proceeding to developing this framework, I will
draw upon several literatures aimed at explaining legislative cohesion and the behaviour
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of legislators in the plenary.
2.2 Understanding the European Parliament today
The European Parliament has become an important decision maker within the European
Union. Its powers have been further increased by the adoption and ratification of the
Lisbon treaty. It can be argued that the European Parliament is almost as powerful
as the Council in all policy areas. The changes in the rules of procedure did not only
strengthen the main political groups (Kreppel 2002), but also aimed at making the EP
a stronger actor in relation to the other institutions (Hix and Høyland 2013: 3), while at
the same time it gained budgetary power. In this context it becomes even more important
to understand the dynamics of the European Parliament.
During the current session there were 1201 individual cases voted upon and 1093
of these cases were passed, while only 103 bills failed. This is a small indication that
the European Parliament has become more cohesive.1 Hix, Noury and Roland (2005)
show that there is increased cohesion within the European Parliament, despite that the
European Party Groups (EPGs) and the national ones have become more ideologically
diverse. The level of cohesion within the institution is well documented. It has been
shown numerous times that the main dimension of conflict in the European Parliament
is the ideological one (Hix 2004, Hix, Noury and Roland 2005; 2006, Hix and Høyland
2013).
Legislators are conceptualized as agents of two principals, as they have to respond to
both the demands of the European Party Groups and to those of the national parties
(Hix 2002). Transnational party groups are formed based on policy interests (Kreppel
and Tsebelis 1999, McElroy and Benoit 2012). An individual level of explanation for the
existence of transnational parties is given by Hix and Noury (2009). They posit that
division of labour combined with sharing of information are the main reasons why MEPs
with similar preferences choose to organize themselves in European Party Groups (Hix,
Noury and Roland 2007).
Following the rational presented above it is implicit that almost all national parties
have strong incentives to join EPGs. A similar approach is also presented by Hix and
Høyland (2011: Chapter 3). National parties on their own have almost no chances of
securing office or their policy goals unless they join European Party Groups (Hix and
Høyland 2011: 54). For example in 2010 there were only 3.1% of the legislators that were
Non-affiliated (McElroy and Benoit 2012: 154). Thus, it can be argued that individual
national parties have little, or no influence on their own within the European Parliament.
Yet, this does not imply that national parties are unable to influence their representatives.
One potential implications is that the effects of national and transnational parties
1This paper focuses only on final votes. The final date of the coding is 2013-03-14.
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are different on legislators, as they can have different leverage (Lindberg, Rasmussen and
Warntjen 2008: 1109). Conventionally, legislators in the European Parliament have been
conceptualized as agents of two principals. It has been shown that MEPs are to respond
to the demands of the national parties, which insure their re-election, while at the same
time they try to accommodate the preferences of the European Party Groups (Hix 2002;
2004). Unlike national parties, transnational ones do not have the incentive to establish
strong brand names and maintain these (Lindberg, Rasmussen and Warntjen 2008: 1113).
Transnational party groups have strong incentives to form a centralized leadership
which monitors the compliance of legislators and sanctions them accordingly (Lindberg,
Rasmussen and Warntjen 2008: 1113), much like national parties. Furthermore, there is
a consensus in the field that national interest are mainly present high-profile cases (Hix
and Noury 2009).
Recently, it has been shown that European legislators are mainly influenced by their
European Party Groups (Mu¨hlbo¨ck 2012). Following the recommendations set out by
Lindberg, Rasmussen and Warntjen (2008), Mu¨hlbo¨ck (2012: 7) finds that there is a
culture of consensus between the institutions and that transnational groups play a strong
role. She highlights that in a very large majority of the cases national parties do not
play a role, as they cannot afford to care (Mu¨hlbo¨ck 2012). A weakness of the study
is that it is solely based on the final stage of the decision making. Therefore, it cannot
be concluded that national parties do not have an influence during the decision making
process, for example at the committee stage. Yet, it can be argued that as they cannot
afford to care about final votes, it is doubtful that they have the resources needed to
invest in the decision making process.
McElroy and Benoit (2012: 152) argue that the European level party system is rela-
tively fluid, as national parties switch their European level affiliation, while at the same
time some several transnational parties cease to exist, while others are established (McEl-
roy and Benoit 2012). For example when focusing on the party groups elected in the Eu-
ropean Parliament in 2009, one notices that two new political groups were formed2 after
the dissolution of the Union for a Europe of the Nations (UEN) group, which was formed
in 1994, but was not reassembled after 2009 (McElroy and Benoit 2012: 153-154). At the
same time, the composition of the European Parliament in terms of national groups has
also changed. Seventy national parties gained seats in the European Parliament, while 50
national groups that were represented in the 6th legislature failed to secure representation
in the current term (McElroy and Benoit 2012: 153-154).
To a certain extent this makes the picture even more complex. There is a mutually de-
pendent relationship between national parties and European Party Groups. This implies
that agreement has to be reached between the national and transnational organizations
in order to insure a recursive and long-lasting collaboration. There is strong evidence
2Europe of Freedom and Democracy group, and European Conservatives and Reformists group
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that the main transnational groups have become strong and cohesive, if not collusive,
over time (Hix, Noury and Roland 2007, Raunio 1997, McElroy and Benoit 2012). Given
these opposing forces at work, it is necessary to establish a high level of cohesion in the
plenary. Parties need to act in a cohesive manner in order to maximize their influence
in the legislative decision making process (Cox and McCubbins 2007). It can be argued
that to a certain extent national parties have become less important in the European
Parliament.
At the same time, the internal structure of the parties has developed to a great extent
in the latter years. One such important development is the assignation of members to
committees. Jacobs, Corbett and Shackleton (1990: 348) propose that the position of the
EP is both formed and negotiated at the committee level. Yordanova (2009) argues that
the committees face a large degree of both internal and external pressure. This provides
a possible explanation for the observed level of cohesion. Shifting negotiations to the
committee level provides an opportunity to reach a grand coalition before the plenary.
2.2.1 Negotiations at the committee level
There are several reasons why it is desirable to shift negotiations at the committee level.
First, the committees have their own resource structure and the members are specialized
in their respective area. This is highly advantageous for the parties as they will gain
more inside knowledge. A side effect of this is that the position the EP will be strength-
ened during the negotiation process with the Council and Commission, as the EP will
have an informational advantage (Raunio 1997, Mamadouh and Raunio 2003). Further-
more, Neuhold (2001) proposes that committees also serve as a means of a developing
a majority in the EP on an issue-by-issue basis. Yordanova (2009: 254) adds that the
“committee system also provides an arena for developing strong cohesive position among
party groups”.
In a context where it seems that a large part of the focus European Party Groups
lies upon maintaining and enforcing discipline (Carrubba, Gabel, Murrah, Clough, Mont-
gomery and Schambach 2006, Carrubba 1997, Carrubba, Gabel and Hug 2008, Hug 2003)
it remains slightly puzzling why strong parties would shift a part of their decision making
capabilities to individual legislators. Arguably, at least in part the answer to this ques-
tion is a matter of scarcity of resources. It is doubtful that the transnational parties have
enough resources to follow the entire decision making process in the legislative. Transna-
tional parties are formed based on policy preferences. Therefore, it is safe to assume that
the members of the party will have similar preferences to the central leadership. This is
seen by looking at the high rates of voting cohesion in the current European Parliament.
The cohesion rates are displayed in the Figure 2.1. We see that the only group with a
cohesion rate below 50% is EFD, while all the other groups have a cohesion of over 80%.
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Figure 2.1: Aggregate voting cohesion per European Party Group. Source: votewatch.eu
In order for such cohesion rates to be attained and maintained, a intermediary step
between the reviewing the proposal from the Commission and plenary voting is needed.
The Committee stage provides this intermediary step. I argue that parties prefer to
invest resources in a beneficial committee assignment on their behalf, in order to insure
a cohesive position of the party in the plenary. This argument is in line with Raunio
(1997) and Neuhold (2001). European Party Groups assign members to the committees
in a way in which they can maximize their gains. For the purpose of this thesis the
way in which members are assigned to committee is not important. Several authors such
as Yordanova (2009), Bowler and Farrell (1995), McElroy (2006; 2008) and Whitaker
(2005; 2001) have explored the factors that lead to committee assignments. However,
the aspect of relevance is that transnational party groups incur a certain costs when
appointing members to committees and that EPGs have an incentive to assign members
to committees.
Cox and McCubbins (1993) provided evidence for the US Congress that parties are
able to enforce discipline through the institutions of legislative in itself. Hix, Noury and
Roland (2007) argue that there are similar mechanisms that influence the behaviour of
parties in the European Parliament. Theoretical models of party discipline are relatively
common in the literature (Carrubba et al. 2006, Carrubba 1997, Carrubba, Gabel and
Hug 2008, Hug 2003).3 If parties did not care about committee assignment they will suffer
considerably higher costs and increased uncertainty at the plenary level. Therefore, there
are few reasons to believe that higher costs and a high level of uncertainty in coalition
formation is desired by the rational EPG leadership. These costs could be seen as political
transaction costs.
The transaction costs at the plenary level are composed of the two same elements as
discussed by Furubotn and Richter (1997: 47-48). Their content is different since we are
referring to political parties and not national states, yet the rationale remains unaltered.
First, there are the costs of setting up and maintaining the political organization of
the system. These costs encompass the formal negotiations, the ability of the party
to impose its own view and the costs of withstanding external pressure. The external
3Although some contributions contents the party’s disciplining power, for example Mu¨hlbo¨ck (2012)
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pressure can either come from national states, other European level institutions or from
interest groups. Secondly, there are the costs of running a polity (Furubotn and Richter
1997: 47-48). Here, we aim to capture both the costs linked to internal organization (such
as committee or rapporteurship appointment), the costs of maintaining and imposing a
cohesive polity line and the costs associated with monitoring and enforcing the agreed
policy line.
European Party groups have to balance out these two types of costs. It is widely
accepted that transnational parties in the European Union have few resources. Therefore,
in order to maximize their influence in the legislative arena parties have to carefully choose
their battles, in other words, carefully assess their costs versus their benefits. The costs of
internal organization and monitoring and enforcing behaviour come at two levels. First at
the macro-level of inter-institutional bargaining and secondly when parties address their
internal organization.
One highly efficient way of reducing the costs, while at the same time increasing
the efficiency of legislative negotiations is to shift the inter-institutional organizational
costs, to the intra-party level. If transnational parties were not to shift the core of the
negotiations to the committee level they would suffer the same costs twice. Therefore, it
is rational for parties to shift negotiations at the committee level as it maximizes their
utility while at the same time it minimizes the costs. Firstly, when they appoint members
to the committees and yet again when they would incur the same costs at the plenary
level. Therefore, by shifting the real bulk of debate and negotiations at the committee
level parties can more effectively allocate their resources.
Albeit strong theoretical reasons to expect committees to be the optimal solution to
the negotiation problem in the context of MEPs with split loyalty, committees are not
always the best way to represent the view of the entire European Parliament. In the
words of the former vice-president of Party of European Socialists as quoted by (McElroy
2006: 13):
Committees are definitely and regrettably not representative of the Parliament
in plenary, they are not microcosms; this results in legislative distortion. The
environmentally minded from all groups are on the Environment committee,
giving it a distinctly green outlook; likewise there are too many farmers on
Agriculture. The result of this specialization and lack of representativeness
is that policy is not reflective of the majority view of the Parliament and we
frequently have to spend hours in Parliament voting to correct the committee
report and proposed legislation. (Personal interview)
consequently, even if committees are for many motives optimal for insuring a cohesive
position in the plenary the also present some drawbacks, as illustrated above.
In conclusion, it seems that successful negotiations in the committee stage lie at the
heart of insuring a cohesive position in the plenary. Consequently , it can be proposed that
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in cases where these negotiations fail, or are burdened with disagreements, that European
Party groups, unable to rely on their alliance partner, will use the party pressure in order
to insure that at least their MEPs will act in a cohesive manner and not defect from
the party line. This is further explored in Section 2.3. Nonetheless, even if negotiations
at the committee level are likely to impact the level of agreement within the European
Parliament, there are also other factors that affect the legislator’s behaviour in the plenary.
This is further discussed in the next section.
2.2.2 Voting in the European Parliament
Carey (2007) proposes that legislative unity is mainly driven by the following three factors:
similar preferences, discipline and agenda control. At the same time, it can be argued
that within party cohesion is mainly driven by the division-of-labour (Carey 2007) and
the costs of collecting information (Hix and Noury 2009).
The literature aiming at explaining the existing cleavages and party cohesion in the
European Parliament has been on the ideological dimension (Hix, Noury and Roland 2007,
Hix and Noury 2009, McElroy and Benoit 2012; 2007). Many of these studies aimed at
investigating the dimensionality of the policy space. Some studies have used the available
roll call data and employed spatial models and thereafter regressed the dimensions of
conflict (Hix and Noury 2009, Hix, Noury and Roland 2005, Hix and Høyland 2013).
Despite its inherent advantages, this approach has received some criticism (e.g. Mu¨hlbo¨ck
and Yordanova 2012). Others have looked at ideological party positioning by employing
expert surveys (McElroy and Benoit 2012; 2007).
These studies show that there is overall one dominating dimension of voting in the
European Parliament, namely the traditional left and right, while at the same time some
variation in voting explained by another pro- / anti-integration dimension (Hix, Noury
and Roland 2007). One of the weaknesses of spatial models of legislative voting (Poole
2005) is given by the lack of control variables in the analysis - the algorithms aim to
maximize the correct number of classifications given the specifications of the model.4
Secondly, the content of the dimensions needs to be inferred post-hoc (Hix, Noury and
Roland 2006: 495). Even, with these minor caveats the results have proven to be very
robust (Hix and Høyland 2013). This finding is also supported by studies employing a
different method - namely expert coding. The series of paper by McElroy and Benoit
(2007; 2012) also reach a similar conclusion. McElroy and Benoit (2012) show that
European Party Groups occupy the entire left-right political spectrum. Furthermore,
they add that national parties are relatively cohesive in terms of their placement as well.
This leads one to expect that most of the variations in legislative unity are explained by
ideological factors.
Arguably, a high level of cohesion has been a scope in itself. For example, Hix and
4This is further discussed by (Poole 2005)
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Noury (2009) show that the high level of cohesion that is observed in the European
Parliament implies, at least to a certain extent, that the EP has started to resemble
national parliaments. Furthermore, the extensive literature on the European Parliament
has also given us increased understanding the balance of power between institutions,
especially when it comes to the need for cohesion as a way for the traditionally relatively
weak and new European Parliament to impose itself.
When it comes to explaining the Parliament’s interaction with the Council and Com-
mission one of the main focuses of the research has been on procedural differences
(Crombez 1996; 1997; 2000, Tsebelis 1994, Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). This approach
has offered important insights on how the European Parliament functions. It has ex-
plained the relative power of EPGs and has aided research aimed at understanding the
dimensionality of this institution. Nonetheless, in the post-Lisbon setting, co-decision II
became the ordinary legislative procedure. This implies that the power of the European
Parliament has increased considerably. Another implication for the theoretical advances
in the field is that procedural aspects have become so sparse, that analyzing them in the
present setting is unlikely to provide us with new insights.
Before proceeding to a discussion of other potential factors affecting voting I will
draw upon some of the main finding from the literature focusing on ideology. Given the
increased powers of the EP, and despite the high level of agreement, defections are rare,
yet they still occur. Hix, Noury and Roland (2006) use nominate scaling methods as
a proxy for ideology, in order to estimate the number of dimensions that exist in the
European Parliament. They find that the main dimension of politics in the European
Parliament is the traditional left and right dimension (Hix, Noury and Roland 2006).
The evidence of the existence of a second dimension is relatively weak and has declined
in importance over time (Hix, Noury and Roland 2006: 507). Hix and Noury (2009)
conducted a similar study after the 2004 round of expansion, when ten new member
states were added and reached similar conclusions.
The findings from Hix and Noury (2009) largely support those from Hix, Noury and
Roland (2006). How can the EP be conceptualized? The European Parliament is much
like any normal legislature and is to be conceptualized in a low dimensional policy space.
The levels of party cohesion remained relatively stable when compared to those from the
Fifth European Parliament and ideological distance remained the most important predic-
tor of voting behaviour, even if nationality played a role in the case of the controversial
Services Directive (Hix and Noury 2009). This provides strong evidence that the most
important dimension of ideology is the left and right ideological battle, as highlighted by
(Hix and Høyland 2013).
The study conducted by Hix and Noury (2009) shows that the voting behaviour of
MEPs was not affected by the size-effect created by the pure increase in the number of
legislators, nor by a composition effect, created by the socio-economic differences between
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the old and new members. Overall, new MEPs from the 10 new members states behaved
slightly different from the remainder, however these differences are more visible in the
case of highly salient directives Hix and Noury (2009).
There is one puzzle that still needs to be addressed: are there only ideological differ-
ences that drive defections? Is the observed level of cohesion an artifact of strong party
leadership that mastered rapporteur appointment and that have shifted negotiations to
the committee level in order to insure cohesiveness in the plenary? The European Parlia-
ment is a heterogeneous organization with a hierarchical structure. Therefore, the nature
of the cases there is bound to spark a higher polarization in some cases compared to oth-
ers. Especially in situations, where it is against the legislator’s own interests to present a
unified front that will accept a proposal that will be either against her ideological position,
or the desires of her constituency.
This thesis sets out to provide one possible explanation for cases where there is in-
creased polarization at the EP level and an alternative mechanisms for why individual
defections occur in some cases. Aside procedural differences other structural character-
istics of the bills discussed have been largely ignored by the literature in the case of the
European Parliament. New research (Bailer, Mattila and Schneider 2010) on the Council
highlights the importance of economic factors with regards to the level of polarization or
cohesion. More specifically, I am to investigate whether bills with budgetary implications
alter the level of cohesion within the European Parliament given the existing precondi-
tions. In the next section I will use theory developed for the Council and derive several
testable predictions.
2.3 Cohesion for free?
Overall, research on the legislative bodies of the European Union has ignored the struc-
tural and re-distributive implications of legislation. If Lasswell (1950) famous dictum
“politics is who gets what, when, where and how” is still of interest, it can be argued
that there is a re-distributive interests affect the conflict dimension in the European Par-
liament. To the best of my knowledge there are no studies investigating how budgetary
implications affect legislative cohesion in the European Parliament. This stands in stark
contrast to how such approaches have been recently employed on the Council (Bailer,
Mattila and Schneider 2010, Aksoy 2010, Kandogan 2000, Carrubba 1997). Given the
increase in importance and power of the European Parliament, extrapolation of this ap-
proach to EP may give us new insights in the dimensions of conflict that govern this
complex institution.
The aim of this thesis is to investigate how legislative unity is affected by the structural
characteristics of a bill controlled for other exogenous factors such as party of rapporteur
and his/her seniority. From a substantial point of view the most relevant case for such
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an analysis is the 7th European Parliament. The current EP is constituted after the
ratification of the Lisbon treaty, which increased the power of the Parliament, secondly
the co-decision became the ordinary legislative procedure and the EP gained for the first
time some budgetary power (Hix and Høyland 2011). These factors are likely to better
highlight the theoretical mechanisms proposed below.
Arguably, a natural starting point for the theoretical framework of this thesis are
the contributions of Hillman (1989), Peltzman (1984), Grossman and Helpman (1996)
and Stigler (1971). Peltzman (1984), for example, shows empirically that in many cases
economic interests are masked by ideological variables. The article is solely focused on
congressional voting, nevertheless, given the similarities between the congressional voting
and the European Parliament it might be argued that his main finding can be translated to
the setting of the European Parliament. The US Congress literature seems to agree that
economic interests are important determinants of the voting behaviour (Magee, Brock
and Young 1989).
A more general theoretical framework is proposed by Grossman and Helpman (1996)
who investigate how special interest groups affect the platforms of the respective candi-
dates. They show that parties are willing, at least to a certain extent to give into the
demands of the special interest groups (Grossman and Helpman 1996). They further
show that parties aim at maximizing the sum of aggregate benefits between informed
votes and those of the special interest groups. Even if, the theoretical approach is rela-
tively far away from looking at the individual reasons for defections, it gives a hint that
economic gains actually matter in the legislator’s, and to some extent party’s preferences.
In the context of the European Union, Bailer, Mattila and Schneider (2010) argue that
interest groups are also influential in the distribution of the European Union budget.
This highlights that defections based on economic concerns are not necessarily linked to
national interests. There are many possible explanations for why legislators are more
willing to act in a less cohesive manner on bills that have budgetary implications than
otherwise. Nonetheless, given the limited scope of this thesis the main aim is to establish
whether such interests are actually a polarizing factor within the European Parliament,
especially in relationship with national states.
The above gives some evidence that at least from a theoretical standpoint the economic
implications of legislative proposals are important for the legislator’s incentive to support
or not support a bill. We are forced to depart slightly from the framework used in the
case of the Congress, or settings where governments or national states are represented.
The European Parliament encompasses individual members from every member state.
Therefore, theoretically we can differentiate between two motivations for caring about
budgetary implications: national gains to their own constituency and gains to supporters
of the European Party group.
In the case of the Council it has been shown that the redistributive dimension has
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gained more importance (Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins 2005). Another interesting
mechanism that came forth in the case of the Council was that losers were not likely to
remain quiet (Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins 2005). While the link between Council
members and their constituencies is clear, this link is, however, more blurred in the case of
the European Parliament. Drawing on the literature of democratic deficit (Føllesdal and
Hix 2006, Crombez 2003, Majone 1998), one notices that the weak connection between
the electorate and the European Parliament is frequently mentioned. Why should such
mechanism apply to the EP when the link between electorate and MEPs is frail and at
the same time legislators are organized in transnational party groups?
One answer to this question comes from the literature on the US Congress. Fenno
(1978) aims at answering how legislators are influenced in their decisions by their home
constituencies. He proposes that legislators have three main goals, re-election, maximiza-
tion of power while in service, and good public policy Fenno (1978). These goals are
very similar to how MEPs have been conceptualized so far. Despite the frail electoral
connection, there are strong reasons to believe that legislators, also within the European
Parliament, care about their national constituencies, as they are the ones that insure
re-election. Fenno’s (1987) argument that legislators will employ a “home style”, while
they cultivate trust in their respective constituencies. Given the similarities between
the European Parliament and national parliament, more general legislative theory is also
supportive of this argument. For example Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) argue
that districts are highly important in the allocation of political pie, especially in regards
to economic benefits and taxation. Therefore, as long as re-election within the European
Parliament, or a the continuation of a political career is a goal for legislators they will
have strong incentives to account for the interests of their “home constituencies”.
Granted that legislators are interested in constituency interests, it is only natural
that they will aim at insuring that benefits will be distributed towards the constituency,
while at the same time will try to avoid that detrimental economic measures will affect
these. These “sources of bias” in legislation are further discussed by Weingast, Shepsle
and Johnsen (1981) and to a certain extent by Shepsle (1979). Yet, in certain cases
legislators might be willing to accept short-term costs for their constituency in favour or
long term benefits, or for other reasons, such as maximizing individual utility be willing
to internalize these costs. While in other cases, given that the EP is trans-national these
costs might be so spread that the losses will be difficult to identify. Furthermore, there
is a high degree of cohesion within the European Parliament and there are relatively
few defections (Hix and Høyland 2011; 2013, Nordkvelle 2012). The juxtaposition of
these factors with a normative desire of good policy implies that whether a bill has not
a budgetary implication is in general irrelevant for its passage.
Another reason for why this might be the case is simply the multitude of factors af-
fecting the legislator’s voting decision at the moment of the vote. Budgetary implications
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are not the only reason legislators vote the way they do. They are merely a factor that
is likely to affect their decision one way or the other. It can be argued that the failure or
rejection of a bill is dependent on the aggregate interest legislators have for such a bill,
not on whether it alters the legislative status quo. If group X desires bill Y, and she is
able to get support from groups A, B, C, those groups will per definition support that bill
regardless of the costs. If groups A, B, and C would have not desired that bill they would
have not agreed to support it in the first place. Therefore the first testable implications
is:
Hypothesis 1. Budgetary implications do not affect the probability of a bill being passed
or failed.
One example of a case with budgetary implication which was desired by a considerable
number of legislators and parties is “Mechanism for monitoring and reporting greenhouse
gas emissions and other information relevant to climate change”5. Most of the costs of this
legislation were initially covered by the existing framework within the European Union
(European Commission 2011b), hence new budget lines were not requested. In this case
93% of the legislators voted for the proposal and the winning coalitions was formed by all
parties with the exception of EFD. Another similar legislation is “Accounting rules and
action plans on greenhouse gas emissions and removals resulting from activities related to
land use”6. Consequently, when legislators endorse the costs of a legislation, and the type
of case does not have a strong ideological dimension, the effect of budgetary implications
will be minimal.
Even if legislation is not likely to impact the failure or passage of a bill, it is likely
to affect legislative unity. It can be argued that in cases of legislation which either will
affect specific national countries, or regions, or that will affect a specific sector legislative
unity is likely to be reduced. One example of the latter is the “Common fisheries policy”7,
where only 502 legislators voted for while 137 voted against. This polarization is likely
to be visible also in the case of resolutions, that in time will potentially affect either the
budget of the European Union, or of individual member states, such as: “Decision on the
opening of, and mandate for, inter-institutional negotiations on common organisation of
the markets in agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation)”. It can be distinguished
between two mechanisms that affect the legislator’s decision, on the one side national
party pressure, while on the other and perhaps most importantly the desire to represent
the national constituency’s needs. These mere examples seem supportive of the arguments
presented above, nonetheless, empirical tests of this are employed in Section 4.4.
Even if budgetary implications are unlikely to determine the chances of passage or
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negative impact on legislative unity. If it is assumed that losers are willing to use their
voice, in other words vote against a proposal that has detrimental budgetary implications
for their constituency, party or that supports something they are ideologically against, it
is better to look at overall legislative unity.
Hix and Høyland (2013) show that an overwhelming majority the winning coalition
has been formed by five or more parties. This framework does not imply that legislation
with budgetary implications will be passed with fewer parties, even if that might be the
case, but it implies that individual defections and polarization are more likely. Hence,
under the assumption that the discontent will show their position, it is expected that
overall legislative unity will be lower.
As discussed in the previous sections the European Parliament has large incentives to
present an unified front in order maximize its influence in the legislative process. Some
studies have shown that defections from the party line are rare, yet it is interesting to
look at which factors might motivate defections when studying aggregate legislative unity.
Factors such as pressure from European Party Groups, or national parties might exercise
varying pressure upon legislators. Given the diverse factors that affect the legislator’s own
voting decision factors such as membership in one or another European Party Group, or
even the pressure of a national group become less important. Local constituencies are
smaller than both national parties which usually represent the country and European
Party Groups. Of course, group pressure might have a different impact on different legis-
lators, nevertheless, from a theoretical perspective this is not that relevant. As defections
will most likely take place when the interests of the constituency of the legislators are at
risk, as in these cases the legislator will be most interested in those that actually vote for
him (Fenno 1978).
Theoretically, it can be distinguished between two types of legislation, those bills
that are desired by a large majority of the legislators and do not spark conflict and
those cases where there is an a high level of internal polarization. The polarization can
either be on the necessity of the measures encompassed by the bill, the way in which
it alters the status-quo or the fact that it alters the existing consensus. In practice
quantifying this distinction is virtually impossible, as it is hard to trace the paternity
of a bill. Additionally, the level of polarization is dynamic. For example, a bill which
starts as relatively uncontroversial, for example ACTA, becomes controversial while it is
drafted and debated. At the other side of the spectrum, one can find bills which start
out as controversial, yet when the bill is parsed through the complex decision making
mechanisms within the European Union the bill ends up being relatively uncontroversial
by the time of the final vote.
Clarke and Primo (2007: 734-744) argue that theoretical models are to be conceptu-
alized as “maps” and that even if all aspects cannot be tested they are still to retain these
are they aid one in understanding the phenomenon. A dynamic measure of polarization
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within the European Parliament is very hard to attain and construct. Therefore, I choose
to employ a proxy for this. In this framework the most most important level of polar-
ization is the one a bill has right before its final vote. Consequently, the proxy employed
in this thesis to capture this latent concept is defection by the party of one of the rap-
porteurs. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, committee level negotiations are paramount for
legislative unity. Thus, in cases where there is a split within the party of the rapporteur,
or the party defects, the other parties are likely to use their available party pressure in
order to constrain the behaviour of legislators in the plenary.
Granted that the bulk of negotiations is shifted at the committee level, it can be
argued that in cases where bills have budgetary implications, it will be harder to get all
legislators to agree, and hence we will observe lower legislative unity. Additionally, when
budgetary implications are the only polarizing factors, and committee level negotiations
were successful, legislative unity will be lower in the plenary. In those cases the alliances
are already formed at the committee level and European Party Group have few incentives
to increase pressure on individual legislators. Therefore, the legislator that feels that the
proposal is detrimental for his home constituency will defect without incurring the risk
of losing the trust of his respective EPG, hence to a large extent he will continue to
maximize all of his three goals.
Hypothesis 2. Bills with budgetary implications are more likely to decease the overall
parliamentary cohesion in the absence of other polarizing factors.
Despite the high level of agreement within the European Parliament there might be
cases where negotiations at the committee level may stall, or be only partly successful.
For example, it has been shown that in general high-profile, salient cases tend to be
dominated by more mechanisms than normal bills (Hix, Noury and Roland 2005; 2007,
Hix and Høyland 2013). Alternatively, it can be argued that, regardless of the profile
of the case, negotiations at the committee level which are burdened with a large level of
disagreement. Such cases can be identified by mapping splits of the defection of the party
of one of the rapporteurs.
In such cases, party groups, will notice such defections. Party groups are strategic
actors that aim at getting their most desired policy through. In situations where they
know defection from another group is likely they are likely to increase pressure on leg-
islators in order to further their goal. Under the relatively not problematic assumption
that party groups will increase internal pressure on legislators when there is an unstable
coalition let us investigate how this would potentially affect the behaviour of legislators.
As long as legislators have three main goals that they aim to maximize, namely re-
election (e), power while in office (p), and good policy (g), they are bound to respond to
party pressure. Nonetheless, the response will be different for each legislator, depending
on her utility function. In this application the most interesting situation is when there is a
case which has a budgetary implication, and there is a split in the party of the rapporteur.
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As discussed above, if budgetary implications are detrimental for the home constituency
of the legislator she is most likely to defect in order to protect her home constituency, as
in there are few consequences. In other words, it is conceptualized that in the absence
of additional polarizing factors, e and p will remain constant, while e will decrease if the
legislator does not respect the desires of the home constituency.
Nonetheless, in the situation at hand, with increased party pressure, both e and p
are likely to be affected. Thus, legislators are faced with a dilemma, where they have
to choose between reduced e and reduced p. Yet, there is a weak connection between
the electorate and legislators (Hix and Høyland 2011, Scarrow 1997) , while, as discussed
above party groups have very strong incentives to monitor the behaviour of legislators.
Given this, I propose that legislators are more likely to follow the line of the European
Party Group, and not defect from the party line. This is likely to lead to increased
legislative unity when compared to cases where budgetary implications are present on
their own.
If European Party Groups will increase legislative pressure the legislators will experi-
ence higher costs if they choose to defect from the party line. One potential reason is that
European Party Groups might sanction frequent defectors, for example by granting them
less speaking time, or less favorable committee assignment. If such a sanction would be
in place the legislator’s second goal, of power maximization, would be potentially threat-
ened. Nonetheless, it remains unclear, which goal legislators value higher. Perhaps, the
answer to this question is highly dependent on the case analyzed and on the preferences
of the legislator at that point in time. For example, in cases where the national party is
preparing nominations for the next term, it might be the case that the legislator would
prefer to employ his/her home style and defect from the party line, despite sanctions, in
order to maximize the chances of re-election. This leads to a final testable implication:
Hypothesis 3. For cases with budgetary implications, and splits or defections on behalf
of the party of the rapporteur, legislative cohesion is likely to be higher.
One such example is “Fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for
in the EC-Denmark/Greenland Fisheries Partnership Agreement”8. In this case there
were clear national interests at stake, for example those of Denmark. Nonetheless, the
European Party Group Greens/EFA opposed this legislation, 574 legislators voted for
this legislative proposal. As discussed by the intergovernmentalist approach, national
interests can be important for legislators. (Moravcsik 1993: 482) proposes that interstate
negations are dependent on national state preference formation. European Party Groups
as strategic actors, will surely take this in their calculations and therefore increase pressure
in cases where such mechanisms are present. As anticipated above, in cases which have
both budgetary implications, and when the committee stage negotiations encountered
troubled waters European Party Groups are likely to put more pressure on legislators.
8case number: A7-0358/2012
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In the cases where there is a split between the party of the rapporteur, the impact
of budgetary implication may be of the opposite direction. This follows from the fact
that splits in the party group of the rapporteur are more easily detectable and may thus
induce EPGs to employ the available “whips” to discipline their MEPs. Furthermore, the
costs of defections for the legislators will in these cases be significantly higher as defection
may hamper the other goals that legislators have. Hence, the collocation of polarizing
factors is most likely to increase legislative unity. This is tested in Section 4.5.
2.4 Summary
By drawing upon several literatures this thesis proposes a new framework for assessing
cohesion in the European Parliament. In this chapter I have first reviewed the literature
assessing legislative behaviour in the European Parliament. So far, the literature (Hix
2002, Hix, Noury and Roland 2007, Hix and Noury 2009, McElroy and Benoit 2012)
has focused on the ideological determinants of voting in the European Parliament or
on procedural differences (Crombez 1997; 2000). Nonetheless, after the ratification of
the Lisbon treaty the powers of the European Parliament have increased considerably,
especially as now the Parliament has budgetary power (Hix and Høyland 2011). By
extrapolating recent findings in the Council (Bailer, Mattila and Schneider 2010) and
employing classical theoretical arguments developed originally for the US Congress (Fenno
1978, Cox and McCubbins 2007) I propose that the budgetary implications affect the
behaviour of legislators in final votes.
As legislators are mainly responsive to the demands of the European Party Groups
(Mu¨hlbo¨ck 2012), their behaviour is not only determined by the way in which they value
the concerns of their constituencies – versus their own gains while in term – but also
by party pressure as well. In order to capture this, I have argued that the initial level
of agreement before final votes, which can be seen by splits in the party of the rappor-
teur is likely to affect their payoffs. I have further proposed that legislators aiming at
avoiding sanctions will respect the desires of their party group in situations where they
add increased pressure and are more likely to defect in cases where party groups do not
mobilize. Consequently, the negative effect of budgetary implications is mitigated by in-
creased party pressure. The next chapter presents the data and research design employed
in order to test theoretical propositions.
Chapter 3
Data and Research Design
In the first part of this chapter, I will describe the data collection process and present
and overview of the variables included in the dataset. Thereafter, I present several issues
linked to coding before proceeding to discussion of coding one of the substantially impor-
tant variables. The discussion changes course to the operationalizations of the dependent
variable and the choice of model and is completed with a test of the linearity assumption.
3.1 Data collection
The focus on this thesis lies on the 7th European Parliament and it aims to investigate
the effect of budgetary implications of legislation on legislative unity. As the literature
has only marginally focused on how budgetary implications affect legislative cohesiveness
in the European Parliament, there is no available data on the budgetary implications
of bills. In order to be able to test the theoretical propositions quantitatively I have
collected data on the bills passed in the 7th European Parliament from the first sitting on
01.07.2009 to 14.03.2013. The adoption, and ratification of the Lisbon treaty increased
the powers of the EP. Firstly, the Parliament is now on equal footing with the Council,
as co-decision became the ordinary legislative procedure. Secondly, the Parliament has
gained increased budgetary power. Therefore, the European Parliament has now become a
stronger decision maker within the EU. Given the scope of this thesis it is the most relevant
to study the hypothesized relationship in the context of the 7th European Parliament.
As this is a novel dataset and the collection of this data is one small contribution made
to literature, it may be useful to go through the process of data collection and inherent
coding issues and decisions made while making the dataset in this section. The main
advantage of this dataset is that it consists of the entire population of cases available, has
very limited number of missing observations and spans over a relatively significant part
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of the current term.1 The dataset records several characteristics of interests in the frame
of this thesis, which are presented in Table 3.1 on page 28, the coding of the variables in
presented in section 3.2. The units of analysis are final votes.
King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 23-25) set out five main guidelines for data collection
in qualitative research. Given their generality they are highly relevant in this setting as
well. The data collection process has been carried out in accordance with the guidelines
of King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 23-25).
I have collected the information on a set of variables deemed to be important for the
entire population of cases from the 7th European Parliament. This implies that issues
of sample selection and sample bias become redundant as long as the aim is to make
inferences about the current sitting of the European Parliament. At the same time, this
satisfies the second criterion set out by King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 24).
Ideally, similar data should have been collected for the previous sittings of the Eu-
ropean Parliament. In that case one could have made more general inferences about
how budgetary implications affect legislative unity in situations where the parliament has
limited decision making power over the budget, compared to when it is one of the actors
that decides the budget. Given the relatively limited scope of this thesis I argue that the
population of cases voted upon in the European Parliament during the current sitting
(last date coded: 14.03.2013) will suffice for the purpose at hand. It has to be emphasized
that this is a first to test how budgetary implications affect legislative unity, which may
be extended by further research. The main scope of the analysis is to investigate whether
budgetary implications have an impact on legislative unity.
The next two guidelines are linked to validity and reliability. Validity refers to mea-
suring the actual concept that we aimed to measure, namely that we capture the latent
concept (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 25). Simply because of the nature of the vari-
ables, for example the result of a vote is either a pass or a fail, or if 200 voted for, there are
only 200 votes for. Of course one can question the indices used as dependent variables,
however, that is not a problem of data collection, but one of operationalization of latent
concept. Hence, such issues are discussed in section 3.3. As budgetary implications are
variable of substantial interest in this thesis, a further discussion of issues of validity and
reliability it taken in regard to the way budgetary implication was operationalized and
coded in practice.
Reliability encompasses that one is to employ the same procedure for every case coded
(King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 25). In order to insure the reliability of the dataset, I
have randomly chosen 25 cases and re-coded them. The results were the same. Even if
the method used to code each case was consistent, there is an inherent danger of typos,
such as writing 29 instead of 20. This danger is larger for the numeric variables. The 30
1The main source of missing is logical missing. The overwhelming majority of the 253 missing obser-
vations on the number of terms, presented in table 4.1 on page 43, are logical missing as those cases did
not have rapporteurs
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most influential observations presented in section 4.7.1 are not coding errors.
I have performed several tests to check for coding errors. The errors were identified
and corrected before the analysis of the data was started. The first test was to check if
the numbers of legislators that voted, did not vote and were absent corresponded to the
total number of MEPs. The number of MEPs fluctuated slightly during the set period, a
± 10 boundary was used on legislators. Secondly, I have aggregated abstentions per day
and double checked the cases where such errors were present. Even if these tests are not
perfect, they should at least to a certain extent increase the reliability of the data.
One of the main goals was to maintain the dataset replicable. This is also the last
criterion set out by King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 26). The data is collected from
various publicly available sources. Each source is both an open source, and to the extent
of my knowledge is regularly updated, facilitating both the replication of the dataset,
as well as tests of coding. The case number, and the number of terms served by a
rapporteur are taken from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/portal/en, while the names
of the rapporteurs and their respective parties are retried from http://parltrack.euwik
i.org/. Budgetary implications are coded from both of the above, while depending on the
availability of the documents from the official website of the Commission and European
Parliament. The remaining variables are coded based on the information available on
http://www.votewatch.eu/.
3.2 Data gathering process and coding
The dataset represents an effort to code all the resolutions and bills voted upon in the
current term of the European Parliament which lies at the heart of the analysis. In devel-
oping the framework I have explicitly focused on two aspects, the budgetary implication
and the way in which legislators voted. While there are several sources of acquiring the
bills voted upon in the current term2, the dataset collects information with other indica-
tors that in some cases are available from other sources, such as the number of votes, rate
of absenteeism, or the rapporteur for each case in order to facilitate empirical investiga-
tion. The ID-indicators of the data set are the case number (i.e. A7-0010/2009) and the
date of the vote are coded, alongside with the full name of the bill, these will also enable
merging with other datasets. A full overview of the variables is presented in Table 3.1 on
page 28.
The actual coding was done in a case-by-case manner. If the same case has been
voted upon twice, for example a first reading and then the document returned for a
second reading both cases are coded, on different dates. As long as two votes are taken
upon the same bill they will share the same case number. In cases where a split vote was
2For example votewatch.eu .
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requested on the final vote - the case will appear twice, the full name allows the user to
differentiate between the two, as it specifies which part of the document was voted upon.
Most of the other information coded is dependent on the case, therefore the variables
are coded per case, however there is one exception, namely the budgetary implication.
If a vote taken upon an entire bill which originally had a budgetary implications and a
split is proposed only for an amendment, which did not have a budgetary implication,
the first vote on the amendment will have no budgetary implication, the second vote on
the bill will have a budgetary implication and the final vote on the entire bill will also
have a budgetary implication. It has to be emphasized that this was a rare case, the total
number of rows affected by this coding decision is very small (≤ 3).
In order for the reader to get a sense of how the data was collected and coded I present
an overview of the variables, possible doing categories and a short description, in Table
3.1 on page 28. All the examples used are from the same case, hence show how a row
was coded. The example was chosen arbitrary. In this paragraph I will employ a different
example, in order to highlight the coding of the variables. Firstly, I coded variables that
aid one in identifying the case, such as the case number, for example A7-0329/2012 and
the full name of the document. One example is, “Tariff-rate quotas applying to exports
of wood from Russia to the EU - Draft legislative resolution : single vote - ordinary
legislative procedure, first reading”. Based on this, I have coded whether the case was
a legislation (coded 1), or a resolution (coded 0). Thereafter, I have coded the policy
area, which in this case is International trade. Next, the voting behaviour of legislators
was coded, how many voted yes, no, and abstain, as well as information about those who
were present but did not vote.
The budgetary implication was coded as 0 for cases that were encompassed by the
existing framework, and 1 for cases which alter the existing status-quo. This is further
discussed in the next section, Section 3.2.1. Finally, with the aid of information from vote
watch.eu, I have coded the European Party which formed the winning coalition. Lastly,
the names, and European Party Groups of the rapporteurs were coded. As mentioned, I
have coded the EPG to which the rapporteur belonged at the time of the vote.
As mentioned the variables are coded per case, therefore each new row in the dataset is
either a new case, a recurring case which was voted again, for example a second reading, or
in very few cases a split vote. It has to be emphasized that the overwhelming majority of
the cases were new cases. This allows one to explore the both the structural characteristics
of the case and the aggregated behaviour of legislators and to a certain extent of European
Party Groups at the moment of the voting.
Most of the concepts covered are self-explanatory and require a relatively low level
of abstraction. A standard code-book was not required for the data gathering process.
Variables such as the number of yes, no, abstentions, or the number of absent legislators
only required a transcription of the numbers to the data sheet. Yet, in order to maximize
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coherence in the data gathering process I developed strict coding rules for the variables
where a subjective decision was required. In the next section I will present a discussion
of the decision made while coding budgetary implications.
3.2.1 When do bills have budgetary implications?
A budgetary implication can be simply defined as: a bill has a budgetary implication when
its enforcement has an impact, either positive or negative impact on the budget. Never-
theless, under this definition any bill act would have a budgetary implication, as its mere
application, and enforcement entails at least certain administrative costs. Furthermore,
the European Union budget is designed as a framework, where the distribution of certain
resources is allocated from the start. This entails that all European Party Groups and
legislators are aware that certain sums will be spent on certain areas. It is outside the
scope of the thesis to discuss what mechanisms affect the distributive decisions around
budgetary allocation.
Do bills with financial implications which are restricted to the existing framework
actually have budgetary implications? This question is debatable. It can be argued that
these bills do not have in practice any budgetary implications, as they do not alter the
status quo. The conflicts between legislators and European Party groups are already
resolved at the time of the vote on the actual proposal. A bill which has financial impli-
cations which are already covered by the existing framework will not change the status
quo on the area. The main focus lies on legislative unity, and the interest lies on how
budgetary implications alter the voting behaviour of legislators. If a proposal is covered
by the framework, there are no theoretical grounds that it will alter the behaviour for
legislators as the status quo will remain unchanged.
From a theoretical perspective the interests lies on polarization within the legislative,
as discussed in Chapter 2. In order to capture the theoretical concepts the definition of a
budgetary implication used in this thesis is: A bill which either adds a positive contribution
or has a negative impact on the budget and which is not covered by an existing framework
or goes beyond it, in other words a bill which does change the existing budgetary status
quo. In other words, bills which alter the existing framework. Under the assumption
that every legislative act will have an impact on the budget, no matter how small - this
definition allows one to distinguish between two types of legislation. Those that will
trigger economic polarization within the legislative on the one side, and those bills that
only have regulatory outcomes, where economic concerns are largely redundant in final
votes.
How to differentiate between the two possible situations? In many respects this has
been the hardest variable to code. Nonetheless, the European Union’s commitment to
openness and the availability of internal documents have enabled the coding of this vari-
able. In order to code the budgetary implication, I have looked first at the published
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legislative report, thereafter at the committee draft report and in some cases at the doc-
uments attached to the procedure from the Official Journal. The published legislative
report proved to be a very good proxy for coding the budgetary implication.
During the coding process, I noticed that bills which had budgetary implications in the
Commission’s proposal retained them. Conversely, bills that started without budgetary
implication, seem to have remained without budgetary implication to the final vote.
Legislation with budgetary implications is required to have an addition set of documents
attached, even if such documents are not always available, the reports mention the their
presence.
In order to give the reader a better understanding of how the variables were coded and
where the information was retrieve from I will choose two arbitrary examples, one with-
out and one with budgetary implication. For example case A7-0223/2011 - Derivatives,
central counter-parties and trade repositories does not have a budgetary implication. By
looking at the published legislative proposal - COM(2010)0484 - it is noted in the section
Budgetary implication that “The proposal has no implication for the Union budget.” (Eu-
ropean Commission 2010). In the committee draft report there is no mention of budget, or
financial implications (PE456.945). Finally, when we look at the documents attached to
the procedure published in the Official Journal we see that there is no mention of financial
or budgetary implications of the legislation (OJ C126 2011: 9). Therefore, A7-0223/2011
was coded as not having a budgetary implication.
On the other hand let us shift focus to a bill with a budgetary implications. For exam-
ple, case A7-0218/2012 - European statistical program 2013-2017 which has a budgetary
implication. The published legislative proposal clearly states that the legislation has a
budgetary implication –
Total amount to be borne by the budget of the EU is 299.4 million EUR
(current prices) for the duration of the programmer from 2013 to 2017, of
which 57.3 million EUR is covered by the programming period 2007 to 2013
and 242.1 million EUR by the programming period 2014 to 2017. (European
Commission 2011c)
A similar statement is also made in the Committee Draft report (ECON, Committee
on Economic and Monetary Affairs 2012), thus budgetary implications that exceed the
allocated framework are in most cases easy to recognize. At the same time, it has to
be mentioned that a careful analysis of the above mentioned documents was required in
order to identify budgetary implications in certain cases.
In some cases the difference between bills with budgetary implications and those
without, or already covered by the budget is blurred. Generally, legislation which was fully
covered by the existing framework was simply stated not to have a budgetary implication,
or in other cases the Commission’s report only stated that the bill has a minor impact
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on the EU budget, without further details. As mentioned, in those cases, after a careful
analysis of the documents from the Commission and Committees was required, and by
following the definitions presented in this section a decision was made in each case.
Arguably, in the terms discussed by King, Keohane and Verba (1994) and Adcock
and Collier (2001) the concepts of reliability and validity of the measurements are largely
satisfied. Given the low degree of abstaction, the standard formatting of the documents
and their availability there were few hinders when going from a theoretical concept to
empirical observations.
3.3 Operationalization of legislative unity
In order to measure legislative unity, I choose to employ two indices used for measuring
party unity (Rice 1924, Hix, Noury and Roland 2005). The classical approach was devel-
oped by Rice (1924). The index is given by the absolute difference between Yes and No





The RICE index ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 is reached when an equal number of
legislators vote Yes and No, while 1 is reached when all vote either Yes or No. A vast
majority of the cases in the European Parliament are voted upon under the simple ma-
jority rule (Hix and Høyland 2011), where legislators have three voting options, namely:
Yes, No, Abstain. Unfortunately, the RICE index in its original form is ill-equipped to
deal with abstentions.
Nevertheless, abstentions in the EP have no impact on the outcome of the vote under
simple majority. Thus, ignoring abstentions is not per se substantially problematic. At
the same time, ignoring abstentions totally, implies the strengthening of the assumptions
that legislators are hard liners and will choose direct defection from the party line. At
the same time, a conventional approach has been to treat abstentions as no votes. For
example several empirical studies of ideology using nominate scores operate with this
assumption (Hix, Noury and Roland 2005; 2006; 2007, Hix and Noury 2009). One way
of understanding this in the context of the EP is to assume that the same mechanisms
that leads to no votes lead to abstentions. Hence, the index becomes:
RICEabs =
|Y es− (No+ Abstentions)|
Y es+ (No+ Abstentions)
(3.2)
In order to better highlight this, I present a hypothetical example. If 100 legislators
vote “Yes” and 10 “No”, while another 20 abstain from voting: RICE reports a relativly
high cohesion score of 0.81, while RICEabs reports a much lower score of only 0.53.
One implication of this difference is that RICE is likely to over-estimate legislative unity,
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while RICEabs is likely to under-estimate it. Therefore, using both indices as dependent
variables might prove a be useful and simple solution to avoiding and controlling for this
bias problem.
Adding an extra assumption on behaviour is not the optimal way of dealing with
abstentions. Another better approach would be to differentiate the group of legislators
that did not vote from those that votes “Yes” and those that voted “No”. A solution to
this problem is presented by Hix, Noury and Roland (2005: 215) initially to deal with
party group cohesion. However, legislative cohesion is just aggregated party cohesion,
therefore there should be no constraints in using the Agreement Index as a proxy for
overall legislative cohesiveness.





(Y +N + A)−max{Y,N,A}]
Y +N + A
(3.3)
The Agreement Index (AI) treats abstentions, labelled with A as a separate category.
Unlike, the RICE index the interest here lies on the largest group of votes against the
others. RICE and the Agreement Index are similar, thus in many respects the Agreement
Index can be conceptualized as a more generic version of RICE which is capable of dealing
with more than two categories. Treating abstentions as a different category affects the
final outcome. Using the same example from above we can illustrate how the results
change. The Agreement Index in this case is of 0.538. We see that AI score is very close
to the score on RICEabs when we account for abstentions, however it still remains much
lower than the original RICE score.
Even if, the Agreement Index can be seen as an improved version of RICE it still
fails to deal with one issue. It does not account for those that were present, but did not
vote. Arguably there are two ways of including them, either as a separate category, or
like in the case of RICE combine them with one of the existing categories. Those that
did not vote have absolutely no impact on the outcome of the vote, hence it is hard to
conceptualize them as a separate category. It can be further argued that the lack of a
vote from legislator cannot affect legislative unity.
A more natural way of treating those that did not vote might be to include them in the
abstention category. The reason for combining these categories is that from a theoretical
standpoint they have the same impact on legislative unity. They do not impact the
outcome of the vote, but are two categories that should be accounted for, at least in
empirical tests. In order to test how this impacts legislative cohesion I chose to include
them, this slightly alters the results and formula, becoming:
AD = Abstain+Did not vote (3.4)




(Y +N + AD)−max{Y,N,AD}]
Y +N + AD
(3.5)
Including them as a separate category will mathematically change the result only
when those that did not vote are the largest group. In the sample at hand this is seldom
the case. In order to have a basis for comparison I will slightly modify the example above,
by assuming that there were 20 more members that were present at that session but did
not vote. When those that did not vote are included we see that the AIn index decreases
to 0.33, from 0.58. This implies that dealing with those that did not vote can lead to
a problem of under-estimating legislative cohesion. Nevertheless, since the theoretical
reasons for excluding those that did not vote are weak I choose to run the empirical tests
on AIn as well.
3.4 What about ideology?
Most of the existing literature in the field has argued that ideology is the main predictor
of the voting behaviour of MEPs in the European Parliament, as discussed in Chapter
2. It has been shown by employing nominate models that the left-right dimension is the
main dimension of voting within the European Parliament (Hix and Noury 2009, Hix and
Høyland 2013) and that European Party Groups occupy the entire range of the left-right
spectrum (McElroy and Benoit 2012).
This thesis does not aim to investigate the importance of ideology for legislative unity
in the European Parliament. It focuses on how the budgetary implications of bills affect
legislative unity. Nonetheless, ideology, or party positions are important factors that one
should control for. There are several ways of doing this, nevertheless the structure of the
data employed in the empirical analysis and the length of the time series impeded me for
using better controls for ideology, such as nominate scores. An alternative operational-
ization would have been a measure of ideology similar to that developed by McElroy and
Benoit (2012). Nevertheless, data for such a measure on the current European Parliament
is not available. If the measure is not adjusted in a case by case manner it might lead
to misleading results. In this context I will employ an alternative solution to control for
party positions, namely party dummies for each of the parties in the winning coalition of
each case.
Let us take a closer look at the party system in the European Parliament. In 2003,
Hix, Kreppel and Noury (2003) concluded that the party system in the EP “has become
more consolidate and more competitive as the powers of the EP have increased”. Never-
theless, a lot has changed from 2003, the European Union had two rounds of enlargement
and in 2009 the Lisbon treaty was ratified increasing again the powers of the European
Parliament. In broad terms the party system has remained relatively unchanged, however
after the 2009 election new parties were formed, while others ceased to exist (McElroy
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and Benoit 2012), however there were not radical changes in the overall ideological posi-
tion of parties, only in the names of the European Party Groups. Secondly, parties have
increased in size, but the composition of the largest parties remained relatively stable.
Nonetheless, new national parties joined the European Parliament (further discussed in
McElroy and Benoit (2012)).
In the seventh European Parliament, the European People’s Party is the largest group
with 270 members, followed by S&D with 190 members and ALDE with 85.3 Even if these
three parties to a certain extent have divergent ideologies, their policy interests overlap
in many areas. If these three groups reach agreement on a certain vote the legislation will
pass with a majority in favour of at least ∼ 72%. A center left-coalition without ALDE
would mean a support of only ∼ 36%, while a center-right with ALDE would mean a
support of ∼ 47%. Therefore, if S&D and EPP have divergent preferences on an issue,
they will both battle for the support of ALDE. Nevertheless, it has been shown that in ∼
70% of the cases a coalition of either center-left, with EPP and ALDE or one of center-left
and EPP against ALDE is formed (Hix and Høyland 2013: 9). The initial reaction is to
conclude without further ado that the party system has become collusive and that there
is very little competition between the largest parties within the European Parliament.
One explanation for this type of behaviour is the ideological proximity of the two
largest parties (Hix, Raunio and Scully 1999, Hix 2001, Hix, Kreppel and Noury 2003,
Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999). The literature points out that EPP and S&D tended to
be clustered closer together on the pro/anti-integration dimension rather than on the
conventional left and right one. However, the integration issues have become less salient in
the past years. When looking at the voting patterns in the seventh European Parliament,
we notice that there are three areas where the left and the right tend to compete more
when compared to the remainder. There are two areas where a center-right coalition tends
to be more successful and there is competition between the left and right on Economic and
Monetary questions and in Employment and Social matters (Hix and Høyland 2013: 9).
The left seems more successful in Gender Equality and Environment and Public health
(Hix and Høyland 2013: 9). Both of these trends are a continuation of the pattern from
the sixth EP. As the European Parliament got increased power in the budgetary sector
we see that there is increased competition compared to the sixth EP between EPP and
S&D on that area.
There is little doubt that ideology is a very complex concept. As discussed in the
beginning of this section two of the most reliable measures of ideology cannot be used in
the application at hand due to data availability issues. Using party dummies is therefore
the next best alternative.
Even if, this operationalization comes with several caveats, it is the best alternative to
control for party positions, given the nature of the data. It captures how party alliances
3There a some small variations as MEPs sometimes change affiliation during the term
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vary from case to case. Given that the position of parties is only secondary to this analysis
the models which control for ideology are presented in the Chapter 5 of the thesis.
3.5 Choice of model
The dependent variable in this case is the overall unity of legislators in the European
Parliament. This is a latent concept that is operationalized in several distinct ways, as
discussed above, in Section 3.3. In accordance with the definition from Greene (2003:
896) the dependent variable is censored. Censoring implies that the researcher is able to
observe the independent variables for the entire sample, but she is not able to observe
the full spectrum of the dependent variable (Long 1997: 187). In other words, censored
observations occur when “some observations on the dependent variable, corresponding
to the known values of the independent variable(s) are not observable” (Kennedy 2011:
262).
Kennedy (2011: 264) illustrates that omitting or not accounting for limit observations
creates bias. In order to avoid such problems, Kennedy (2011: 264) proposes to include
the limit observations via maximum likelihood. This means that in the case of censored
variables the parameter estimates from simple OLS regressions are likely to be biased
(Henningsen 2010: 1). If we were to fail to account for censoring we could have estimated
an OLS, the problem would have been that censored observations would pull down the
line, and hence cause an underestimated intercept while at the same time it would over-
estimate the slope (Long 1997: 189). James Tobin proposed a way to deal with this in
his 1958 study of household expenditures (Tobin 1958).
Why not an OLS? At a first glance the model seems to require the basic requirements
for an OLS model. The dependent variable must be continuous. If this is not the case.
An OLS-model will return inconsistent estimates for the data (Wooldridge 2002: 524). If
we are to restrict the sample to the observations of yi > 0, in other words looking only
at the data on the uncensored observations, we are going to create omitted variable bias.
Tobit or a probit estimation? These two models employ the same structural model,
however there are some differences between the two. In a Tobit model it is assumed that
we know the value of the latent dependent variable y* when y* > 0, however in a probit
model it as assumed that the researcher knows only if y* > 0 (Long 1997, Greene 2003).
Greene (2003: 776) further points out that the results from the probit model can be
derived by 1
σtobit
(βtobit). It should be emphasized that this holds only if the tobit model
is correct. Therefore, it can be argued that using a tobit model is a more efficient way of
estimating the regression at hand.
There are two assumptions within the model that need to be checked - first that the
disturbance i is not heteroskedastic. If this condition is not satisfied the estimates are
likely to be inconsistent. Nevertheless, if the error are heteroskedastic this can be cor-
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rected by modelling this directly. However, in the application at hand heteroskedasticity
is not a problematic. The tests for heteroskedasticity are presented in Appendix C. As it
can be seen from Figure C.1, there are relatively few reasons to doubt that the assumption
of heteroskedasticity is violated.
The second assumption cannot be checked so easily. It implies that the same data
generation process that determines the censoring is the one that determines the outcome
variable (Long 1997). Kennedy (2011: 264) argues that this assumption in some cases
is problematic. In this example we must be willing to assume that there are the same
mechanisms that determine the overall agreement level in the European Parliament as
those that determine absolute agreement.
The Tobit model, or censored regression model uses the information provided by
censoring and provides consistent estimates of the parameters (Long 1997: 189). I have
used the AER and VGAM packages in R in order to estimate the Tobit models presented in
the next chapters. The results of the models are identical when using the two libraries.
For robustness checks I have estimated fixed and random effects linear models. These
models are presented and discussed in Chapter 4 and 5, respectively.
3.6 How does the Tobit model work?
Using the typology from Wooldridge (2002: 517-520) the applications of censored regres-
sion models can be divided into two categories. First, when the dependent variable y* is
observed for the entire sample but is censored below or above a value and secondly when
we are interested in the features of the distribution of y (Wooldridge 2002: 517-520). The
latter approach is closer to the application in this thesis. Nevertheless, such uses of tobit
models have been criticized, for example by Sigelman and Zeng (1999).
Before proceeding to estimating a tobit model, let us look at the structural charac-
teristics of the model. The equation of the tobit model is presented in Equation 3.6
(Wooldridge 2002: 517-520). Where y* is the latent variable that is observed for values
that are larger than τ and otherwise censored. The error term has a normal distribution
given by i ∼ N(0, σ2).
y∗i = Xiβ + i (3.6)
In order to reach the log-likelihood function, the standard likelihood function for cen-
sored normal distributions is used, where τ is the censoring point (Wooldridge 2002).
The log-likelihood for a standard tobit model is presented in Equation 3.7 (Wooldridge
2002). The log-likelihood function of the tobit model is composed of two parts. The first
part corresponds to a standard regression which does not account for censored observa-
tions (Wooldridge 2002). The latter part deals with the relative probabilities that an
observation is censored.


















Given the structure of the model we get three types of coefficients, nevertheless there
seems to be little agreement on what is best to report (Greene 2003: 764, Wooldridge
2002: 520). First, we have the expected value of the latent variable (y*), secondly of y|y
> = 0 and lastly the expected value of y. According to Greene (2003: 764) if the data
is always censored there is little point in reporting the coefficients for the latent variable.
In the case of the analysis at hand the data is not always censored, in fact there are few
right-censored observations, namely between 1 and 5 depending on the specification of
the dependent variable. Because there are relatively few censored observations and the
effect on the latent variable is what is of interest, the mean effect of y* is what will be
reported. This is in accordance with Greene (2003: 764).
Wooldridge (2002: 572) recommends to report the coefficients and their respective
standard error. This is reported in the tables in Chapter 4. When it comes to the
interpretation of the model, it should be interpreted as if there was no censoring in the
data (Wooldridge 2002: 572). The reason for this is that the “population model is a
linear conditional mean” Wooldridge (2002: 572). The conditional mean assumption
implies that information about the expected value of the disturbances is not contained
by x (Greene 2003: 14).
Given the formal structure of the tobit model one can also extract three different
types of marginal effects. Just as in the case of expected values we retrieve the same
three types of marginal effects. First we have the marginal effects on y*, thereafter those
for values of y for uncensored observations and those for both censored and uncensored
observations Wooldridge (2002). Yet, are these effects of interest? Given the application
at hand marginal interests are not of substantial interest. There are few data points that
are censored, and there are also limited theoretical reasons for which these would be of
interest.
3.7 Linearity?
There are several very good reasons why a tobit model, or other linear specifications
are optimal given the data and variables at hand. Nevertheless such estimations make
a very stark assumption, namely that the relation between the dependent variable and
the independent ones is linear. Given the similarities between the dependent variables
I choose to present the tests only for the Agreement Index (AI). There are only minor




































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.1: Standardized residuals vs. predicted values for the AI tobit model
First, in order to check for linearity a model needs to be estimated. The model tested
in this section is the one presented in Section 4.5 and specifically in Table 4.5. There are
several ways of assessing linearity in a model, I will start by first looking at the residuals
versus the predicted values. This is presented in Figure 3.1.
The linearity assumption is supported in this case as long as amount of observations
below and above the 0 line are relatively equally distributed. In this case it can be argued
that they are relatively equally distributed, but the relationship is not perfect. Values
that are located close to the 0 line are relatively well predicted. In this case the main
concentration of points is around 0 for high values on the dependent variable. It has
to be noted that there are some points which are under-predicted and some that are
over-predicted. The further away an observation from 0 in a negative direction, it is
more over predicted. Observations that have positive standardized residuals are more
over predicted. Influential observations will be discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
Generally, the model is more likely to under-predict legislative unity.
Another assumption of linearity is the homogeneity of variance. This can also be
assessed from Figure 3.1, by evaluating whether the vertical scatter of the points is similar,
or ideally the same across all values of the standardized predicted values. In this case
there seem to be only some problems of homogeneity of variance. Figure 3.1 shows that
the model is better at predicting higher levels of legislative unity. Yet, they are not so
grave that a linear approach should be dropped.
Furthermore, we need to assess whether the residuals are normally distributed, a his-
togram is presented in Figure 3.2a. The interpretation of this figure is straightforward, it
the better the histogram matches the normal distribution, the more normally distributed
the residuals. Again, in this case perfection is not reached, nevertheless, it can be argued





































































































Figure 3.2: Test of normal distribution for residuals
that the distribution at least resembles a normal distribution.
Another way of evaluating this is by looking at the PP Plot, which is also presented
in Figure 3.2b. Overall, it can be argued that the data is relatively well-behaved, yet the
relation is not perfectly linear. As highlighted by Greene (2003: 11), linearity doesn’t
necessarily denote the relationship between the variables, but the way in which parameters
and their disturbances enter the equation. In most cases, this assumption is not restrictive
(Greene 2003: 14). On a final note, the assumptions regarding the data generation process
for the regressors, namely “x may be fixed or random, but it is generated by a mechanism
that is unrelated to ” (Greene 2003: 17) is relatively unproblematic in this application.
Albeit some minor concerns, the assumptions for linear regression models hold rela-
tively well, even if the relationship between the dependent variables and the independent
ones is not perfectly linear.
3.8 Summary
In order to test the theoretical implications I have collected data on all final votes taken in
the European Parliament in the period 14.09.2009 - 14.03.2013. The data was collected
from publically available sources and represents a first attempt to code the budgetary
implications of bills voted upon in the European Parliament in the above mentioned
period. The datasets encompasses information about the type of bill, and its budgetary
implication, how legislators voted and the rapporteurs and their respective parties for
each case. A full overview of the variables is presented in Table 3.1.
A bill is considered to have a budgetary implication when it enactment changes the
existing budgetary status quo, as discussed in Section 3.2.1. Legislative unity is opreta-
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tionalized by employing the standard RICE index Rice (1924) and the Agreement index
as developed by Hix, Noury and Roland (2005). In order to address the caveats of these
approaches I have constructed two modified version. The robustness of the results over
these various operationalizations should serve as an indication that the relationship is
not only dependent on the operationalization of legislative cohesion. Party positions are
used a proxy for ideology. Sections 3.5 and 3.6 address the choice of model. As the
dependent variable is right-censored the optimal model is a tobit. The assumption of lin-




In this chapter, I shall first present the descriptive statistics for the variables included in
the model. Thereafter, a short discussion of simple bivariate correlations of substantial
interest is undertaken. The results from a standard OLS model are presented in order to
evaluate the results in the presence of controls. Given the structural form and the fact
that it does not account for censoring the OLS models have, the substantial interpretation
will be succinct. Hypothesis 1 is tested in Section 4.4. The main body of this chapter
encompasses the results of the Tobit regression models, their substantial implications,
in other words the empirical tests of Hypothesis 2 and 3. A closer discussion of the
interaction between budgetary implications and defection on behalf of the party of the
rapporteur is presented in Sections 4.6 and 4.6.1. Lastly, a discussion of the observations
with most leverage on the results is presented in Section 4.7.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics for the variables to be included in the main statistical models
are presented in Table 4.1. The dependent variables which capture legislative unity, as
discussed in Section 3.3, are continuous. The Agreement Index ranges from 0 to 1. Where
0 denotes the no legislative unity, while 1 denotes perfect legislative unity. The value 0
is attained when an equal number of legislators vote yes, no and abstain, while 1 when
all the legislators vote either yes, no or abstain. The RICE index reaches its minimum
value when half of the legislators vote yes and the other half vote no, and its maximum
when all the legislators vote either yes or no.
The independent variables in this models are all categorical. Given the nature of the
concepts these variables aim to capture, it is only natural to operationalize them as such.
For example, a bill either has, or does not have budgetary implications. Yet, there is one
exception. The number of terms served by the lead rapporteur, which is a continuous
variable.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
Mean SD Min Max Missing
AI 0.76 0.19 0.12 1.00 0.00
AIn 0.67 0.18 0.03 0.95 0.00
RICE 0.68 0.42 -0.97 1.00 0.00
RICEabs 0.61 0.41 -0.97 1.00 0.00
Budgetary implication 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 2.00
Legislation 0.38 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.00
No. Terms of rapporteur 1.82 0.83 1.00 5.00 253.00
Defection 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.00
EPP dummy 0.95 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.00
We see that none of the dependent variables reach their minimum value, but for in-
stance AI, and RICE reach their maximum value, highlighting the issues of right-censoring
discussed in Section 3.5. At the same time, all the specifications of the dependent vari-
ables reach values close the maximum points. This indicates that a tobit model is an
appropriate way to deal with this type of a dependent variable, as it is right-censored. In
the next section, I will look at bivariate correlations and thereafter, despite the censor-
ing issues I will estimate OLS models and evaluate how the relationship changes in the
presence of controls.
4.2 Bivariate Correlations
Bivariate correlations highlight the patterns present in the data, therefore I will start by
assessing the simple correlations between the co-variates and the dependent variables.
There are two reasons for presenting such an analysis, firstly for the intrinsic interests
of the patterns present in the data and secondly as a check for the regression models
estimated. It is problematic to base a large amount of substantial interpretation on
bivariate correlations, other than a check for the presence of correlations and expected
the regression results.
Table 4.2: Bivariate correlations for the variables of substantial interest
AI AIn RICE RICEabs Budget Legislative No. Terms Defection EPP
AI 1.000 0.878 0.657 0.712 0.003 0.204 0.062 -0.422 0.409
AIn 0.878 1.000 0.696 0.734 -0.004 0.218 0.086 -0.365 0.379
RICE 0.657 0.696 1.000 0.982 0.007 0.120 0.057 -0.300 0.270
RICEabs 0.712 0.734 0.982 1.000 -0.005 0.130 0.044 -0.309 0.277
Budget 0.003 -0.004 0.007 -0.005 1.000 0.189 -0.034 -0.013 0.030
Legislative 0.204 0.218 0.120 0.130 0.189 1.000 0.115 -0.078 0.077
No. Terms 0.062 0.086 0.057 0.044 -0.034 0.115 1.000 -0.006 0.018
Defection -0.422 -0.365 -0.300 -0.309 -0.013 -0.078 -0.006 1.000 -0.275
EPP 0.409 0.379 0.270 0.277 0.030 0.077 0.018 -0.275 1.000
The bivariate correlations are presented in Table 4.2. They give one a measure of
the relationship between two variables and ranges from -1 to 1 (Hellevik 2006: 236-242).
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The closer the correlation to ±1, the stronger the relation. It can be seen that all the
independent variables have a degree of correlation with the dependent ones. It seems that
budgetary implications are weakly correlated with the Agreement Index and its modi-
fied version which includes those that did not vote. Furthermore, the direction of the
relationship changes. There is a small negative correlation between AIn, and RICEabs
and budgetary implications. Between AI, and RICE and budgetary implications the cor-
relation is positive. As discussed in Chapter 2, the impact of budgetary implication is
dependent on the existent level of polarization within the European Parliament. However,
this does not imply that the relationship is non-existent or not significant. The weakness
of bivariate correlation is that they do not control for the presence of other factors that
might in turn affect the relationship. In order to determine the true nature of the rela-
tionship, or whether it is a mere artifact of statistical modelling, further tests are needed.
That there is a certain level of correlation between the independent variables means that
they all have to be included in the model in order to avoid bias in the estimates. As it
can be seen from Table 4.2 multicollinearity is not a problem in this case.
At the same time the bivariate correlations help us asses the relationship between the
various specifications of the dependent variables. There is a 87.8% correlation between
the Agreement Index as proposed by Hix, Noury and Roland (2005) and the modified
version, AIn. The high correlation implies that the two indices measure almost the same
thing. That they are not perfectly correlated implies that the concepts captured are
slightly different. This explanation is analogous for RICE and RICEabs. The bivariate
correlation between the RICE index and the modified version of RICE that accounts for
abstentions is even higher. A correlation of 0.982, implies that they almost capture the
same concept.
The relationship between the Agreement Index and the RICE index is presented in
Figure 4.1. It illustrates that the relationship is linear. Most of the data points are
clustered around the value 1, indicating a high level of agreement within the European
Parliament. The correlation between the AI and RICE is of only 0.657. This is expected
as the two measure slightly different theoretical concepts and deal with abstentions in
different ways. The Agreement Index deals with abstentions as a new category, equally
important to yes and no votes, whereas RICE completely ignores abstentions. Solely
based on the bivariate correlation one can expect to a certain extent that the effect of
budgetary implications is likely to differ across the different specifications of the dependent
variable. However, when the nature of the data is accounted for, the relationship stabilizes
as discussed in the following sections.
Let us take a closer look at scatter plot between the AI unity measure and the RICE
index, presented in Figure 4.1. As the relationship between the two indices is linear,
observations that attain high values on one, will most likely attain high on the other.
We notice that there is a lot of clustering around the 1 region, while there are fewer
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Figure 4.1: Scatter plot between AI and RICE index
observations that attain minimum values. This supports the theoretical consensus that
the European Parliament is a united legislative body. It seems that also in the current
European Parliament, legislators tend to agree and vote in a similar fashion.
Furthermore, there are several observations that tend to receive lower scores on AI
than compared to RICE. One explanation for this is that the Agreement index deals with
abstentions, while the RICE index ignores them. Thus, cases with a large number of
abstentions will receive a different score on AI on RICE. One example of this is in the
case of “Exclusion of certain countries from trade preferences”, which is a draft legislative
resolution voted upon by co-decision. In this case, namely A7-0207/2012, 322 legislators
votes for, 78 against, while 218 abstained. The AI score is of 0.28 which is considerably
lower than the RICE score of 0.42.
Arguably, AI and RICE are likely to over-report legislative cohesion while their re-
spective modified versions under-report it. In order to determine whether the results are
dependent on the specification of the dependent variable I will estimate all the regressions
with these various specifications of legislative unity. Obtaining similar results across these
various model specifications can be seen as convincing evidence that the results are not
dependent on the measure of cohesion used. At the same time, using diverse specifica-
tions of the dependent variable is a good way of dealing with the issue of under or over
reporting legislative cohesion by setting different constraints on certain categories.
There is one problematic aspect that remains, namely dealing with those that were
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present but did not vote. There are no theoretical reasons to assume anything about this
group. Not voting can either be a random event. For example, legislator X had a meeting
to attend at the time of the vote. At the same, not voting can be a strategic decision.
One example of this could be that legislator Y is against a proposal, but does not want
to defect, and hence decides not to vote. As discussed in Section 3.3 I choose to include
those that were present, but did not vote in AIn.
There are few, if any accurate ways of empirically testing whether the reason for
not voting is strategic or simple random. Making stalk assumptions about what not
voting means would only increase the distance between the theoretical and the empirical
models. One such assumption is made, namely I have assumed that those that did not
vote are equally important as abstentions. This is incorporated by the AIn. As there
are no theoretical reasons to exclude those that did not vote, I have incorporated this
this constraint on the AI. AIn can serve as a test of how much the results are driven
by those that did not vote. Despite this change AIn remains relatively highly correlated



























Figure 4.2: Party unity by budgetary implication. The green lines illustrate individual
observations, while the purple area shows the distribution.
An alternative way of displaying bivariate correlation between two variables of sub-
stantial interest is by looking at bean plots. Bean plots are a version of box plots, which
unlike box plots reveal the true form of the density, therefore making them more infor-
mative. The polygon represents the shape of the density, while the short horizontal lines
represent each data point (Kampstra et al. 2008). The data points that are duplicates
are represented by longer thin horizontal lines (Kampstra et al. 2008). The long thicker
horizontal lines represent the mean of each distribution (Kampstra et al. 2008).
For the Agreement Index the distribution of no budgetary implication is slightly dif-
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ferent than that of budgetary implications, therefore it can be argued that there is a
relation between the two. When it comes to other dependent variables we see a similar
pattern, the means of the two distributions vary. Without controlling for other factors it
seems that budgetary implications increase legislative cohesion in both the case of AI and
RICE, while they decrease it for AIn and RICEabs. One possible reason is that bivariate
correlations fail to account for the initial level of polarization. Although offering some
evidence for the proposition that budgetary implications affect legislative unity, any firm
conclusions require moving beyond these bivariate plots. Furthermore, the relationship
is expected to change in the presence of controls. In the next section, I will proceed to
present the results from the OLS regression model and discuss briefly how the relationship
of interests changes in the presence of controls.
4.3 OLS Regression Results
In order to facilitate interpretation I first estimate standard OLS-regression models dis-
regarding the censoring issues of the dependent variable. In terms of magnitude and
implicitly significance the results are likely to be biased, as discussed in section 3.5. It
is still interesting to examine the results even if we fail to account for the nature of the
data. As can be seen from Table 4.3, the OLS results provide some preliminary support
for the hypothesized relationship.
Firstly, when no interaction is assumed between the defection by the party of the
rapporteur and budgetary implication we see that budgetary implications have an overall
negative effect on legislative cohesion, yet the coefficient is not significant. In other words,
in the absence of controls for the initial level of polarization budgetary implications does
not affect legislative unity. Despite this caveat, the interesting theoretical relationship is
for cases where there is a higher level of polarization. As discussed in Section 2.3, one
way of studying this more in depth is to set up an interaction between defection by the
party of the rapporteur and budgetary implications. This is presented in Table 4.3 in
models (2) - (5).
Once this interaction is in place, the coefficient for budgetary implications remains
negative, but gains significance. This implies that in the case of OLS, the effect of
budgetary implication is not strong enough to have an impact on its own on legislative
cohesion, indicating perhaps that there is not enough variation in the data. Nonetheless,
when the interaction is removed for tobit model specifications budgetary implications
retain their significance, as presented in Appendix B, in Table B.1. In this case the
models have been estimated on all types of votes, we see that legislative bills increase
the overall legislative unity in the plenary. Therefore, it can be argued that legislators
value legislative proposals higher than resolutions, as they have a tendency to be more
cohesive on such votes. At the same time, parties are more likely to exert party pressure
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Table 4.3: OLS Models
Dependent variable:
AI AIn absRICE abs(RICEabs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Budget −0.018 −0.034∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.027∗ −0.036∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
Result 0.150∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.052∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.028)
Legislative 0.050∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
No. Terms 0.007 0.007 0.011∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Defection −0.165∗∗∗ −0.202∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.270∗∗∗ −0.274∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023)
EPP dummy 0.268∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.029) (0.030)
Budget:Defection 0.177∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.046) (0.049)
Constant 0.361∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.039) (0.041)
Observations 944 944 944 944 944
R2 0.343 0.358 0.343 0.377 0.330
Adjusted R2 0.338 0.353 0.338 0.373 0.325
Residual Std. Error 0.140(df = 937) 0.138(df = 936) 0.139(df = 936) 0.171(df = 936) 0.180(df = 936)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
on the legislators on these types of votes. Legislative proposals can alter the existing
status-quo, which compared to resolutions, which in many cases can be conceptualized
as policy statements. The number of terms served by the lead rapporteur has a positive
impact on legislative unity only in models (3) and (4).
It is worth noticing that despite the different specifications of the dependent variable
the results do not change much in terms of significance and direction. This implies that
regardless of the way in which we deal with abstentions, or even when we include the
legislators that did not vote, the results remain robust. There is one exception – the
coefficient which controls for the number of terms the lead rapporteur has served loses
significance in the AI model. The number of terms served by the lead rapporteur is has
a small positive impact on overall legislative cohesion in models (3) - (5). Overall, the
coefficients for seniority, even if positive, remain weak in the OLS models. The evidence
about the impact of seniority in the literature have been split. Yet, given the size of these
coefficients and the possible bias in OLS estimation I will explore their impact further in
the Section 4.5.
In general, defections by the party of the rapporteur are rare, with a total of 97
defections in this period. Nevertheless, when we use the Agreement Index and its modified
version as a dependent variable, the coefficient is significant and has a negative impact
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on the overall cohesion, when there are no budgetary implications. The relation does not
change much for RICE and its modified version. In the cases where there is no defection
by the party of the rapporteur budgetary implications will have a negative impact on the
overall cohesion. For example in the case of AI, legislative unity will decrease with 3.4%
and for RICE with 2.8%.
The interaction term between budgetary implication and the defection by the party
of rapporteur is positive. This implies that defection by the party of rapporteur does
not decrease cohesiveness for cases with budgetary implication. On the other hand, the
effect of budgetary implications has a negative impact on cohesion for cases where there
is no such defection. As presented in Section 2.3, there are several substantial ways
of understanding this relation, yet given the problems of model estimation a check of
robustness might be needed before proceeding to substantial conclusions on the empirical
tests.
When it comes to the control variables, the result of the vote and the presence of
the largest party in the winning coalition we see that both have a positive impact on
legislative cohesiveness. As discussed in Section 3.5, the results from the OLS models
are to be interpreted with caution as they from a statistical standpoint per definition are
biased. In the next section, I will present simple logit models with result as the dependent
variable in order to test the first hypothesis. Thereafter, I shall proceed to a discussion
of the tobit models, which account for the censoring of the dependent variable. Towards
the end of the chapter, after a discussion of the substantial results, and a discussion of
influential observation is undertaken in order to check whether the results obtained are
only driven by a small number of cases.
4.4 Cohesion, not rejection
The first hypothesized relationship is that budgetary implications do not affect the failure
or passage of a bill. In order to test this proposition I have estimated a simple logit with
the outcome of the vote as the dependent variable and the remainder of the co-variates
as independent. I have included, in successive models, the AI, AIn, RICE and RICEabs
as controls for cohesion. The results are presented in Table 4.4. Removing the controls
for cohesion does not alter the results substantially.
The outcome of the vote is affected by other factors, and not by budgetary implica-
tions. The results show that the defection by the party of the rapporteur reduces the
changes for a passed bill, while the presence the European People’s Party in the winning
coalition increases the chances of passage for a bill. However, EPP is the largest party,
and represents around ∼ 36 % of the legislative. Arguably, there are other factors that
might predict the outcome of the vote, yet they are outside the theoretical realm of this
thesis.
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Table 4.4: Logit models with outcome of the vote as the dependent variable
Dependent variable:
Outcome of the vote
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Budget 0.111 0.128 −0.022 −0.316









Legislative 0.186 0.120 0.406 0.682∗
(0.339) (0.341) (0.347) (0.365)
No. Terms 0.066 0.051 0.145 0.164
(0.189) (0.189) (0.192) (0.198)
Defection −1.313∗∗∗ −1.265∗∗∗ −1.356∗∗∗ −1.309∗∗∗
(0.379) (0.378) (0.388) (0.408)
EPP Dummy 0.952∗ 0.883∗ 1.131∗∗ 0.771
(0.503) (0.501) (0.510) (0.526)
Constant 2.332∗∗∗ 2.101∗∗∗ 2.861∗∗∗ 3.834∗∗∗
(0.663) (0.641) (0.637) (0.695)
Observations 944 944 944 944
Log likelihood −167.575 −167.531 −158.284 −143.132
Akaike Inf. Crit. 349.149 349.061 330.567 300.264
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Claiming that budgetary implications have an effect on the failure or passage of a bill
would be theoretically inconsistent. In order to better illustrate this, let us focus on a
hypothetical example. We have a set of legislators A, B, C and D, which all have equal
voting rights. Assume that A, B and C desire a costly legislation, while D does not. In
order for A, B and C to be rational to desire such a legislation they must be willing to
internalize its costs, despite opposition from D. If they would not have been willing to do
so, it would not have been rational for them to desire the set legislation in the first place.
The example above illustrates another aspect, that as long as there is a high enough
number of legislators that desire a costly bill, they are more likely to focus on insuring
that necessary majority is in place before reaching the final stage of the negotiations and
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tolerate strong disagreement from a minority. This section offers supportive evidence of
Hypothesis 1. In other words, as discussed in Section 2.3 budgetary implications do not
impact the passage or failure of a bill.
This section has illustrated one important substantial difference. There is no statis-
tically significant relationship between budgetary implications and the failure or passage
of a bill. In other words, budgetary implications have no effect on the passage or failure
of a bill. This is supportive evidence of Hypothesis 1. Still, at the moment nothing can
be said with certainty yet about the effect of budgetary implications on legislative unity.
This is addressed in the next sections.
4.5 Tobit Regression Results
The failure to account for the censoring of the dependent variable leads to biased esti-
mates, as discussed in Section 3.5. In order to correct for such bias, I estimate several
tobit models, which differ in how the dependent variable is treated. As mentioned, a tobit
model, unlike an OLS model, accounts for the right-censoring on the dependent variable.
It is estimated via maximum likelihood. The potential problem with the OLS models
estimated is that they are likely to underestimate the intercept while at the same time to
overestimate the slope (Long 1997: 189). Given the small magnitude of the coefficients
a wrongful estimation of the model might lead one to misleading conclusions about the
significance and importance of the covariates, and thus of their substantial implications.
Furthermore, using an OLS in these circumstances per definition creates omitted variable
bias as discussed in Section 3.5. Therefore, Tobit models are estimated as an empirical
test of the hypotheses presented in Section 2.3.
The models are estimated with four specifications of the dependent variable, legislative
agreement. In short, the models show that budgetary implications in the absence of other
polarizing factors, and defection on behalf of the party of the rapporteur in the absence of
budgetary implications decrease legislative unity. When there is both defection and the
bill has a budgetary implication legislative unity is increased. Furthermore, legislative
bills – and in Models (2) and (3) also seniority – have positive effects on legislative unity.
Using legislative agreement aggregated to the entire legislative has one down side, namely
that it aggregates individual level data to the level of the entire legislature. Many nuances
are lost in this aggregation process, making us unable to differentiate between defections
from the European Party group, or from national parties.
Nevertheless, given the that budgetary implications have not been directly discussed in
the literature on the European Parliament, I am more interested in defections in general,
not necessarily their source. Differentiation between individual behaviour requires very
detailed individual level data, which unfortunately is not available. Nevertheless, there
is a way to circumvent this issue. No assumptions are made upon the effect of party
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group pressure on MEPs. Recent evidence also shows that national parties are not likely
to defect from the European counterpart (Nordkvelle 2012: 34). In only 3.76% of the
cases the national party line defected from the European Level one (Nordkvelle 2012: 34).
Therefore, not being able to differentiate between MEPs that defected from the European
party line to support their national party, or vice-versa is not problematic.
The models are estimated on all the final votes, irrespective of type of vote taken
in the European Parliament in the current session. The reason for this is that there
are no theoretical reasons to expect that the effects will be stronger or absent on some
types, while they will be present on other types of votes. There has been a debate
in the field in how the type of procedure affects the behaviour of legislators and the
Parliament’s power relative to the other institutions within the European Union (Crombez
1996; 1997; 2000, Tsebelis 1994, Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). This approach has offered
important insights in how the European Parliament functions. It has explained the
relative power of EPGs and has aided research aimed at understanding the dimensionality
of this institution. However, in the post-Lisbon setting co-decision II became the ordinary
legislative procedure. This implies that variations in the procedural aspects have become
so sparse that in the context of the current European Parliament such an approach has
become moribund.
The tobit regression results are presented in Table 4.5. Firstly, I estimate a model
with the Agreement Index as the dependent variable, thereafter with AIn, its modified
version. In order to check whether the results are dependent on the measure of legislative
unity employed the tobit regression is also estimated with RICE and RICEabs. In order
to capture the theoretical argument that the effect of budgetary implications is dependent
on the initial level of polarization, I set up an interaction between budgetary implications
and defection by the party of the rapporteur. The models further control for the result of
the vote, whether the bill was a legislation, or a resolution, the number of terms served by
the lead rapporteur, and whether EPP was in the winning coalition. Below, I will proceed
to the interpretation of the results. Overall, given the significance and magnitude of the
scaling parameter, σ, tobit model specifications are a significant improvement from OLS,
as they account for the censoring on the dependent variable.
The Agreement Index takes values between 0 and 1, where 0 represents the lowest
level of agreement possible. In other words, when for example 100 vote yes, 100 vote
no and 100 abstain AI will be 0. Let us focus on the results when we disregard those
that were present but did not vote. In this case the lowest score on AI is reached in the
case of “ Motions for resolutions - G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh”, voted upon on 08.10.2009
where 158 legislators voted yes, 318 no, while 164 abstained. The agreement score for
case, B7-0086/2009 is 0.125. It might be surprising that the highest level of disagreement
is reached on a resolution. One way of understanding this is the that the conclusions
of the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh led to substantial implications for the regulation of
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Table 4.5: Tobit models with different specifications of the dependent variable
Dependent variable:
AI AIn abs(RICE) abs(RICEabs)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Budget −0.034∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.028∗ −0.036∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
Result 0.139∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.052∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.028)
Legislative 0.048∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
No. Terms 0.007 0.011∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Defection −0.202∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.271∗∗∗ −0.274∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023)
EPP dummy 0.265∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.029) (0.030)
Budget:Defection 0.177∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.046) (0.049)
Constant 0.381∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.039) (0.041)
σ −1.981∗∗∗ −1.975∗∗∗ −1.768∗∗∗ −1.717∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 944 944 944 944
Log likelihood 529.119 525.504 325.851 280.819
Wald Test (df = 7) 525.511∗∗∗ 493.260∗∗∗ 570.476∗∗∗ 464.899∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
financial markets in the European Union, while at the same time the summit increased
the external pressure on the EU as a whole to increase regulation on the financial markets
and hinder further losses because of the financial crisis. Additionally, given the timing
there was a lot of pressure on legislators from their national constituencies and perhaps
governments. The low level of agreement is easy to understand in this case.
The results from the tobit models show that legislators are more inclined to reach a
grand coalition in absolute terms 1 when they vote over legislation compared to resolu-
tions. As a large part of the literature has argued, it seems that legislators place more
importance on legislative proposals than on resolutions. The costs are lower for legislators
to disagree on resolutions and set up working bodies on the task or area, than to fail to
agree on legislation. If legislation is failed in the first reading, an absolute majority is
1and not in terms of how many parties vote
54 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
required to pass it in the second reading (Hix and Høyland 2011), thus creating several
procedural effects. These effects produce an extra incentive for legislators to present a
cohesive behaviour in the first reading in the plenary.
One possible explanation is that legislative proposals bear greater importance com-
pared to resolutions, which can be considered as mere policy statements. Legislative
proposals can in certain cases radically change the existing legislation in a country or at
the European level. Furthermore, given either the difficulty, at least in terms of proce-
dural aspects, or the length of time necessary, European Party Groups, and maybe even
national ones may increase the constraints placed on legislators. Such arguments are sup-
ported by the tobit models presented in this section. The effect of legislative proposals is
small, yet significant at the 1% level and robust over the different operationalizations of
legislative unity.
The argument that legislators that have served more terms gain leeway and are able
to create a more cohesive behaviour in the European Parliament is only partly supported.
The evidence in the literature has been mixed so far, as they are from this model speci-
fication. The coefficients for seniority are small, and they are only significant at the 5%
level in the AIn and RICE. The number of terms can also be conceptualized as a proxy
for legislative leverage of certain MEPs. It might be that the position and reputation of
these legislators aid them when leading discussions within the European Parliament.
Scarrow (1997) shows that the European Parliament seems to attract members with
long-standing careers in the national politics. It can be argued that this implies that senior
legislators are able to forge a higher level of cohesion within their national delegations as
well, given their prestige and reputation. McElroy (2006: 14) finds that both experience
and expertise are important factors that determine the committee allocation of MEPs.
Her findings are contrasting to those of Bowler and Farrell (1995). The finding can be
extrapolated to legislative unity. Yet, caution is advised when arguing that rapporteurs
which served more than one term have a positive effect on legislative unity, as this finding
is supported by only two of the four models presented. This finding is further explored
in the Robustness chapter, where it is shown that its significance is dependent on model
specification.
The presence of EPP in the winning coalition also has a moderate positive effect on
legislative unity. The result is robust across the different specifications of the dependent
variable. Unlike seniority, the magnitude of the effect is relatively larger, varying between
0.240 in the AIn model and 0.347 in the RICE specification. The finding is significant at
the 1% level. In the 7th European Parliament the European People’s Party is the largest
group with 270 members. If all the members of the European People’s Party would vote
for a proposal, that would represented ∼ 36.7% of the votes. Conversely, if the European
Party does not support a bill, it is much harder to the remaining parties to force a grand
coalition, as parties on the Left side of the political spectrum, and Center would have
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to collaborate with those on the far Right. This positive effect is not surprising, yet at
the same time it highlights the importance of including a control for the largest party
within the European Parliament. Alongside, the interaction of substantial interest this is
perhaps one of the most robust finding. The effect of party positions is further explored
in Section 5.2.
Largely, the results remain robust regardless of the specification of the dependent
variable in terms of direction and statistical significance, with the exception of seniority.
This finding provides us with some indication that the results are not so dependent on
the measure of cohesiveness used. More specifically, regardless of the way we deal with
abstentions, and even when we include those that did not vote the results remained
relatively unchanged in terms of direction, relative magnitude, and significance.
The theoretical section of this thesis has mainly focused on the effect of budgetary
implications on legislative unity. There are only 210 bills with budgetary implications
that exceed the existing framework. In other words, in only ∼ 17% of the cases legisla-
tors voted upon bills with such implications. As we have seen in the previous section,
budgetary implications do not have an impact on failure or passage. Given the theo-
retical framework employed this finding is expected. However, as discussed the impact
of budgetary implications is dependent on the initial level of polarization. In order to
capture this an interaction term is set up between budgetary implications and defection
by the party of the rapporteur. This will enable one to see how the effect of budgetary
implications varies in the absence of other polarizing factors, compared to cases where
there is a known level of disagreement. Even if legislative unity is observed at the same
time as defection, defection is decided before the actual moment of the vote. Further
endogenity issues are discussed in section 5.1.
Using defection as a proxy for legislative polarization gives one a tool which enables
her to study this effect more in-depth. Both budgetary implications and defections seem
to be relatively rare events. When there is no budgetary implication, defections of behalf
of the party of the rapporteur have a negative effect on legislative unity. This effect is
robust regardless of the specification of legislative unity. This implies that the effect is
presented regardless of the way we deal with abstentions, or even when we include those
legislators who did not vote. This is supportive of Hypothesis 3.
When there is no defection on behalf of the party of the rapporteur, budgetary implica-
tions have a small negative effect on the level of cohesion within the European Parliament.
The effect is significant at the 1% level for AI and AIn, while at 5% for the modified ver-
sion of RICE which accounts for abstentions, and only at the 10% level for RICE. The way
in which we deal with abstentions does not only affect the significance or RICE, but also
the magnitude of the coefficient. In the versions of the dependent variable that deal with
abstentions, the magnitude of the effect of budgetary implications ranges between -0.034
and -0.036. Nonetheless, when abstentions are ignored, namely in the RICE model, the
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effect is smaller, of only -0.028. This implies that legislators seem to prefer to abstain, on
in some cases not to vote, rather than vote against the European Party Group’s wishes.
In other words, European Party Groups seem to have a certain leverage over the
behaviour of legislators. This leeway is not so strong that it deters individual members
from expressing their own wishes, but they do it in such a way that it doesn’t defy the
party line, for example by abstaining on the respective vote. This is supportive evidence
of the theoretical arguments presented in Section 2.3. The presence of this tendency does
not imply that legislators are willing to alter their behaviour totally, or that they never
defect, but merely that in certain cases they prefer to be soft-liners and abstain, instead
of voting the opposite of their party. Hence, they aim at minimizing the potential costs
of defection, while at the same time aiming at maximizing their power in the legislature.
These findings are supportive of the hypothesized relationship in the theoretical chap-
ter. The coefficient of the interaction term is supportive of Hypothesis 3. The interaction
term is robust and significant at the 1% level in all the four models presented in this sec-
tion. This offers relatively convincing evidence that the coefficient is not only a matter
of statistical randomness.
As negotiations are shifted to the committee level, and rapporteurs have a rather
high leverage in the decision making process, the other legislators present at the case
negotiations will know when the rapporteur, and implicitly her party, is likely to defect.
Given that parties have accepted and constantly invest in appointing skillful rapporteurs
it is likely that they will follow the position of the rapporteur, or in some cases there might
simply be a split in this party. Knowing this, provides the other legislators, or even party
groups with a very strong incentive to find other alliance partners and to try to induce
a cohesive behaviour within the party at the time of the vote. Therefore, the observed
overall cohesion will be higher in cases where legislators already have an incentive to
disagree, namely cases with budgetary implications, and knowledge of a defection on
behalf of the party of the rapporteur. This interaction is further explored in the two next
sections.
In conclusion, the tobit models provide convincing evidence in favour of the hypoth-
esized relationship. Firstly, the behaviour of individual members, is shaped, at least to
a certain degree by budgetary implications. Secondly, these findings suggest that there
may be an economic dimension of voting within the European Parliament. This highlights
that the conclusions reached by (Fenno 1978) for the US Congress are highly relevant for
the European Parliament and again show the similarities between the US Congress and
the European Parliament.
This is further explored in section 3.4. So far it has been shown that, almost regardless
of the way in which one deals with abstentions, and those that did not vote budgetary
implications have a certain impact on legislative unity. The theoretical predictions pre-
sented in Hypothesis 2 are supported, at least to a certain degree. Furthermore, by only
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looking the coefficients we see that budgetary implications seem to be more important
also for bills where there is relatively little initial polarization. In order to further discuss
whether the empirical results actually support Hypothesis 3, I will focus on the interaction
term between budgetary implication and outcome of the vote in the next section.
4.6 Budgetary implications and defections
Figure 4.3 presents the interaction between bills where the party of the rapporteur was
in the winning coalition versus those were it was not, with regards to their budgetary
implications for the AI model. If the dependent variable is changed the changes in
the plot are only minimal, given the small differences between the coefficients. The
points represent the estimate, while the red lines represent the confidence interval of the
estimate. The confidence interval for bills with defection and budgetary implications and
defection is relatively large, given that there are few bills that fit in the category. Even




































Figure 4.3: Interaction plot based on Model (1) showing the effect of budgetary implica-
tions for cases with and without defection on behalf of the party of the rapporteur
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The importance of inherent characteristics of a bill has been largely neglected in
the literature. As presented in Chapter 2, most of the work has focused on the type of
procedure, ideology or in some cases the salience of the case as explanations for the voting
behaviour in the plenary. The economic traits of a bill have been largely ignored for the
European Parliament, and only recently studied for the Council. These results show that
the budgetary implications have a significant impact on to cohesiveness in the European
Parliament, even if their effect is small. This can be seen as a suggestion that there is an
economic determinant of voting in the current European Parliament.
Figure 4.3 allows one to see how the effect of budgetary implications differs in two
cases and to better link the empirical evidence to Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3. In
normal cases, where there is no evidence of disagreement in the negotiation phase before
the vote, budgetary implications have a small negative effect on overall cohesion. Many
of the bills coded in this period had a positive implication the communitary budget,
therefore if the time series is extended to cover other sessions of the European Parliament
we would expect to see a stronger effect, especially if it is differentiated between bills with
a negative implication for the budget and those with a positive one.
Another way of looking at the mechanisms that lead to this effect is by focusing on
successful negotiations at the committee stage and party pressure. When there is no
defection on behalf of the party of the rapporteur, it is an indication that negotiations
at the committee stage were relatively successful and that the bill is likely to have an
acceptable level of support in the plenary. This proposition is in accordance with previous
findings for example those of Neuhold (2001) and Yordanova (2009). As argued in Section
2.3, European Party Group leaders will in those situations have fewer incentives to enforce
the party line in the plenary, therefore individual legislators, that still disagree with the
agreed proposal are more likely to defect, either by voting against the party line or
abstaining. In such cases it can argued that parties are less focused on legislative unity,
and hence less likely to apply sanctions to legislators who defect. One possible explanation
for this is that the leadership is to a large extent convinced of the passage of the bill, as
they also rely on their alliance partners as well.
The opposite happens in cases where we have both budgetary implications and defec-
tion on behalf of the party of the rapporteur. Given the nature of the negotiation process
before the plenary, European Party leadership will know that at least one party is likely
to defect from the agreed consensus, either to support or to vote against the bill. There-
fore, being convinced, at least to a certain extent, they will increase party pressure on
legislators in those cases in order to insure the desired outcome in the final vote. Hence,
we observe a higher level of legislative unity. If legislators value at least equally the goals
of protecting the interests of their home constituency and those of insuring power in the
legislative, they are less likely to defect in cases where there is increased party pressure,
hence in cases where their behaviour might be sanctioned. In the next section I will
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provide several case examples to better illustrate the mechanisms at work.
As I have noticed from coding the dataset, budgetary implications are not always
detrimental to constituencies, sometimes they add increased revenue to the EU budget.
In most cases, however, these budgetary implications make losers and beneficiaries easier
to identify. Some of the bills that are covered in the dataset had a positive budgetary
implication for the communitary budget, yet their impact was different from member
state to member state depending on the existing regulation. Another reason for why this
relationship may be observed and why the impact of budgetary implications is negative,
yet weak on legislative unity. One potential explanation for this is that a large majority
of the bills actually increase the revenue of the European Union. The evidence so far
suggests that alongside the Left-Right ideological dimension that has been proved to
drive votes in the plenary (Hix 2004, Hix, Noury and Roland 2007, Hix and Noury 2009)
there are other mechanisms at work.
The apparently high level of cohesion in the European Parliament might be slightly
more superficial than previously assumed. Looking at cases with budgetary implications
might reveal new ways of moving beyond the surface and understanding the strategic
choices legislators make in the European Parliament. Nonetheless, the plot presented in
Figure 4.3 only presents the interaction term. Empirically it might be more interesting
to look at the interaction term while setting various levels on the other covariates. A plot
of simulated probabilities is presented and discussed in section 4.6.1.
4.6.1 Simulated Probabilities: Substantial difference?
It might be interesting to investigate whether the effects are strong enough to produce
substantially different results. This is done in the simulation plots. The simulated effects
for budgetary implications for bills where defection is present, and respectively for those
without, are presented in Figure 4.4 and in Figure 4.5. Unlike the interaction plot, the
simulated effects account for the effect of the other covariates present in the model. It
produces random samples from the specified multivariate normal distribution. The dis-
tribution is given by the beta coefficients and the co-variance matrix of the model. 1000
random draws are taken in this case. The simulation shows that there is a substantial
difference in cohesion also when other variables are taken into account and kept at me-
dian. At the same time, it allows one to grasp a more detailed picture of the interaction
between budget and defection, which allows one to make more detailed inferences about
the hypothesized relationship. The predicted cohesiveness does not change substantially
when we only look at legislation and keep the rest of the coefficients at their mean values,
of course with the exception of the interaction term.
For ease of interpretation, I choose to present the simulated probabilities as box
plots. The box is bordered by the 25th and 75th quartile, while the dotted lines rep-





































Figure 4.4: Simulated effect of budgetary implication for bills with defection when the
other co-variates are kept at their median values, and EPP at 0
resent the “whiskers” and are bordered by the lowest and the highest values within the
1.5 * range(25th, 75th quartile). The small circles in the outskirts of the graph show the
extreme values, or outliers. Outliers in this care not necessarily problematic, as they can
be seen as an artifact of the algorithm used to randomly draw the distributions and hence
of little substantial interest. The overall interpretation of the figure is the standard one
of a box and whisker diagram.
In Figure 4.4 the effects of budgetary implications for bills where the party of the
legislator defected is presented. When there is a defection, we see that the impact on
predicted cohesiveness is positive. This is much smaller for bills without budgetary impli-
cations, compared to those which have such implications. This supports the theoretical
arguments presented in the theoretical section of this thesis and shows that the relation-
ship holds even in the presence of other co-variates. The mere defection of the party of
the rapporteur, increases legislative unity, as the other parties get together to to insure
that their most desired outcome will actually happen in the plenary, while at the same
time they increase pressure on legislators. Therefore, European Party Groups are more
likely to use their available “sticks and carrots” in order to insure that their legislators
4.6. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS AND DEFECTIONS 61
will act in a cohesive manner in the plenary.
There is little doubt that cases where both budgetary implications are presented
and there is a defection on behalf of the party of the rapporteur are important and even
salient cases. In more general terms these cases usually have clearly identifiable losers and
beneficiaries. Several examples of this are “Security of gas supply”, “EU guarantee to the
EIB against losses under loans and guarantees for projects outside the EU”, “Temporary
suspension of autonomous Common Customs Tariff duties on imports of certain industrial
products into the Canary Islands”, or “Common system for taxing financial transactions”,

































Figure 4.5: Simulated effect of budgetary implication for bills without defection, when
the other co-variates are kept at their median values and EPP at 1
This effect is even stronger when we have budgetary implications. There are some
reasons to believe that budgetary implications are likely to increase the existing level of
polarization within the European Parliament. Furthermore, the leadership of the parties
might be even more motivated to put pressure on individual legislators as they are aware
that national parties might also put pressure on their legislators.
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Figure 4.4 provides relatively good evidence of the theoretical mechanisms discussed
in the theoretical chapter. First, it shows that budgetary implications have an impact on
legislative cohesion, and this effect is stronger and positive in the presence of other factors
that on their own reduce the expected level of unity. Even if budgetary implications on
their own have a weak, and non-significant impact on legislative unity, this section has
shown that this effect is dependent on the initial level of polarization.
As noted previously, defections are relatively rare. Let us look at the effect of bud-
getary implications for normal cases. Given that the party of the rapporteur is in the
winning coalition and an overwhelming majority of the cases, it is likely that European
Party Groups have fewer incentives to apply party pressure on their legislators in these
cases. Therefore, Figure 4.5 allows us to see a more detailed picture of the effect of
budgetary implications when there are no defections.
Based solely on Figure 4.5 one can argue that budgetary implications decrease overall
legislative unity. There is a higher level of agreement in the European Parliament in the
absence of budgetary implications. Even if, legislative unity is positive in cases where
there are no defections on behalf of the party of the rapporteur, it still remains slightly
lower compared to cases where there are no defections and no budgetary implications.
Even if, there were not so many cases which had both budgetary implications and
where the party of the rapporteur defected, one notices that these cases are relatively
high-profile. Several examples where the confluence of these polarizing factors was ex-
hibited are: “Trans-European energy infrastructure”, “Fishing opportunities and financial
contribution provided for in the EC-Denmark/Greenland Fisheries Partnership Agree-
ment”, “Financing instrument for development cooperation - banana accompanying mea-
sures”, “EU guarantee to the EIB against losses under loans and guarantees for projects
outside the EU ”, or “Security of gas supply”.
Another highly interesting case is “Common system for taxing financial transactions”,
which has a positive impact on the EU budget - “Preliminary estimates indicate that,
depending on market reactions, the revenues of the tax could be 57 EUR billion on a
yearly basis in the whole EU.” (European Commission 2011a). The winning coalition was
formed by GUE/NGL, Greens, S&D and EPP, and in total encompassed 487 legislators
that voted for the proposal, while 152 voted against and 46 abstained. Given that the
nature of the case and the way it impacts the EU budget one would have perhaps expected
a higher level of cohesion. Alongside ideological differences, it can be argued that this
case highlights that legislators are also concerned with the interests of their constituencies.
This implies that legislators which are aware that higher taxes at the national level will
have a negative impact on chances for their re-election are likely to have voted against,
or abstained in this case. As in that all of the parties of the three rapporteurs were in the
winning coalition and knew that they had the vote secured, it is unlikely that the added
increased pressure on their legislators, hence lowering the costs of defection.
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In conclusion, legislative unity is affected by budgetary implications. In cases where
there are other polarizing factors and pressure on the legislators is increased, Figure 4.4
shows that the confluence of such factors with budgetary implications increases legislative
unity. On the other hand, in cases where there are no other polarizing factors and only the
budgetary status-quo is altered, Figure 4.5 shows that budgetary implications will have a
negative impact on legislative unity. This is in accordance to the theoretical propositions
presented in Section 2.3.
4.7 Model diagnostics
The first question that comes to mind is which model is better? Nevertheless, as sub-
stantially important effects remain significant over various specifications of the dependent
variable this question is not so relevant. An aspect that might be more relevant for model
fit is to look at the residual plots and investigate the cases which have leverage over the
results.
4.7.1 What drives the estimates?
Even if the substantial effects are stable across various specifications of the dependent
variable it is interesting to look at which cases drive the estimates for each model. The
main focus in this section will lie on the interaction term and its components. Given the
robustness of the results over different specifications of the dependent variable, I choose to
focus on the tobit model with the unaltered Agreement Index as the dependent variable.
The residual plots for this are presented in figure 4.6. Each point is labelled with the row
number of ease of identification. For the other models, the residual plots are presented
in Appendix A.
In order to test whether the results are only driven by a small number of cases I
remove the 5 of most influential observations for each term of the interaction on both
the negative and positive side. In total, I re-estimate the Tobit models without the 30
most influential observations. The results are presented in Table 4.6. As it can be seen
from the table the results remain largely unchanged in terms of direction and significance.
Consequently, it can be argued that the results are not only driven by a small number of
cases, even though these cases have the highest leverage over the results. In other words,
the 30 most influential observations on the interaction term are removed.
One of the cases which has the highest negative leverage on the coefficient for budget
is “Surveillance of budgetary positions and surveillance and coordination of economic
policies”2, voted on 23.06.2011. In this case the vote was split, with 333 legislators
voting for, 303 voting against and only 26 abstentions. The winning coalition was formed
2case number: A7-0178/2011
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Figure 4.6: Most influential observations for interaction term
only of ALDE and EPP. The lead rapporteur, Corien Wortmann-Kool has served two
terms and the bill had an implication for the overall EU budget. In this case the party
of the rapporteur did not defect, yet budgetary implications alone caused polarization.
Given the theoretical framework employed, it is not problematic that this case has a high
leverage over the estimates.
Granted the nature of the case there is little doubt that national interests another
polarizing issue in this case, especially as the regulation aims “to monitor and coordinate
Member States’ budgetary policies, by way of a preventive measure to ensure budgetary
discipline within the European Union” (Europa.eu 2012). Another dimension of conflict
in this case was the amount of power that was to be delegated to the EU as institution
(euractiv.com 2013). This case highlights that even if defection by the party of the
rapporteur does not capture all the dimensions of conflict within the European Union,
such as national or pro - anti- integration defection remains a stable and relatively reliable
proxy for the initial level of polarization in the EP before final votes.
The example brings one close to a major weakness of this thesis, its inability to accu-
rately capture national polarization on cases. This implies that the intergovernmentalism
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Table 4.6: Tobit models without influential observations
Dependent variable:
AI AIn abs(RICE) abs(RICEabs)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Budget −0.029∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.023∗ −0.036∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014)
Result 0.163∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.030
(0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.029)
Legislative 0.061∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
No. Terms 0.004 0.009∗ 0.011∗ 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Defection −0.180∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗ −0.280∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
EPP dummy 0.289∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.028)
budget:defection 0.158∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.040) (0.044) (0.045)
Constant 0.332∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.039)
σ −2.072∗∗∗ −2.050∗∗∗ −1.917∗∗∗ −1.813∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 919 917 918 920
Log likelihood 598.596 579.201 453.003 361.760
Wald Test (df = 7) 643.357∗∗∗ 600.534∗∗∗ 823.404∗∗∗ 570.399∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
critique on the ideology-approach that national interests drive the behaviour of legisla-
tors cannot be dismissed or incorporated more than already presented in the theoretical
section. On the positive side the thesis shows that there are other dimensions of polariza-
tion, or even conflict within the European Parliament except the legislators own ideology.
Hence, it shows the importance of economic polarization.
The cases that have a positive leverage over the estimates for budgetary implications
are mainly resolutions that aim at changing the existing budgetary framework in the
future, for example: “Draft amending budget No 3/2012: surplus from the 2011 financial
year”; “Draft amending budget No 3/2011: 2010 budget surplus”, or “Draft amending
budget No 8/2010: Section III - Commission - European Solidarity Fund: floods in Ireland
- completion of ESF - Objective 1 (2000 to 2006)”. Given the nature of these two cases,
with the exception of the latter they were accepted by a grand-majority and generally
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there was little polarization. One potential reason for this is simply that these cases are
pure formalities, even potentially alter the budget they encompass mainly technicalities.
The latter case is a good example of a highly uncontroversial issue, given the norms and
values upheld by the European Union. Yet again there are few reasons for which the
leverage of these cases is problematic.
If one is to contrast this the theoretical framework it becomes rather expected that
such cases have leverage. Furthermore, the cases which have positive leverage over the
estimates for budgetary implications also have a positive implication for the overall EU
budget. Legislators have few incentives not to support such cases, or to polarize in these
circumstances.
Table 4.6 presents the tobit models without the 30 most influential observations on the
interaction term. The results remain relatively robust. The greatest loss in significance
is in the RICE model for the coefficient for budgetary implications. This implies that
the RICE model is more dependent on those high-leverage cases compared to the other
models. One of the most influential cases for the RICE model is the “Implementation
of excessive deficit procedure”3, one of the few bills decided upon by consultation. As
expected given the high leverage of this proposal upon member states the vote has been
split with 339 legislators voting for, 304 against and 26 abstentions. The small number of
abstentions can be seen as results of high party pressure. Again, in this case the majority
was formed by two parties, EPP and ALDE. Given the theoretical framework employed
in this thesis, it is expected that such bills will have a negative leverage in the models.
It should not be problematic that these observations drive the estimates, as they are
in line with the theoretical arguments. The persistence of the statistical relations between
the variables, and the results remain supportive of the theoretical framework. Neverthe-
less, these cases are only a handful, therefore they may not be representative. Even if the
tobit models are robust, it can be argued that a better robustness check would be either
to include other co-variates that might affect the studied relationship. Alternatively, I
will also check whether the results are robust enough to tolerate different model specifi-
cations, namely multi-level fixed and random effects. Such tests are presented in Chapter
5.
Even when removing some of the observations with most leverage the results of these
Tobit models provide empirical support for the hypothesized relation. In other words,
budgetary implications have a negative impact on legislative cohesion, in the absence of
other polarizing factors. Yet in cases where the party of the rapporteur also defects the




Simple bivariate correlations show that there is a weak relationship between budgetary
implications and legislative unity. The OLS model allows one to better grasp the patterns
in the data, nonetheless the estimates are potentially bias, consequently tobit models are
estimated. Hypothesis 1 is supported by the models presented in Section 4.4. As predicted
in the theoretical section, budgetary implications do not affect the failure or passage of
a bill. Alike the OLS models, the tobit specifications show that budgetary implications
affect legislative cohesion. Hypothesis 2 and 3 are supported. The relationship between
budgetary implications and the voting behaviour of legislators in final votes is further
explored in Sections 4.6 and 4.6.1.
Figure 4.3 shows that budgetary implications decrease legislative unity in the absence
of splits in the party of the rapporteur, or in other words in the absence of other polarizing
factors. This relationship remains robust even when the effect of the other co-variates
is taken into account as show in Figure 4.5. This is supportive evidence of Hypothesis
2. Hypothesis 3 is also supported, the coefficient for the interaction between budgetary
implications and defections on behalf of the party of the rapporteur is significant and
positive in all the models estimated in this Chapter. The relationship is illustrated in
Figure 4.4.
The major caveat of the results is the weakness of the coefficients, warranting some
concern that the models might be driven by a few cases only. However, in Section 4.7
I have removed 30 of the observations that had most leverage on the result. Even if
the coefficients became weaker they retained their direction and to a large extent their
significance level. In the next section, I will explore whether the results are a mere artifact
of model specification, by employing hierarchical models and adding more controls.
Chapter 5
Robustness
In the previous section I have presented the results from the empirical testing of the
theoretical arguments proposed. I have argued that the results are robust over different
specifications of the dependent variable. The results were robust, yet in order to insure
that the findings are not driven by the type of model or by the set of covariates employed,
I will test several other model specifications and include some new control variables. I
will include controls for ideology, based on the findings from Hix and Noury (2009), and
for time as recommended by Cox and McCubbins (2007). Before proceeding to the above
mentioned, a discussion of the caveats of the empirical specification is undertook.
5.1 Shortcomings of the empirical approach
A tobit model seems to be the optimal model given the specification of the dependent
variables. As discussed in Section 3.5 the tobit model is able to eliminate a great deal
of bias linked to model estimation. Nevertheless, it does not steer clear of all potential
sources of bias. In this section, I am aim to highlight several other potential sources of
bias, and thereafter propose several remedies. However, Clarke (2005) shows that this is
not so problematic as previously assumed.
Omitted variable bias is perhaps the biggest concern given the specification employed
in the Results chapter. Therefore, there are considerable reasons to believe that the
estimates presented suffer from a great deal of bias. For example, Johnston and DiNardo
(1972: 110) argue that the inclusion of irrelevant variables in the model is much less
problematic, when compared to excluding variables that might be correlated with the
co-variates of interest. The same dictum is presented by King, Keohane and Verba (1994:
173).
Arguably, there are two such variables that have been ignored so far, firstly party
positions, or ideology, and secondly policy areas. In the following sections I present
models with controls for party positions and thereafter proceed to an estimation of multi-
level models, both fixed and random effects in order to account for both omitted variable
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bias as an excluded co-variate and in order to account for the nature of the data.
Is this enough? Ideally, I would include more control variables. Nonetheless, in this
case, even if it is desired, it is practically impossible. Mainly, because of the nature of
the dataset, the time-series is recent and there are few, if any available datasets that
are compatible. The models employed in this thesis are all linear, therefore limiting the
sources of omitted variable bias to other variables that are correlated with the variables
included in the regression (Clarke 2005: 348).
Clarke (2005) shows that unless the researcher know the true specification of the
model “[t]he addition may increase or decrease the bias, and we cannot know for sure
which is the case in any particular situation” (Clarke 2005: 342). There is relatively
limited research on budgetary implications of legislation within the European Union, and
even less within the European Parliament. It can be concluded that omitted variable
bias remains a problem for this thesis. As presented in the next two sections the main
findings remain robust even when dealing with the two most likely sources of bias.
A second potential problem of the general model specification is endogenity. Ideally, it
would be desired that all the independent variables occur and are observed, in time, and
prior to the dependent one. This aspect is mainly problematic for the outcome of the vote
which is observed at the same time as the level of legislative unity. When this variable
is removed from the model specification there are only minor changes in the coefficients.
Alternatively, even if the defection of the party of the rapporteur is known a priori, it is
observed also at the same time as legislative unity.
Confluence of events makes causal inferences more problematic. From a chronological
perspective, defection on behalf of the party of the rapporteur occurs before the observed
legislative unity in final votes. According to Cox (1992: 293) this temporal ordering serves
as a way of showing, or at least arguing for the existence of a causal effect. Causality is
only secondary here. Even if it can be argued that from a temporal perspective defection
is observed prior to cohesion, it might be better to attempt to remedy this problem.
Arguably, a more suitable way to deal with this endogeniety problem is by employ-
ing a system estimation by instrumental variables (Wooldridge 2002: 183-205). Simply
put, in order to employ such a model specification one is to find an instrument that pre-
dicts the endogenous independent variable, but does not predict the dependent variable
(Greene 2003, Sovey and Green 2011). The purpose is to isolate exogenous variation in
defections (Sovey and Green 2011). According to Greene (2003) one way of doing this
is by employing a two-stage least squares regression. In the first step, the instrument,
alongside the other co-variates of interests is used to estimate the predicted values for the
endogenous independent variable, in this case defection (Greene 2003). Secondly, these
predicted values are used to regress the dependent variable (Greene 2003).
Nonetheless, finding a good and strong enough instrument is not an easy task. Un-
fortunately, there is little theoretical guidance in choosing an instrument in this case.
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Arguably, one potential instrument is the country of the rapporteur. It can be argued
that rapporteurs which come from influential member states have higher leverage within
the European Parliament and enjoy a stronger backing within the Council, and hence
are more likely to lead successful committee level negotiations. Yet, the correlation has
proven to be too low for this instrument to be valid. I have also employed the GDP
level within the national country of the lead rapporteur, Yet again the conclusions was
the same, the instrument was too weak. As these instruments were too weak, I have
abandoned this strategy. Consequently, even if endogenity is not critical in this example,
it still remains slightly problematic.
5.2 What else is there? Controlling for ideology and
time.
Given the theoretical focus on the structural characteristics of bills, especially on their
economic implications, the models so far neglected ideology. This could be seen as a
potential weakness, especially as one of the arguments from the literature is that the
effect of budgetary implications is often hidden by ideology (Peltzman 1984). If budgetary
implications are actually significant, we should expect this relationship to hold even when
we control for ideology, or in other words for party positions. Ideally, I would have
employed a similar method to Hix, Noury and Roland (2006) to capture ideology, by
using the nominate scores. Nevertheless, corresponding data to this time series was not
available at the time of the writing, as discussed in Section 3.4. The proxy for ideology
employed in this analysis is party positions on each case, whether a party was or was not
in the winning coalition on each vote.
The usage of this proxy for ideology allows us to capture which parties supported
each bill, and how this impacts legislative unity. Using European party group dummies
requires us to make a secondary assumption, namely that MEPs join the party that
best represents their ideological standpoint. Given the recent evidence (Hix and Høyland
2013, McElroy and Benoit 2010) there seems to be a certain level of empirical support for
this assumption. Therefore, there are few reasons that make us consider this assumption
problematic. Most of the empirical and theoretical evidence suggests that the main
dimension of voting in the European Union is the Left-Right one. This proxy allow one
to isolate whether there are parties that are neto-defectors.
There are numerous empirical accounts showing the European Parliament operates in
a low dimensional policy space, where the most important dimension is the left - right one.
The evidence shows that the importance of pro and anti-integration issues has decreased
throughout time (Hix and Høyland 2013). Therefore, it can be argued that a proxy for
ideology which captures this, is a good substitute for nominate scores. More specifically
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Table 5.1: Tobit models with controls for ideology and number of sessions
Dependent variable:
AI AIn abs(RICE) abs(RICEabs)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Budget −0.010∗ −0.015∗ −0.005 −0.004
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Result 0.059∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
Legislative 0.005 0.022∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.012∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
No. Terms −0.0003 0.005 0.003 −0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Defection −0.023∗∗ −0.007 −0.054∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Time −0.00003∗∗∗ −0.00002∗∗ −0.00003∗∗∗ −0.00004∗∗∗
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
EPP dummy 0.337∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
S&D dummy 0.322∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
ALDE dummy 0.141∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
Greens dummy 0.134∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
GUE/NGL dummy 0.056∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
ECR dummy 0.102∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
EFD dummy 0.058∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
budget:defection 0.078∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024)
Constant −0.259∗∗∗ −0.325∗∗∗ −0.504∗∗∗ −0.528∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.032) (0.032) (0.028)
σ −2.671∗∗∗ −2.334∗∗∗ −2.333∗∗∗ −2.448∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 944 944 944 944
Log likelihood 1, 179.445 863.677 857.460 969.669
Wald Test (df = 14) 4, 888.157∗∗∗ 1, 998.342∗∗∗ 3, 729.560∗∗∗ 5, 123.591∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
in the case at hand the interest lies mainly on the impact of controlling for party positions
with regard to issues.
A problem with this proxy is that it fails to capture the individual ideological position.
Therefore, within the realm of this thesis it cannot be claimed that legislators value
economic concerns more than their ideological position, or vice-versa. Even if nominate
scores would have been calculated, such inferences would remain problematic.
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There is another important aspect that has been largely ignored both in the theoretical
discussion and in the empirical approach, namely the time perspective. Some studies of
the European Parliament, and mainly research on the US Congress (Cox and McCubbins
2007) highlight that legislators tend to act in a more heterogeneous way in the beginning
of the parliamentary mandate and that their behaviour gets more and more cohesive as
sessions go by. In order to capture this aspect, I have designed a variable that simply
counts every session that went by. If there are 50 cases discussed in the same session
they will have the same number, while the next session when legislators meet will be
incremented by 1. This variable is continuous. Taking the natural logarithm of this
variable does not substantially affect the results presented in Table 5.1.
Tobit models specifications with the above mentioned control variables are included
Table 5.1. Perhaps the most contrasting result in this table is the very small, yet signif-
icant negative coefficient for time. In the case of the 7th European Parliament it seems
that cohesion decreases slightly or, marginally as time goes by. The effect is so weak in
this case. Overall, the introduction of controls for party potions and time decreases the
magnitude and in some cases also the significance of the results. For example, seniority
is not significant in any of the models. Legislative bills retain their positive effect on
legislative unity only in models (2) - (4). Controlling for ideology and the number of
sessions that passed seems to reduce the impact of legislative bills. Yet, for the models
AIn and RICE it can be argued that legislative bills have a small, but positive effect on
legislative unity in the European Parliament.
The coefficients for budgetary implications become smaller and lose significance in
the RICE and RICEabs models. The effect remains negative for bills where the party of
the rapporteur does not defect. The effects of defection by the party of the rapporteur
remain unchanged and are significant in all the models with the exception of the AIn. The
interaction term, is significant and positive in all the models. Although, the magnitude
of the effects of the interaction get weaker the substantive interaction presented in the
previous Chapter is largely unaltered. In short budgetary implications reduce legislative
cohesion. Yet, when the party of the rapporteur defect on a case with a budgetary
implication legislative unity is likely to increase.
The coefficients for the parties are positive and significant in all the models presented
in Table 5.1. The largest effects are for the two largest parties within the European Par-
liament in the current sitting: EPP and S&D. The coefficients for all the party dummies
are significant at the 1% level.
Given the small changes in several of the co-variates might also argue that the models
presented in Section 4.5, might have been affected by omitted variable bias. The sub-
stantial interpretation of the relationship of interest, the interaction between budgetary
implications and the proxy for polarization has not changed to a large extent. High-
lighting the robustness of the hypothesized relationship presented in Section 2.3. Adding
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controls for party positions shows another substantial difference, specifically the impor-
tance of abstentions. Yet, the models became more sensitive to the way in which we deal
with abstentions. One can infer that legislators are soft-liners and prefer to abstain, or
not to vote, rather than directly defect from the party line. This is supportive evidence
of the hypotheses presented in the theoretical Chapter of this thesis. Overall the rela-
tionship of substantial interest remains robust even in the presence of more controls, for
the Agreement Index and its modified version AIn.
There are many other controls that could have been included in this section, never-
theless, given that the time series employed in the analysis is relatively recent there are
few corresponding datasets publicly available. These circumstances make the inclusion of
new control variables impossible. Nevertheless, in order to investigate whether the rela-
tionship remains robust I will estimate multi-level models control for policy areas. This
is presented in the next section. By doing this I am also able to show how and whether
policy areas affect the relationship of substantial interest. Hix and Høyland (2013) show
the cohesion varies across policy areas.
5.3 Accounting for policy areas
Differences between policy areas have so far only received limited attention. This may
be problematic. Previous research found that there are different level of cohesion along
various policy areas (Hix and Høyland 2013). Furthermore, it has been shown that there
are also differences in the coalitions that are formed across policy areas (Hix and Høyland
2013). Not accounting for differences between policy areas may be seen as a source of
omitted variable bias, as it means excluding unobserved differences between policy areas
from the analysis. Furthermore, ignoring the hierarchical character is a problem in itself.
Ignoring the hierarchical character of the data may introduce bias in the standard
errors, and thus increase the chances for Type I errors (Steenbergen and Jones 2002:
219). At the same time accounting for the hierarchical character of the data will allow
one to test whether the results are robust enough to support both a different estimation
and a new variable.
There are different ways of accounting for the multi-level structure of the data. One
approach is to assume fixed effects, the other is random effects (Gelman and Hill 2007:
Chapter 14). Both of these approaches are pursued in the following. I first estimate a set
of fixed effects models. I then move on to estimate a set of models where I include both
a random intercept and a random effect of budget. The reported results show that the
relationship of interests remains significant.
The data at hand is both highly clustered and at the same time it has a clear hier-
archical structure, as each case can be seen as nested within a policy area and the data
at hand has both subsets, fitting nicely in the definition developed by Steenbergen and
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Table 5.2: Fixed Effects Multi-level linear models
Dependent variable:
AI AIn abs(RICE) abs(RICEabs)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Budget −0.036∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.028∗ −0.036∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016)
Result 0.140∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.054∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.028)
Legislative 0.076∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
No. Terms 0.012∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.012∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Defection −0.180∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.248∗∗∗ −0.246∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023)
EPP dummy 0.259∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.029) (0.030)
Budget 0.034 0.030 0.044 0.053
(0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.033)
Budgetary control −0.002 0.012 0.021 0.003
(0.027) (0.027) (0.034) (0.035)
Civil liberties, justice & home affairs −0.037 −0.071∗∗ −0.001 −0.037
(0.028) (0.028) (0.034) (0.036)
Constitutional & inter-institutional affairs −0.032 −0.041 −0.046 −0.036
(0.040) (0.041) (0.050) (0.052)
Culture & education 0.013 0.009 0.107∗ 0.074
(0.045) (0.045) (0.056) (0.058)
Development −0.025 −0.040 0.005 −0.021
(0.035) (0.035) (0.043) (0.045)
Economic & monetary affairs −0.098∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.033)
Employment & social affairs −0.060∗ −0.072∗∗ −0.074∗ −0.069
(0.034) (0.035) (0.043) (0.044)
Environment & public health −0.030 −0.024 −0.024 −0.024
(0.028) (0.029) (0.035) (0.037)
Fisheries 0.036 0.011 0.046 0.060
(0.031) (0.031) (0.038) (0.040)
Foreign & security policy −0.015 −0.003 0.032 −0.001
(0.030) (0.030) (0.037) (0.038)
Gender equality −0.068∗ −0.056 −0.050 −0.083∗
(0.038) (0.039) (0.048) (0.050)
Industry, research & energy −0.043 −0.045 −0.048 −0.052
(0.030) (0.031) (0.038) (0.039)
Internal market & consumer protection 0.022 0.028 0.034 0.041
(0.035) (0.035) (0.043) (0.045)
International trade −0.029 −0.036 0.0002 −0.027
(0.027) (0.027) (0.034) (0.035)
Legal affairs −0.002 −0.050∗ 0.012 0.011
(0.029) (0.029) (0.036) (0.037)
Petitions 0.025 0.029 0.026 0.042
(0.082) (0.083) (0.102) (0.106)
Regional development 0.005 0.006 0.029 0.031
(0.033) (0.034) (0.041) (0.043)
Transport & tourism −0.026 −0.041 0.005 −0.001
(0.032) (0.033) (0.040) (0.042)
budget:defection 0.136∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.047) (0.049)
Constant 0.378∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.037) (0.046) (0.048)
Observations 944 944 944 944
R2 0.400 0.379 0.410 0.378
Adjusted R2 0.383 0.362 0.394 0.360
Residual Std. Error (df = 917) 0.135 0.137 0.168 0.175
F statistic (df = 26; 917) 23.518∗∗∗ 21.562∗∗∗ 24.539∗∗∗ 21.445∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Jones (2002: 219). Alongside accounting for the nature of the data, multi-level models
present several other advantages. They allow one to specify predictors at different level
and to investigate whether the effect of lower level predictors is conditioned or modified
by the higher level ones Steenbergen and Jones (2002: 219). Multi-level modelling allows
one to make more specific inferences about the nuances of the effects investigated.
The reference category for fixed effects models, presented in Table 5.2, is the Agricul-
ture committee. It can be argued that the bills discussed in the Agriculture committee
might concern structural funds to a larger degree when compared to bills from other
committees. The Common Agricultural Policy has been one of the most salient topics in
the European Parliament since its entry into force. Aksoy (2010: 174) points out that
Agriculture is one of the largest expenses in the European Union budget. Given that the
importance of the agricultural sector varies across members states it can be argued that
this policy area is rather polarized. Furthermore, this is one of the areas where, according
to the theoretical framework, the legislator’s interest on their constituencies is likely to
be strong.
Therefore, it can be argued that agriculture is a substantially interesting reference
category. From a theoretical perspective it is suggested that budgetary implications will
differ across policy areas. This motivates letting the effect of budgetary implications vary
in these model. The results from the random intercept and random effect models are
presented in Table 5.3. The fixed effects models are presented in Table 5.2.
The fixed effects models only capture variation within each policy area when estimat-
ing the models, hence effectively controlling for all observed and unobserved differences
across policy areas. The results are presented in Table 5.2. The coefficient for budgetary
implications retains its significance in all the models with fixed effects. When it is as-
sumed that policy areas have a fixed effect, budgetary implications for bills where there
was no defection on behalf of the party of the rapporteur will have a negative effect on
overall legislative unity, regardless of the way in which one deals with abstentions and
those that did not vote. The magnitude of the coefficient for budget varies between -0.028
in the RICE model to -0.043 in the AIn model. When the MEPs that did not vote are
accounted for, the effect of budgetary implications is slightly stronger, enforcing again
the claim that legislators prefer a form of mild defection, either not to vote, or to abstain,
rather than directly defect. Unfortunately, the distinction between defecting by voting
the opposing from the party line, for example voting No, when the party line is Yes,
versus abstaining or not voting remains blurred. Hix (2002) considers defections those
cases where legislators vote differently from the party line.
It seems that European Party Groups mobilize and induced, more pressure on legis-
lators, and hence a higher level of cohesion among their members when they know the
initial level of disagreement is high. This is shown by the interaction term between defec-
tion and budgetary implications. Setting aside the interaction term one notices that the
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coefficient for seniority regains its significance. Thus, it seems that members that served
more than one term are better equipped at forging legislative unity within the European
Parliament. Although, it has to be mentioned that the effect are relatively small, yet
the coefficient is significant in all the model specifications. At the same time, legislative
proposals have a relatively higher positive impact on legislative unity. Even when ac-
counting for the hierarchical nature of the data by estimating a fixed effects linear model
the results are analogous to those from the initial tobit models, presented in section 4.5.
The fixed effects model includes a dummy variable for each policy areas, which pro-
duces less efficient estimates. Only looking at variation within policy areas means avoiding
all possible sources of omitted variable bias from variables at the policy area level. This
does however come at the cost that all variation between policy areas is discarded (Gel-
man and Hill 2007: Chapter 12). It may also be interesting to investigate whether the
reported results hold when the effect of budgetary implication itself is allowed to differ
across these policy areas and controls for party positions are introduced.
Random effects models can be understood as an approximation of the “weighted aver-
age of the mean of the observations in the [group] and the mean over all [groups]”(Gelman
and Hill 2007: 253). In contrast to fixed effects models, which accept estimations on very
little data, random effects models tend to constrain the estimates from groups with very
little individual data towards the mean of all the data available (Gelman and Hill 2007).
The fixed effect model imposes several restrictions on the variations of coefficients. By
looking at table 5.2 we see that even when the assumption about the effects of policy
areas is relaxed the results remain largely unaltered in terms of significance across the
various specifications of the dependent variable.
I have included party dummies in the models with random intercept, random effects
of budget across policy areas. As discussed in section 5.2 controlling for party positions
decreases the importance of the effect of budgetary implication, especially for bills where
there is not defection. These results hold even when we account for policy areas as it can
be seen from Table 5.3, the substantial effects are not different from those presented in
Section 5.2. The effect of budgetary implications for cases where there are not defections
are only significant in the AI and AIn model, showing again that legislators try to avoid
defection and select a softer approach. At the same time it shows that accounting for
party positions affect the relationship between budgetary implications and legislative
unity. This is expected in light of Peltzman’s (1984) argument that economic factors are
often hidden by ideological variables.
Albeit the loss of significance for the coefficient of budget alone in the RICE and
RICEabs model, the interaction term remains significant in all the models as it can be
seen from Table 5.3. Even so, there is a decline in the estimated effect. The theoretical
argument that in polarized cases, where there is a high risk of both individual and party
defection, the remaining European Party Groups will push for a cohesive behaviour within
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Table 5.3: Random intercept and effect of budget controlled for party positions
Dependent variable:
AI AIn abs(RICE) abs(RICEabs)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Budget −0.022∗ −0.019∗ −0.005 −0.005
(0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Result 0.050∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
Legislative 0.015∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
No. Terms 0.002 0.008∗ 0.006 −0.0001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Defection −0.022∗∗ −0.006 −0.054∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
EPP dummy 0.333∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
S&D dummy 0.323∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
ALDE dummy 0.145∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Greens dummy 0.133∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
GUE/NGL dummy 0.060∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
ECR dummy 0.106∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
EFD dummy 0.058∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
budget:defection 0.088∗∗∗ 0.052∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024)
Constant −0.289∗∗∗ −0.350∗∗∗ −0.542∗∗∗ −0.569∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.031) (0.031) (0.028)
Observations 944 944 944 944
Log likelihood 1, 121.495 815.201 811.101 913.988
Akaike Inf. Crit. −2, 206.991 −1, 594.403 −1, 586.202 −1, 791.976
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −2, 119.688 −1, 507.101 −1, 498.900 −1, 704.674
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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their own parties in order to insure their most desired outcome in the plenary.
Contrariwise to the fixed effects model the number of terms sever by the lead rap-
porteur looses significance in models (1), (3) and (4). It barely remains significant in
the AIn model at the 10% level and has a very small magnitude of only 0.008. Conse-
quently, there is little that can be said about the actual effect of seniority on legislative
unity as the effect seems to be dependent on both model and specification. On the other
hand, legislators seem to act in a more cohesive way when they vote upon legislative bills
compared to resolutions. This effect has proved robust across various model types and
specifications.
5.4 Summary
A caveat of the approach that remains unsolved is dealing with the potential endogenity.
Several instruments for defection were tested, yet, the correlation was to weak for such
an approach to be fruitful. Therefore, such a course was not pursued. Sections 5.2
and 5.3 aims to address the omnipresent threat of omitted variable bias. The results are
relatively robust, yet in the presence of party controls the effects of budgetary implications
on their own loose significance for the RICE and RICEabs models, yet the remainder of
the interaction remains significant. This suggests that the findings of this thesis are
relatively vulnerable to the way in which ideological positions are captured. Despite
this caveat, the robustness tests remain supportive of the hypothesized relationships.
Budgetary implications on their own have a negative effect on legislative unity, yet this
effect is mitigated when the part of the rapporteur also defects.
In order to test whether the results were driven by the type of model I have estimated
fixed and random effects models, which also account for the hierarchical structure of the
data. This chapter has shown that in the presences of controls for party positions the
relationship between budgetary implications and legislative unity is weaker when there
are no other polarizing factors. Yet, irrespective of the controls for party positions the
relationship remains significant in situations where there are both budgetary implications
and defections by the party of the rapporteur, even when policy areas are accounted for,
as presented in Table 5.3.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis has set out to investigate whether budgetary implications affect the behaviour
of legislators in final votes. The main focus in the literature has been on the ideological
determinants of voting (Hix, Noury and Roland 2006, Hix and Noury 2009), and in
some cases on the procedural differences between the bills (Kreppel 2002). After the
ratification of the Lisbon treaty, the European Parliament has become an equal legislator
to the Council in most policy areas and has gained budgetary power (Hix and Høyland
2013). Peltzman (1984) has shown that ideological variables may mask economic interests.
Economic determinants of voting in the European Parliament have been overlooked by
the literature so far. This thesis makes a contribution to filling this gap in the existing
literature by investigating how the budgetary implications of bills affect the behaviour of
legislators in final votes.
Drawing upon a recent study (Bailer, Mattila and Schneider 2010) on the Council
and using classical theory developed for the US Congress (Cox and McCubbins 2007,
Fenno 1978), I have proposed that, depending on the initial level of polarization in the
European Parliament, budgetary implications alter the behaviour of legislators. At the
same time, it has to be mentioned that budgetary implications do not affect the chances
for passage or failure of a bill. Budgetary implications are important for the level of
agreement, not for the outcome of the vote. It is conceptualized that legislators have
three main goals: re-election, power while in office and good policy (Faas 2003, Fenno
1978). In order for them to attain the latter two goals, they are to further the interests
of their home constituencies (Fenno 1978).
For the setting of the European Parliament I have, however – in line with much
of the existing literature (Hix 2002, Hix, Raunio and Scully 1999, Hix and Noury 2009,
Mu¨hlbo¨ck 2012) – argued that legislators are responsive to the demands of their European
Party Groups, and hence less likely to defect in situations where there is increased party
pressure. This is especially so because the electoral connection between legislators and
their constituencies is frail (Carey 2007). Such situations are captured by looking at
situations where there is a breakdown in the negotiations and the party of the rapporteur
79
80 CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
either defects or is split. From this proposition I derive two testable hypotheses. First, I
hypothesize that in situations where the bill has implications for the status quo allocation
of resources, legislative cohesion is likely to be lower. Secondly, legislative unity is likely
to increase in situations where the party of the rapporteur defects, as legislators respond
to increased party pressure. Failure to respond to party pressure might lead to sanctions,
consequently making the attainment of the second goal harder.
To the best of my knowledge, such propositions have not been tested on the European
Parliament previously. In order to rectify this omission, I have collected data on all final
votes in the European Parliament in the period 14.09.2009 - 14.03.2013. The dataset
contains information about the type of bill, information about how the legislators voted,
as well as the rapporteurs on the case. Bills are coded to have budgetary implications
when they alter the existing status quo on the set area, as discussed in Section 3.2.1.
By employing the RICE index (Rice 1924) and the Agreement Index (Hix, Noury and
Roland 2005) in their original form and with some modifications, I have tested the impact
of budgetary implications. Despite the small level of censoring, OLS estimates are likely
to be inconsistent. Consequently, I have employed Tobit model specifications in order
to draw inferences about the hypothesized relationship. The initial level of polarization
before final votes has been captured by the interaction between budgetary implications
and defection on behalf of the party of the rapporteur. This interaction has been shown
to be robust across model specifications. Yet, as predicted by Peltzman (1984) it seems
that ideological variables mask in part the effect of budgetary implications. Even when
controlling for party positions, budgetary implications in the absence of other polarizing
factors retain their significance in the models with the Agreement Index. Accounting for
the hierarchical nature of the data does not alter the results substantially, as shown in
Section 5.3.
In conclusion, it can be argued that the interaction between budgetary implications
and legislative unity is significant and relatively robust. Generally, members of the Eu-
ropean Parliament aim at pleasing their home constituencies, while at the same time
remain loyal to their European Party Group. In cases where the party of the rapporteur
defects and the bill has budgetary implications, it seems that parties use their pressuring
mechanisms and, as a consequence, higher cohesion in the legislative is likely.
Despite the relative robustness of these findings, caution is warranted. First, the effects
are weak in terms of magnitude. Secondly, even if defection is known chronologically
before the final vote, it is only observed at the time of the vote, thus raising problems
of endogenity. Several instruments have been tested in order to remedy the problem,
nonetheless they have proven too weak. Given the weak correlation such an approach has
not been pursued.
This thesis has been unable to differentiate between national interests and partisan
ones. For example, Grossman and Helpman (1996) propose that interest groups are also
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able to alter the behaviour of legislators, hence legislators might also defect because of
partisan interests and not only because of national constituencies. Further research is
needed in order to map the exact mechanisms that lead to defections. Another aspect
that could be potentially interesting for future research is the dis-aggregation of budgetary
implications further in order to investigate how these effects differ when bills add increased
revenue, or in cases in which they are extractive from the national constituencies versus
in cases where they only impact the budget of the EU as an institution.
This thesis provides some evidence that altering the existing budgetary allocation
is bound to lead to a higher level of disagreement between legislators. As mentioned,
future research could dis-aggregate budgetary implications further and investigate how
legislative unity is influenced when national party positions are accounted for. This
is perhaps most interesting in situations when the implications are detrimental for the
respective member states.
These caveats notwithstanding, this thesis has provided robust evidence for how bud-
getary implications impact the level of cohesiveness in the European Parliament, yet the
effects are dual as they are dependent on the initial level of polarization. Nevertheless,
in order to better map the dynamics of the European Parliament, future research could
elaborate on both the factors that influence committee level negotiations, while at the
same time differentiate more clearly between the mechanisms that affect the legislator’s
behaviour in the plenary,or example, by differentiating between partisan interests and
national ones.
In conclusion, this thesis has shown that budgetary implications are important for
the level of cohesion within the European Parliament. For cases where the bill alters
the existing budgetary status-quo, while there are few other polarizing factors, legislative
unity is lower. The main exceptions are the cases where the party of the rapporteur
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Figure A.1: Influential observations for the tobit model with AIn as the dependent vari-
able. The dfbeta values are small, therefore observations with leverage are not a major
concern. I have removed the 30 of the most influential observations in this case and
re-estimated the model. Removing these observations did not impact the substantive
interpretation of the models.
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Figure A.2: Influential observations for the tobit model with RICE as the dependent
variable. The dfbeta values are small, therefore observations with leverage are not a
major concern. I have removed the 30 of the most influential observations in this case
and re-estimated the model. Removing these observations only slightly impacted sub-
stantive interpretation of the models. The model remains supportive of the hypothesized
relationship.
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Figure A.3: Influential observations for the tobit model with RICEabs as the dependent
variable. The dfbeta values are small, therefore observations with leverage are not a
major concern. I have removed the 30 of the most influential observations in this case
and re-estimated the model. Removing these observations had only a minor impact the
substantive interpretation of the models.
Appendix B
Tobit models without interaction
Table B.1: Tobit models with only budgetary implication. It presents the tobit models
without the interaction. Budgetary implications retain their negative effect on legislative
unity even in the absence of an interaction with defection of behalf of the party of the
rapporteur.
Dependent variable:
AI AIn abs(RICE) abs(RICEabs)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Budget −0.018 −0.022∗ −0.004 −0.015
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015)
Result 0.150∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.028)
Legislative 0.051∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
No. Terms 0.007 0.012∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Defection −0.165∗∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗ −0.216∗∗∗ −0.226∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.021)
EPP dummy 0.268∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.029) (0.030)
Constant 0.361∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.039) (0.041)
σ −1.969∗∗∗ −1.968∗∗∗ −1.751∗∗∗ −1.706∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 944 944 944 944
Log likelihood 518.164 518.784 310.315 269.933
Wald Test (df = 6) 491.789∗∗∗ 472.942∗∗∗ 521.415∗∗∗ 432.769∗∗∗




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure C.1: Test of heteroskedasticity for the AI tobit model. The figure shows that
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13 l ibrary ( xtab l e )
14 l ibrary ( Z e l i g )
15
16 #### Read data #####
17
18 #data <− read . c sv ( ”C:/Users/Andreea/Dropbox/J inx/Votes/DataSet . c s v ”) # remember to put in c o r r e c t path / use se twd and remove th e wd common par t from the d i r
19 data <− read . csv ( ”DataSet . csv ”)
20
21 #vo t e s = read . t a b l e ( ” v o t e s . t x t ”)
22 #case s = read . t a b l e ( ” ca s e s . t x t ”)
23 #BjornData <− merge ( vo t e s , cases , by . x = c (” case i d ”) , a l l . x = TRUE)
24
25 #### Funct ions ####
26
27 # Ex t r a c t i n g t h e p a r t i e s o f a l l r a p po r t e u r s f o r each case #
28
29 getRapporteursEPGs <− function ( epg1 , epg2 , epg3 , epg4 , epg5 , epg6 , epg7 , epg8 ) {
30 epgs <− c ( ”GUE/NGL” , ”Greens ” , ”S&D” , ”ALDE” , ”EPP” , ”ECR” , ”EFD” , ”NI”)
31
32 rapEpgs <− c ( ”” , ”” , ”” , ”” , ”” , ”” , ”” , ”” , ””)
33
34 i f ( i s .na( epg1 ) == FALSE && epg1 != ””) rapEpgs [ grep ( epg1 , epgs ) ] <− epg1
35 i f ( i s .na( epg2 ) == FALSE && epg2 != ””) rapEpgs [ grep ( epg2 , epgs ) ] <− epg2
36 i f ( i s .na( epg3 ) == FALSE && epg3 != ””) rapEpgs [ grep ( epg3 , epgs ) ] <− epg3
37 i f ( i s .na( epg4 ) == FALSE && epg4 != ””) rapEpgs [ grep ( epg4 , epgs ) ] <− epg4
38 i f ( i s .na( epg5 ) == FALSE && epg5 != ””) rapEpgs [ grep ( epg5 , epgs ) ] <− epg5
39 i f ( i s .na( epg6 ) == FALSE && epg6 != ””) rapEpgs [ grep ( epg6 , epgs ) ] <− epg6
40 i f ( i s .na( epg7 ) == FALSE && epg7 != ””) rapEpgs [ grep ( epg7 , epgs ) ] <− epg7
41 i f ( i s .na( epg8 ) == FALSE && epg8 != ””) rapEpgs [ grep ( epg8 , epgs ) ] <− epg8
42
43 return ( rapEpgs )
44 }
45
46 getStringFromArray <− function (array ) {
47 i f ( i s . null (array ) ) {
48 return ( ””)
49 }
50
51 s t r i n g <− ””
52
53 for ( i in 1 : length (array ) ) {
54 i f (array [ i ] != ””) {










63 ### Ex t r a c t i n g whether a pa r t y o f a rappo r t eu r has d e f e c t e d from the winning c o a l i t i o n ####
64 getDeltaBetween <− function ( majority , rapEpgs ) {




69 de l t a <− NULL
70
71 for ( i in 1 : length ( rapEpgs ) ) {
72 i f ( rapEpgs [ i ] != ”NI”) {
73 found <− FALSE
74
75 for ( j in 1 : length ( major i ty ) ) {
76 i f ( rapEpgs [ i ] == major i ty [ j ] ) {





82 i f ( found == FALSE) {





88 return ( de l t a )
89 }
90
91 #### Cons t ruc t i n g and renaming v a r i a b l e s #####
92
93 data$ r e s u l t 1 <− i f e l s e (data$Result . o f . vote == ”+” , 1 , i f e l s e (data$Result . o f . vote == ”−” , 0 , NA))
94 data$area1 <− as .numeric (data$Pol i cy . area )
95
96 policyareaNames <− levels (data$Pol i cy . area ) [ 2 : 21 ]
97
98 data$budget <− i f e l s e (data$Budgetary . imp l i c a t i on . . 1 . . 0 . >= 1 , 1 , 0)
99
100 data$ s i z e . winning . coa l <− NA
101 data$Majority . formed .by <− as . character (data$Majority . formed .by)
102 class (data$Major ity . formed .by)
103
104 data$ p a r t i e s . o f . rapp <− NA
105
106 data$EPG1 <− as . character (data$EPG1)
107 data$EPG2 <− as . character (data$EPG2)
108 data$EPG3 <− as . character (data$EPG3)
109 data$EPG4 <− as . character (data$EPG4)
110 data$EPG5 <− as . character (data$EPG5)
111 data$EPG6 <− as . character (data$EPG6)
112 data$EPG7 <− as . character (data$EPG7)
113 data$EPG8 <− as . character (data$EPG8)
114
115 for ( i in 1 : nrow(data ) ) {
116 major i ty . array <− unlist ( s t r sp l i t (data$Major ity . formed .by [ i ] , ” , ” ) )
117 data$ s i z e . winning . coa l [ i ] <− length ( major i ty . array )
118
119 rapp . epg . array <− getRapporteursEPGs (data$EPG1[ i ] , data$EPG2[ i ] , data$EPG3[ i ] , data$EPG4[ i ] , data$EPG5[ i ] , data$EPG6[ i ] ,
120 data$EPG7[ i ] , data$EPG8[ i ] )
121 data$ p a r t i e s . o f . rapp [ i ] <− getStringFromArray ( rapp . epg . array )
122
123 rappEpgNotInMajority <− getDeltaBetween ( major i ty . array , rapp . epg . array )
124 data$rapp . party . not . in . major i ty [ i ] <− getStringFromArray ( rappEpgNotInMajority )
125
126 i f (data$rapp . party . not . in . major i ty [ i ] != ””) {
127 data$d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp [ i ] = 1
128 } else {
129 data$d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp [ i ] = 0
130 }
131
132 i f ( length (grep ( ”EPP” , data$Majority . formed .by [ i ] ) ) > 0) {
133 data$EPPdummy[ i ] = 1
134 } else {
135 data$EPPdummy[ i ] = 0
136 }
137
138 i f ( length (grep ( ”S&D” , data$Majority . formed .by [ i ] ) ) > 0) {
139 data$SDdummy[ i ] = 1
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140 } else {
141 data$SDdummy[ i ] = 0
142 }
143
144 i f ( length (grep ( ”ALDE” , data$Majority . formed .by [ i ] ) ) > 0) {
145 data$ALDEdummy[ i ] = 1
146 } else {
147 data$ALDEdummy[ i ] = 0
148 }
149
150 i f ( length (grep ( ”Greens ” , data$Major ity . formed .by [ i ] ) ) > 0) {
151 data$Greensdummy [ i ] = 1
152 } else {
153 data$Greensdummy [ i ] = 0
154 }
155
156 i f ( length (grep ( ”GUE/NGL” , data$Majority . formed .by [ i ] ) ) > 0) {
157 data$GUENGLdummy[ i ] = 1
158 } else {
159 data$GUENGLdummy[ i ] = 0
160 }
161
162 i f ( length (grep ( ”ECR” , data$Majority . formed .by [ i ] ) ) > 0) {
163 data$ECRdummy[ i ] = 1
164 } else {
165 data$ECRdummy[ i ] = 0
166 }
167 i f ( length (grep ( ”EFD” , data$Majority . formed .by [ i ] ) ) > 0) {
168 data$EFDdummy[ i ] = 1
169 } else {




174 #### The Agreement Index and AIn are c a l c u l a t e d be low #####
175
176 class (data$Yes )
177
178 data$AI <− (
179 i f e l s e (
180 data$Yes > data$No & data$Yes > data$Abs ,
181 data$Yes ,
182 i f e l s e (




187 ) − (
188 0 .5 * (data$Yes + data$No + data$Abs − i f e l s e (
189 data$Yes > data$No & data$Yes > data$Abs ,
190 data$Yes ,
191 i f e l s e (







199 ) / (data$Yes + data$No + data$Abs)
200
201 data$AI <− i f e l s e (data$AI == 0 , NA, data$AI)
202
203 #data$AI2 <− i f e l s e ( data$AI > . 7 , 1 , 0)
204
205 data$AbsDidntVote <− data$Abs+data$Didn . t . vote
206
207 data$AIn <− (
208 i f e l s e (
209 data$Yes > data$No & data$Yes > data$AbsDidntVote ,
210 data$Yes ,
211 i f e l s e (




216 ) − (
217 0 .5 * (data$Yes + data$No + data$AbsDidntVote − i f e l s e (
218 data$Yes > data$No & data$Yes > data$AbsDidntVote ,
219 data$Yes ,
220 i f e l s e (
99







228 ) / (data$Yes + data$No + data$AbsDidntVote )
229
230 #### Ca l c u l a t i n g t h e RICE index #####
231
232 data$RICE <− (data$Yes − data$No) / (data$Yes + data$No)
233 data$RICE2 <− i f e l s e (data$RICE > 0 . 1 , 1 , 0)
234
235 data$RICEabs <− NA
236 data$NoAndAbs <− data$No + data$Abs
237 data$RICEabs <− (data$Yes − data$NoAndAbs) / (data$Yes + data$NoAndAbs)
238




243 data$Date <− as . Date ( as . character (data$Date ) , format = ”%d.%m.%Y”)
244
245 data$time <− as .numeric (data$Date ) − as .numeric ( as . Date ( ”2009−09−14” ) )
246 data$ l ogt ime <− log (data$time )
247
248 #### De s c r i p t i v e s #####
249
250 pdf ( ”scatterPlotDV . pdf ”)
251 par ( mfrow = c (2 , 1 ) )
252 s c a t t e r p l o t (data$AIn , data$AI)
253 s c a t t e r p l o t (data$RICE, data$RICEabs )
254 dev . of f ( )
255
256 pdf ( ”scatterAIandRICE . pdf ”)
257 s c a t t e r p l o t (data$AI , abs (data$RICE) )
258 dev . of f ( )
259
260 s c a t t e r p l o t (data$AI , abs (data$RICEabs ) )
261
262 #Budge t a r y Imp l i c a t i onTab l e <− x t a b l e ( t a b l e ( data$ budge t ) )
263
264 boxplot (data$RICEabs )
265 boxplot (data$AI ˜ data$Budgetary . imp l i c a t i on . . 1 . . 0 . )
266 hist (data$AI)
267 #t a b l e ( da ta$AI , data$Budgetary . imp l i c a t i o n . . 1 . . 0 . )
268 plot (data$AI , data$budget , cex = 0 .5 , pch = 19)
269 dev . of f ( )
270
271 budge tLeg i s l a t i on <− with (data , xtabs (˜ Budgetary . imp l i c a t i on . . 1 . . 0 . + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . ) )
272
273 xtab l e ( budgetLeg i s l a t ion , capt ion = ”Budgetary imp l i c a t i on by l e g i s l a t i v e votes ” , l a b e l = ”buge tLeg i s l a t i on ” , a l i g n = ' l c c ' )
274
275 #x t a b l e ( summary ( data [ , c ( ”AI ” , ”AIn ” , ”RICE” , ”RICEabs ”) ] ) )
276
277 numdata <− data [ , c ( ”AI” , ”AIn” , ”RICE” , ”RICEabs” , ”budget ” , ”Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . ” , ”No . . Terms” ,




282 # ### De s c r i p t i v e t a b l e ###
283
284 # l i b r a r y ( x t a b l e )
285 a l i g n = c ( ” l ” , rep ( ”c ” , 3 ) )
286
287 desc . table <− cbind (
288 colMeans ( numdata [ , 1 : 9 ] , na .rm = T) ,
289 apply ( numdata [ , 1 : 9 ] , MARGIN = 2 , FUN = sd , na .rm = T) ,
290 apply ( numdata [ , 1 : 9 ] , 2 , min , na .rm = T) ,
291 apply ( numdata [ , 1 : 9 ] , 2 , max, na .rm = T) ,
292 colSums ( i s .na( numdata [ , 1 : 9 ] ) )
293 )
294
295 colnames ( desc . table ) <− c ( ”Mean” , ”SD” , ”Min” , ”Max” , ”Miss ing ”)
296 rownames( desc . table ) <− c ( ”AI” , ”AIn” , ”RICE” , ”RICEabs” , ”Budgetary imp l i c a t i on ” , ” L e g i s l a t i o n ” , ”No . Terms o f rapporteur ” ,
297 ”Defec t ion ” , ”EPP dummy”)
298
299 print (
300 xtab le (
301 desc . table ,
100 APPENDIX D. R CODE
302 d i g i t s = 2 ,
303 capt ion = ”Desc r i p t i v e s t a t i s t i c s ” ,
304 l a b e l = ”tab : d e s c r i p t i v ” ,
305 a l i g n = c ( ” l ” , rep ( ”c ” , 5 ) )
306 ) ,
307 s i z e = ” f o o t n o t e s i z e ” ,
308 f i l e = ” d e s c r i p t i v e s . tex ”
309 )
310
311 #### Bi v a r i a t e Co r r e l a t i o n s between v a r i a b l e s o f s u b s t a n t i a l i n t e r e s t #####
312
313 data$absRICE <− abs (data$RICE)
314
315 cor (abs (data$RICE) , data$budget , use = ”complete . obs ”)
316 cor (data$absRICE , data$budget , use = ”complete . obs ”)
317
318 b ivar i a t eCor <− cor (data [ , c ( ”AI” , ”AIn” , ”RICE” , ”RICEabs” , ”budget ” , ”Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . ” , ”No . . Terms” ,
319 ” d e f e c t i o n . by . party . o f . rapp ” , ”EPPdummy” ) ] , use = ”complete . obs ”)
320
321 colnames ( b iva r i a t eCor ) <− c ( ”AI” , ”AIn” , ”RICE” , ”RICEabs” , ”budget ” , ”Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . ” , ”No . . Terms” ,
322 ” d e f e c t i o n . by . party . o f . rapp ” , ”EPPdummy”)
323 rownames( b iva r i a t eCor ) <− c ( ”AI” , ”AIn” , ”RICE” , ”RICEabs” , ”budget ” , ”Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . ” , ”No . . Terms” ,
324 ” d e f e c t i o n . by . party . o f . rapp ” , ”EPPdummy”)
325
326 print (
327 xtab le (
328 bivar iateCor ,
329 d i g i t s = 3 ,
330 capt ion = ”Biva r i a t e c o r r e l a t i o n s ” ,
331 l a b e l = ”tab : b iva r i a t eCor ”
332 ) ,
333 s i z e = ” f o o t n o t e s i z e ” ,





339 pdf ( ”beanplotsAIandRICE . pdf ”)
340 par ( mfrow = c (1 , 2 ) )
341 beanplot (
342 data$AI ˜ data$budget ,
343 col = c ( ”#CAB2D6” , ”#33A02C” , ”#B2DF8A”) ,
344 border = ”black ” ,
345 xlab = ”Budgetary Imp l i ca t i on ” ,
346 ylab = ”Agreement Index ” ,
347 main = ”AI by budgetary imp l i c a t i on ”
348 )
349 #green l i n e s show i n d i v i d u a l o b s e r v a t i o n s wh i l e t h e pu rp l e po l ygon shows th e d i s t r i b u t i o n
350 beanplot (
351 data$RICE ˜ data$budget ,
352 col = c ( ”#CAB2D6” , ”#33A02C” , ”#B2DF8A”) ,
353 border = ”black ” ,
354 xlab = ”Budgetary Imp l i ca t i on ” ,
355 ylab = ”RICE” ,
356 main = ”RICE by budgetary imp l i c a t i on ”
357 )
358 dev . of f ( )
359
360 pdf ( ”beanplotsAIandRICEleg i s lat ion . pdf ”)
361 par ( mfrow = c (1 , 2 ) )
362 beanplot (
363 data$AI ˜ data$Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . ,
364 col = c ( ”#CAB2D6” , ”#33A02C” , ”#B2DF8A”) ,
365 border = ”black ” ,
366 xlab = ” L e g i s l a t i v e = 1 ” ,
367 ylab = ”Agreement Index ” ,
368 main = ”AI by l e g i s l a t i o n ”
369 )
370 #green l i n e s show i n d i v i d u a l o b s e r v a t i o n s wh i l e t h e pu rp l e po l ygon shows th e d i s t r i b u t i o n
371 beanplot (
372 data$RICE ˜ data$Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . ,
373 col = c ( ”#CAB2D6” , ”#33A02C” , ”#B2DF8A”) ,
374 border = ”black ” ,
375 xlab = ” L e g i s l a t i v e = 1 ” ,
376 ylab = ”RICE” ,
377 main = ”RICE by l e g i s l a t i o n ”
378 )
379 dev . of f ( )
380
381 #### Est ima t ing OLS models #####
382
101
383 o l sAI . no In t e ra c t i on <− lm(AI ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp
384 + EPPdummy, data = data )
385 summary( o l sAI . no In t e ra c t i on )
386
387 o l sAI <− lm(AI ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy
388 + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp , data = data )
389 summary( o l sAI )
390
391 olsAIn <− lm(AIn ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy
392 + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp , data = data )
393 summary( olsAIn )
394
395 olsRICE <− lm( absRICE ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp
396 + EPPdummy + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp , data = data )
397 summary( olsRICE )
398
399 olsRICEabs <− lm(abs (RICEabs ) ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
400 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp , data = data )
401 summary( olsRICEabs )
402
403 s t a r ga z e r ( o l sAI . no Inte rac t ion , olsAI , olsAIn , olsRICE , olsRICEabs )
404
405 ### Est ima t ing Tob i t w i t h ou t i n t e r a c t i o n ####
406
407 t o b i t . AI . no In t e ra c t i on <− t o b i t (AI ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
408 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy, data = data , l e f t = 0 , r i g h t = 1)
409 summary( t o b i t . AI . no In t e ra c t i on )
410
411 t o b i t . AIn . no In t e ra c t i on <− t o b i t (AIn ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
412 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy, data = data , l e f t = 0 , r i g h t = 1)
413 summary( t o b i t . AIn . no In t e ra c t i on )
414
415 t o b i t .RICE . no In t e ra c t i on <− t o b i t (abs (RICE) ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
416 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy, data = data , l e f t = 0 , r i g h t = 1)
417 summary( t o b i t .RICE . no In t e ra c t i on )
418
419 t o b i t . RICEabs . no In t e ra c t i on <− t o b i t (abs (RICEabs ) ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
420 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy, data = data , l e f t = 0 , r i g h t = 1)
421 summary( t o b i t . RICEabs . no In t e ra c t i on )
422
423 #### Est ima t ing t o b i t models ######
424
425 t o b i t . AI . d e f e c t <− t o b i t (AI ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp
426 + EPPdummy + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp , data = data , l e f t = 0 , r i g h t = 1)
427 summary( t o b i t . AI . d e f e c t )
428
429 t o b i t . AIn . d e f e c t <− t o b i t (AIn ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
430 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp , data = data , l e f t = 0 , r i g h t = 1)
431 summary( t o b i t . AIn . d e f e c t )
432
433 t o b i t .RICE . de f e c t <− t o b i t (abs (RICE) ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
434 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp , data = data , l e f t = 0 , r i g h t = 1)
435 summary( t o b i t .RICE . de f e c t )
436
437 t o b i t . RICEabs . d e f e c t <− t o b i t (abs (RICEabs ) ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
438 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp , data = data , l e f t = 0 , r i g h t = 1)
439 summary( t o b i t . RICEabs . d e f e c t )
440
441 s t a r ga z e r ( t o b i t . AI . de fec t , t o b i t . AIn . de f ec t , t o b i t .RICE . de fec t , t o b i t . RICEabs . d e f e c t )
442
443 #save . image (”MayImage . Rdata ”)
444
445
446 #### L in e a r i t y t e s t s #####
447
448 summary( t o b i t . AI . d e f e c t )
449
450 #ge t un s t anda rd i z e d p r e d i c t e d and r e s i d u a l v a l u e s
451 unstandard izedPred icted <− predict ( t o b i t . AI . d e f e c t )
452 unstandard izedRes idua l s <− resid ( t o b i t . AI . d e f e c t )
453
454 #ge t s t a n da r d i z e d v a l u e s
455 s tandard i zedPred i c t ed <− ( unstandard izedPred icted − mean( unstandard izedPred icted ) ) / sd ( unstandard izedPred icted )
456 s tandard i z edRes idua l s <− ( unstandard izedRes idua l s − mean( unstandard izedRes idua l s ) ) / sd ( unstandard izedRes idua l s )
457
458 #cr e a t e s t a nda r d i z e d r e s i d u a l s p l o t
459 pdf ( ”Standard izedvsPred ic tedRes idua l sAI . pdf ”)
460 plot (
461 standard izedPred ic ted ,
462 standard izedRes idua l s ,
463 main = ”Standardized Res idua l s Plot ” ,
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464 xlab = ”Standardized Pred icted Values ” ,
465 ylab = ”Standardized Res idua l s ”
466 )
467 abline (0 , 0 )
468 dev . of f ( )
469
470 #cr e a t e r e s i d u a l s h i s togram
471 pdf ( ”Res idua l sHistAI . pdf ”)
472 hist ( s tandard izedRes idua l s , f r e q = FALSE)
473 curve (dnorm , add = TRUE)
474 dev . of f ( )
475
476 #ge t p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n f o r r e s i d u a l s
477 probDist <− pnorm( s tandard i zedRes idua l s )
478
479 #cr e a t e PP p l o t
480 pdf ( ”PPPlotAI . pdf ”)
481 plot (
482 ppoints ( length ( s tandard i zedRes idua l s ) ) ,
483 sort ( probDist ) ,
484 main = ”PP Plot ” ,
485 xlab = ”Observed Probab i l i t y ” ,
486 ylab = ”Expected Probab i l i t y ”
487 )
488 abline (0 , 1 )
489 dev . of f ( )
490
491 ##### Res i dua l s and i n f l u e n t i a l c a s e s : d f b e t a t e s t s ######
492
493 data$row <− rownames(data )
494
495 attach (data )
496 nona <− na . omit (data . frame (AI , AIn , RICE, RICEabs , budget , r e su l t 1 , Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . , No . . Terms ,
497 d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp , EPPdummy, row ) )
498 detach (data )
499
500 summary( t o b i t . AI . d e f e c t )
501
502 dfbeta <− as . data . frame ( residuals ( t o b i t . AI . de fec t , type = ”dfbeta ” ) )
503 dfbeta$ id < rownames(data )
504
505 pdf ( ”Re s i dua l s I n t e r a c t i onDe f e c t i on . pdf ”)
506
507 par ( mfrow = c (2 , 2 ) )
508
509 plot ( nona$row , d fbeta [ , 2 ] , type = ”n” , ylab = ”Budget ” , xlab = ”Observation ” )
510 text ( nona$row , d fbeta [ , 2 ] , l a b e l = nona$row , cex = 0 . 7 )
511
512 plot ( nona$row , d fbeta [ , 6 ] , type = ”n” , ylab = ”Defec t ion ” , xlab = ”Observation ” )
513 text ( nona$row , d fbeta [ , 6 ] , l a b e l = nona$row , cex = 0 . 7 )
514
515 plot ( nona$row , d fbeta [ , 8 ] , type = ”n” , ylab = ”Budget * Defect ion ” , xlab = ”Observation ” )
516 text ( nona$row , d fbeta [ , 8 ] , l a b e l = nona$row , cex = 0 . 7 )
517
518 dev . of f ( )
519
520 data [ 1056 , ]
521 data [ 9 8 , ]
522
523 AI . no In f luence <− t o b i t (
524 AI ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp
525 + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy,
526 data = nona [which (
527 nona$row != 1123 & nona$row != 1034 & nona$row != 1126 & nona$row != 184 & nona$row != 781
528 & nona$row != 98 & nona$row != 1126 & nona$row != 295 & nona$row != 1177 & nona$row != 576
529 ) , ] ,
530 l e f t = 0 ,
531 r i g h t = 1
532 )
533 summary(AI . no In f luence )
534
535 AI . no . E f f e c tOnInte rac t i on <− t o b i t (
536 AI ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
537 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy,
538 data = nona [which ( nona$row != 1054 & nona$row != 1056 & nona$row != 182 & nona$row != 434) , ] ,
539 l e f t = 0 ,
540 r i g h t = 1
541 )
542 summary(AI . no . E f f e c tOnInte rac t i on )
543
544 AI . no . E f f e c tOnInte rac t i on <− t o b i t (
103
545 AI ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
546 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy,
547 data = nona [which (
548 nona$row != 1054 & nona$row != 1056 & nona$row != 182 & nona$row != 434
549 & nona$row != 601 & nona$row != 812 & nona$row != 1125 & nona$row != 1180
550 & nona$row != 1025 & nona$row != 652 & nona$row != 1018 & nona$row != 596
551 & nona$row != 595 & nona$row != 331 & nona$row != 597 & nona$row != 256
552 & nona$row != 1026 & nona$row != 544 & nona$row != 948 & nona$row != 1026
553 & nona$row != 324 & nona$row != 705 & nona$row != 518 & nona$row != 968
554 & nona$row != 987 & nona$row != 305
555 ) , ] ,
556 l e f t = 0 ,
557 r i g h t = 1
558 )
559 summary(AI . no . E f f e c tOnInte rac t i on )
560
561 #Df be t a f o r AIn
562
563 t o b i t . nona . AIn <− t o b i t (
564 AIn ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp
565 + EPPdummy + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp ,
566 l e f t = 0 ,
567 r i g h t = 1 ,
568 data = nona
569 )
570 summary( t o b i t . nona . AIn )
571
572 dfbeta . AIn <− as . data . frame ( residuals ( t o b i t . nona . AIn , type = ”dfbeta ” ) )
573 #d f b e t a . AIn$ i d1 <− rownames ( data )
574
575 pdf ( ”Res idua l s In t e rac t i onAIn . pdf ”)
576
577 par ( mfrow = c (3 , 2 ) )
578
579 plot ( nona$row , d fbeta . AIn [ , 2 ] , type = ”n” , ylab = ” Budget ” , xlab = ”Observation ”)
580 text ( nona$row , d fbeta . AIn [ , 2 ] , l a b e l = nona$row , cex = 0 . 7 )
581
582 plot ( nona$row , d fbeta . AIn [ , 6 ] , type = ”n” , ylab = ” Defec t ion ” , xlab = ”Observation ”)
583 text ( nona$row , d fbeta . AIn [ , 6 ] , l a b e l = nona$row , cex = 0 . 7 )
584
585 plot ( nona$row , d fbeta . AIn [ , 8 ] , type = ”n” , ylab = ” Budget * Defect ion ” , xlab = ”Observation ”)
586 text ( nona$row , d fbeta . AIn [ , 8 ] , l a b e l = nona$row , cex = 0 . 7 )
587
588 dev . of f ( )
589
590 #AI MODEL wi t hou t i n f l u e n t i a l c a s e s
591
592 AIn . no . E f f e c tOnInte rac t i on <− t o b i t (
593 AIn ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
594 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy,
595 data = nona [which (
596 nona$row != 434 & nona$row != 182 & nona$row != 282 & nona$row != 1056
597 & nona$row != 1054 & nona$row != 1025 & nona$row != 1180 & nona$row != 575
598 & nona$row != 973 & nona$row != 757 & nona$row != 218 & nona$row != 1018
599 & nona$row != 331 & nona$row != 596 & nona$row != 656 & nona$row != 567
600 & nona$row != 1026 & nona$row != 259 & nona$row != 544 & nona$row != 7
601 & nona$row != 948 & nona$row != 972 & nona$row != 705 & nona$row != 451
602 & nona$row != 987 & nona$row != 518 & nona$row != 172
603 ) , ] ,
604 l e f t = 0 ,
605 r i g h t = 1
606 )
607 summary(AIn . no . E f f e c tOnInte rac t i on )
608
609 #Res i dua l s RICE wi t hou t i n f l u e n t i a l c a s e s
610
611 t o b i t . nona .RICE <− t o b i t (
612 abs (RICE) ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
613 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp ,
614 l e f t = 0 ,
615 r i g h t = 1 ,
616 data = nona
617 )
618 summary( t o b i t . nona .RICE)
619
620 dfbeta .RICE <− as . data . frame ( residuals ( t o b i t . nona . RICE, type = ”dfbeta ” ) )
621 #d f b e t a . AIn$ i d1 <− rownames ( data )
622
623 pdf ( ”Res iduals Interact ionRICE . pdf ”)
624
625 par ( mfrow = c (2 , 2 ) )
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626
627 plot ( nona$row , d fbeta .RICE [ , 2 ] , type = ”n” , ylab = ” Budget ” , xlab = ”Observation ” )
628 text ( nona$row , d fbeta .RICE [ , 2 ] , l a b e l = nona$row , cex = 0 . 7 )
629
630 plot ( nona$row , d fbeta .RICE [ , 6 ] , type = ”n” , ylab = ” Defec t ion ” , xlab = ”Observation ” )
631 text ( nona$row , d fbeta .RICE [ , 6 ] , l a b e l = nona$row , cex = 0 . 7 )
632
633 plot ( nona$row , d fbeta .RICE [ , 8 ] , type = ”n” , ylab = ” Budget*Defect ion ” , xlab = ”Observation ” )
634 text ( nona$row , d fbeta .RICE [ , 8 ] , l a b e l = nona$row , cex = 0 . 7 )
635
636 dev . of f ( )
637
638 RICE . no . E f f e c tOnInte rac t i on <− t o b i t (
639 abs (RICE) ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
640 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy,
641 data = nona [which (
642 nona$row!=434 & nona$row!=282 & nona$row!=128 & nona$row!=1056
643 & nona$row!=1054 & nona$row!=206 & nona$row!=522 & nona$row!=519
644 & nona$row!=601 & nona$row!=164 & nona$row!=812 & nona$row!=596
645 & nona$row!=593 & nona$row!=595 & nona$row!=331 & nona$row!=125
646 & nona$row!=259 & nona$row!=214 & nona$row!=737 & nona$row!=324
647 & nona$row!=544 & nona$row!=74 & nona$row!=987 & nona$row!=968
648 & nona$row!=705 & nona$row!=518 & nona$row!=305
649 ) , ] ,
650 l e f t = 0 , r i g h t = 1
651 )
652 summary(RICE . no . E f f e c tOnInte rac t i on )
653
654 #Res i dua l s RICEabs
655
656 t o b i t . nona . RICEabs <− t o b i t (
657 abs (RICEabs ) ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
658 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp ,
659 l e f t = 0 ,
660 r i g h t = 1 ,
661 data = nona
662 )
663 summary( t o b i t . nona . RICEabs )
664
665 dfbeta . RICEabs <− as . data . frame ( residuals ( t o b i t . nona . RICEabs , type = ”dfbeta ” ) )
666 #d f b e t a . AIn$ i d1 <− rownames ( data )
667
668 pdf ( ”Res iduals Interact ionRICEabs . pdf ”)
669
670 par ( mfrow = c (2 , 2 ) )
671
672 plot ( nona$row , d fbeta . RICEabs [ , 2 ] , type = ”n” , ylab = ” Budget ” , xlab = ”Observation ” )
673 text ( nona$row , d fbeta . RICEabs [ , 2 ] , l a b e l = nona$row , cex = 0 . 7 )
674
675 plot ( nona$row , d fbeta . RICEabs [ , 3 ] , type = ”n” , ylab = ” Defec t ion ” , xlab = ”Observation ” )
676 text ( nona$row , d fbeta . RICEabs [ , 3 ] , l a b e l = nona$row , cex = 0 . 7 )
677
678 plot ( nona$row , d fbeta . RICEabs [ , 9 ] , type = ”n” , ylab = ” Budget * Defect ion ” , xlab = ”Observation ” )
679 text ( nona$row , d fbeta . RICEabs [ , 9 ] , l a b e l = nona$row , cex = 0 . 7 )
680
681 dev . of f ( )
682
683 # RICEabs model w i t hou t i n f l u e n t i a l c a s e s
684
685 RICEabs . no . E f f e c tOnInte rac t i on <− t o b i t (
686 abs (RICEabs ) ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
687 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy,
688 data = nona [which (
689 nona$row != 206 & nona$row != 596 & nona$row != 593 & nona$row != 887
690 & nona$row != 519 & nona$row != 812 & nona$row != 1025 & nona$row != 1180
691 & nona$row != 522 & nona$row != 652 & nona$row != 206 & nona$row != 596
692 & nona$row != 593 & nona$row != 595 & nona$row != 331 & nona$row != 397
693 & nona$row != 16 & nona$row != 752 & nona$row != 781 & nona$row != 602
694 & nona$row != 320 & nona$row != 902 & nona$row != 7 & nona$row != 1034
695 & nona$row != 1026 & nona$row != 1123 & nona$row != 892
696 ) , ] ,
697 l e f t = 0 ,
698 r i g h t = 1
699 )
700 summary(RICEabs . no . E f f e c tOnInte rac t i on )
701
702 #### Table o f models w i th no i n f l u e n t i a l o b s e r v a t i o n s f o r a l l t h e dependent v a r i a b l e s ####
703
704 s t a r ga z e r (AI . no . E f f ec tOnInte ract ion , AIn . no . E f f ec tOnInte ract ion , RICE . no . Ef f ec tOnInte ract ion , RICEabs . no . E f f ec tOnInte ract ion ,
705 t i t l e = ”Tobit models without i n f l u e n t i a l ob s e rva t i on s ”)
706
105
707 #### Id e o l o g y AER models w i th pa r t y dummy #####
708
709 t o b i t . AI . PartyDummies <− t o b i t (
710 AI ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
711 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + time + EPPdummy + SDdummy + ALDEdummy + Greensdummy + GUENGLdummy
712 + ECRdummy + EFDdummy + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp ,
713 data = data ,
714 l e f t = 0 ,
715 r i g h t = 1
716 )
717 summary( t o b i t . AI . PartyDummies )
718
719 t o b i t . AIn . PartyDummies <− t o b i t (
720 AIn ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
721 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + time + EPPdummy + SDdummy + ALDEdummy + Greensdummy
722 + GUENGLdummy + ECRdummy + EFDdummy + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp ,
723 data = data ,
724 l e f t = 0 ,
725 r i g h t = 1
726 )
727 summary( t o b i t . AI . PartyDummies )
728
729 t o b i t .RICE . PartyDummies <− t o b i t (
730 abs (RICE) ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
731 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + time + EPPdummy + SDdummy + ALDEdummy + Greensdummy
732 + GUENGLdummy + ECRdummy + EFDdummy + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp ,
733 data = data ,
734 l e f t = 0 ,
735 r i g h t = 1
736 )
737 summary( t o b i t .RICE . PartyDummies )
738
739 t o b i t . RICEabs . PartyDummies <− t o b i t (
740 abs (RICEabs ) ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
741 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + time + EPPdummy + SDdummy + ALDEdummy + Greensdummy
742 + GUENGLdummy + ECRdummy + EFDdummy + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp ,
743 data = data ,
744 l e f t = 0 ,
745 r i g h t = 1
746 )
747 summary( t o b i t . RICEabs . PartyDummies )
748
749 s t a r ga z e r ( t o b i t . AI . PartyDummies , t o b i t . AIn . PartyDummies , t o b i t .RICE . PartyDummies , t o b i t . RICEabs . PartyDummies )
750
751 ### ML random i n t e r c e p t w i th pa r t y p o s i t i o n s ####
752
753 #wi th pa r t y p o s i t i o n s
754
755 AI . MLbudget . party <− lmer (
756 AI ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
757 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy + SDdummy + ALDEdummy
758 + Greensdummy + GUENGLdummy + ECRdummy + EFDdummy + (1 + budget | area1 ) ,
759 data = data
760 )
761 summary(AI . MLbudget . party )
762
763 AIn . MLbudget . party <− lmer (
764 AIn ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
765 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy + SDdummy
766 + ALDEdummy + Greensdummy + GUENGLdummy + ECRdummy + EFDdummy + (1 + budget | area1 ) ,
767 data = data
768 )
769 summary(AIn . MLbudget . party )
770
771 RICE . MLbudget . party <− lmer (
772 abs (RICE) ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
773 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy + SDdummy + ALDEdummy
774 + Greensdummy + GUENGLdummy + ECRdummy + EFDdummy + (1 + budget | area1 ) ,
775 data = data
776 )
777 summary(RICE . MLbudget . party )
778
779 RICEabs . MLbudget . party <− lmer (
780 abs (RICEabs ) ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
781 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy + SDdummy
782 + ALDEdummy + Greensdummy + GUENGLdummy + ECRdummy + EFDdummy + (1 + budget | area1 ) ,
783 data = data
784 )
785 summary(RICEabs . MLbudget . party )
786
787 s t a r ga z e r (AI . MLbudget . party , AIn . MLbudget . party , RICE . MLbudget . party , RICEabs . MLbudget . party ,
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788 t i t l e = ”Random i n t e r e p t and e f f e c t o f budget c o n t r o l l e d f o r party p o s i t i o n s ”)
789
790
791 #### ML Fixed E f f e c t s ####
792 AI . MLbudgetfe <− lm(
793 AI ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp
794 + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy + as . factor ( area1 ) ,
795 data = data
796 )
797
798 class (data$area1 )
799 summary(AI . MLbudgetfe )
800
801 AIn . MLbudgetfe <− lm(
802 AIn ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp
803 + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy + as . factor ( area1 ) ,
804 data = data
805 )
806
807 class (data$area1 )
808 summary(AIn . MLbudgetfe )
809
810 RiceMLbudgetfe <− lm(
811 abs (RICE) ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
812 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy + as . factor ( area1 ) ,
813 data = data
814 )
815
816 class (data$area1 )
817 summary( RiceMLbudgetfe )
818
819 RiceabsMLbudgetfe <− lm(
820 abs (RICEabs ) ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
821 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy + as . factor ( area1 ) ,
822 data = data
823 )
824
825 class (data$area1 )
826 summary( RiceabsMLbudgetfe )
827
828 s t a r ga z e r (AI . MLbudgetfe , AIn . MLbudgetfe , RiceMLbudgetfe , RiceabsMLbudgetfe )
829
830 #### Log i t Re su l t models ####
831
832 resu l tMode l . AI <− z e l i g (
833 r e s u l t 1 ˜ budget + AI + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp
834 + EPPdummy,
835 model = ” l o g i t ” ,
836 data = data
837 )
838 summary( resu l tMode l . AI )
839
840 resu l tMode l . AIn <− z e l i g (
841 r e s u l t 1 ˜ budget + AIn + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp
842 + EPPdummy,
843 model = ” l o g i t ” ,
844 data = data
845 )
846 summary( resu l tMode l . AIn )
847
848 resu l tMode l .RICE <− z e l i g (
849 r e s u l t 1 ˜ budget + abs (RICE) + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
850 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy,
851 model = ” l o g i t ” ,
852 data = data
853 )
854 summary( resu l tMode l .RICE)
855
856 resu l tMode l . RICEabs <− z e l i g (
857 r e s u l t 1 ˜ budget + abs (RICEabs ) + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
858 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy,
859 model = ” l o g i t ” ,
860 data = data
861 )
862 summary( resu l tMode l . RICEabs )
863
864 s t a r ga z e r ( resu l tMode l . AI , resu l tMode l . AIn , resu l tMode l . RICE, resu l tMode l . RICEabs )
865
866





871 t o b i t . AI . I n t e rP l o t <− t o b i t (
872 AI ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms+ d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp
873 + EPPdummy + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp ,
874 data = data
875 )
876
877 t o b i t . AI . In t e rP lo t1 <− t o b i t (
878 AI ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
879 + I ( d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp − 1) + EPPdummy + budget * I ( d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp − 1) ,
880 data = data
881 )
882
883 c o e f s <− cbind (summary( t o b i t . AI . I n t e rP l o t )$coef f i c ients [ 2 , 1 ] , summary( t o b i t . AI . In t e rP lo t1 )$coef f i c ients [ 2 , 1 ] )
884
885 se <− cbind (summary( t o b i t . AI . I n t e rP l o t )$coef f i c ients [ 2 , 2 ] , summary( t o b i t . AI . In t e rP lo t1 )$coef f i c ients [ 2 , 2 ] )
886
887 conf . i n t <− matrix (NA, nrow = 2 , ncol = 2)
888 for ( i in 1 : 2) {
889 conf . i n t [ i , ] <− c ( c o e f s [ i ] − 1 .96 * se [ i ] , c o e f s [ i ] + 1 .96 * se [ i ] )
890 }
891
892 pdf ( ” Inte rac t ionPlotDe fec tBudget . pdf ”)
893
894 par ( mfrow = c (1 , 1 ) )
895
896 plot (c (−0.5 , 1 . 5 ) , c (−0.7 , 0 . 3 ) , type = ”n” , ylab = ”E f f e c t o f budgetary i m p l i c a t i o n s on AI” , xlab = ”” , xaxt = ”n”)
897 axis (1 , at = 0 : 1 , labels = c ( ”No Defec t ion ” , ”De fec t ion ” ) )
898
899 for ( i in 1 : 2) {
900 segments ( y0 = conf . i n t [ i , 1 ] , y1 = conf . i n t [ i , 2 ] , x0 = i − 1 , col = ” v i o l e t r e d 2 ”)
901 }
902
903 points (c (0 : 1) , coe f s , type = ”p” , pch = 16)
904 segments ( y0 = 0 , x0 = −1, x1 = 2 , col = ”grey50 ”)
905
906 dev . of f ( )
907
908





914 t o b i t . AI . SimPlot <− t o b i t (
915 AI ˜ budget + r e s u l t 1 + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp
916 + EPPdummy + budget * d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp ,
917 data = data
918 )
919
920 beta <− summary( t o b i t . AI . SimPlot )$coef f i c ients [ 1 : 8 , 1 ]
921 vcov <− t o b i t . AI . SimPlot$var [ 1 : 8 , 1 : 8 ]
922 nsims <− 1000
923 set . seed (2709)
924
925 simb <− mvrnorm(n = nsims , mu = beta , Sigma = vcov )
926
927 ###i n t e r c e p t = 1 , budge t = 0 , d e f e c t i o n = 1 , i n t e r a c t i o n = 0
928 x . 0 <− cbind (1 , 0 , median(data$ r e su l t 1 , na .rm = T) , median(data$Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . , na .rm = T) ,
929 median(data$No . . Terms , na .rm = T) , 1 , min(data$EPPdummy, na .rm = T) , 0)
930 ###i n t e r c e p t = 1 , budge t = 1 , d e f e c t i o n = 1 , i n t e r a c t i o n = 1
931 x . 1 <− cbind (1 , 1 ,
932 median(data$ r e su l t 1 , na .rm = T) ,
933 median(data$Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . , na .rm = T) ,
934 median(data$No . . Terms , na .rm = T) ,
935 1 ,
936 min(data$EPPdummy, na .rm = T) ,
937 1)
938
939 x . beta . 0 <− x . 0 %*% t ( simb )
940 x . beta . 1 <− x . 1 %*% t ( simb )
941 exp . y . 0 <− x . beta . 0
942 exp . y . 1 <− x . beta . 1
943
944 quantile . va lues0 <− quantile (exp . y . 0 , probs = c ( 0 . 025 , 0 . 5 , 0 . 9 75 ) )
945 quantile . va lues1 <− quantile (exp . y . 1 , probs = c ( 0 . 025 , 0 . 5 , 0 . 9 75 ) )
946
947 sim <− data . frame (c (exp . y . 0 , exp . y . 1 ) )
948 sim$budget <− NA
949 sim$budget [ 1 : 1000 ] <− ”No”
108 APPENDIX D. R CODE
950 sim$budget [1001 : 2000 ] <− ”Yes ”
951
952 pdf ( ”BoxPlotSimulat ionDefect ion . pdf ”)
953 boxplot (
954 sim$c . exp . y . 0 . . exp . y . 1 . ˜ sim$budget ,
955 frame = T,
956 xlab = ”Budgetary imp l i c a t i on ” ,
957 ylab = ”Predicted cohe s i v ene s s ” ,
958 main = ” E f f e c t f o r b i l l s with d e f e c t i o n ”
959 )
960 dev . of f ( )
961
962 pdf ( ”S imu la t i onP lo tDens i ty f o rFa i l ed . pdf ”)
963 plot (c ( 0 . 4 , 0 . 9 ) , c (0 , 20) , type = ”n” , ylab = ”Density ” , xlab = ”Budgetary imp l i c a t i on ”)
964 l ines (density ( sim$c . exp . y . 0 . . exp . y . 1 . [ 1 : 1000 ] ) , col = ”tomato ”)
965 l ines (density ( sim$c . exp . y . 0 . . exp . y . 1 . [ 1 0 0 1 : 2000 ] ) , col = ”seagreen ”)
966 segments ( x0 = quantile ( sim$c . exp . y . 0 . . exp . y . 1 . [ 1 : 1000 ] , probs = 0 .025 ) , y0 = 0 , y1 = 2 .6 , col = ”tomato ”)
967 segments ( x0 = quantile ( sim$c . exp . y . 0 . . exp . y . 1 . [ 1 : 1000 ] , probs = 0 .975 ) , y0 = 0 , y1 = 2 .67 , col = ”tomato ”)
968 segments ( x0 = quantile ( sim$c . exp . y . 0 . . exp . y . 1 . [ 1 0 0 1 : 2000 ] , probs = 0 .025 ) , y0 = 0 , y1 = 1 .9 , col = ”seagreen ”)
969 segments ( x0 = quantile ( sim$c . exp . y . 0 . . exp . y . 1 . [ 1 0 0 1 : 2000 ] , probs = 0 .975 ) , y0 = 0 , y1 = 1 .9 , col = ”seagreen ”)
970 legend ( 0 . 6 3 , 18 , c ( ”No Defec t ion ” , ”De fec t ion ”) , f i l l = c ( ”seagreen ” , ”tomato ”) , cex = 0 .8 , pt . bg = 1)
971 dev . of f ( )
972
973 pdf ( ”SimulationBudgetRICEBeanPlot . pdf ”)
974 beanplot (
975 sim$c . exp . y . 0 . . exp . y . 1 . ˜ sim$budget ,
976 frame = T,
977 xlab = ”Budgetary imp l i c a t i on ” ,
978 ylab = ”Predicted cohe s i v ene s s ” ,
979 col = c ( ”#CAB2D6” , ”#33A02C” , ”#B2DF8A”) ,
980 border = ”black ” ,
981 main = ”Simulated e f f e c t s o f budgetary imp l i c a t i on f o r RICE”
982 )
983 dev . of f ( )
984
985
986 #### Simu la t i on f o r b i l l s w i t h no d e f e c t i o n ####
987
988 #i n t e r c e p t = 1 , budge t = 0 , d e f e c t i o n and i n t e r a c t i o n = 0
989 a . 0 <− cbind (1 , 0 , median(data$ r e su l t 1 , na .rm = T) ,
990 max(data$Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . , na .rm = T) ,
991 median(data$No . . Terms , na .rm = T) ,
992 0 ,
993 max(data$EPPdummy, na .rm = T) ,
994 0)
995 #i n t e r c e p t =1, budge t =1, d e f e c t i o n and i n t e r a c t i o n =0
996 a . 1 <− cbind (1 , 1 , median(data$ r e su l t 1 , na .rm = T) ,
997 max(data$Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . , na .rm = T) ,
998 median(data$No . . Terms , na .rm = T) ,
999 0 ,
1000 max(data$EPPdummy, na .rm = T) ,
1001 0)
1002
1003 a . beta . 0 <− a . 0 %*% t ( simb )
1004 a . beta . 1 <− a . 1 %*% t ( simb )
1005 exp . ya . 0 <− a . beta . 0
1006 exp . ya . 1 <− a . beta . 1
1007
1008 quantile . va luesa0 <− quantile (exp . ya . 0 , probs = c ( 0 . 025 , 0 . 5 , 0 . 9 75 ) )
1009 quantile . va luesa1 <− quantile (exp . ya . 1 , probs = c ( 0 . 025 , 0 . 5 , 0 . 9 75 ) )
1010
1011 sima <− data . frame (c (exp . ya . 0 , exp . ya . 1 ) )
1012 sima$budget <− NA
1013 sima$budget [ 1 : 1000 ] <− ”No”
1014 sima$budget [1001 : 2000 ] <− ”Yes ”
1015
1016 names( sima )
1017
1018 pdf ( ”S imu la t i onP lo tDens i ty f o rFa i l ed . pdf ”)
1019 plot (c ( 0 . 1 , 0 . 4 ) , c (0 , 25) , type = ”n” , ylab = ”Density ” , xlab = ”Pred icted cohe s i v ene s s ”)
1020 l ines (density ( sima$c . exp . ya . 0 . . exp . ya . 1 . [ 1 : 1000 ] ) , col = ”hotpink ” )
1021 l ines (density ( sima$c . exp . ya . 0 . . exp . ya . 1 . [ 1 0 0 1 : 2000 ] ) , col = ”l imegreen ”)
1022 segments ( x0 = quantile ( sima$c . exp . ya . 0 . . exp . ya . 1 . [ 1 : 1000 ] , probs = 0 .025 ) , y0 = 0 , y1 = 2 , col = ”hotpink ”)
1023 segments ( x0 = quantile ( sima$c . exp . ya . 0 . . exp . ya . 1 . [ 1 : 1000 ] , probs = 0 .975 ) , y0 = 0 , y1 = 2 , col = ”hotpink ”)
1024 segments ( x0 = quantile ( sima$c . exp . ya . 0 . . exp . ya . 1 . [ 1 0 0 1 : 2000 ] , probs = 0 .025 ) , y0 = 0 , y1 = 2 , col = ”l imegreen ”)
1025 segments ( x0 = quantile ( sima$c . exp . ya . 0 . . exp . ya . 1 . [ 1 0 0 1 : 2000 ] , probs = 0 .975 ) , y0 = 0 , y1 = 2 .6 , col = ”l imegreen ”)
1026 legend ( 0 . 0 9 , 12 , c ( ”No budgetary imp l i c a t i on ” , ”Budgetary imp l i c a t i on ”) , f i l l = c ( ” l imegreen ” , ”hotpink ”) , cex = 0 .8 , pt . bg = 1)
1027 dev . of f ( )
1028
1029 pdf ( ”SimulationBudgetRICEBeanPlotRESULT . pdf ”)
1030 beanplot (
109
1031 sima$c . exp . ya . 0 . . exp . ya . 1 . ˜ sima$budget ,
1032 frame = T,
1033 xlab = ”Budgetary imp l i c a t i on ” ,
1034 ylab = ”Predicted cohe s i v ene s s ” ,
1035 col = c ( ”#CAB2D6” , ”#33A02C” , ”#B2DF8A”) ,
1036 border = ”black ” ,
1037 main = ”Simulated e f f e c t s o f budgetary imp l i c a t i on f o r RICE f o r votes without d e f e c t i o n s ”
1038 )
1039 dev . of f ( )
1040
1041
1042 pdf ( ”BoxPlotSimulationNODefection . pdf ”)
1043 boxplot (
1044 sima$c . exp . ya . 0 . . exp . ya . 1 . ˜ sima$budget ,
1045 frame = T,
1046 xlab = ”Budgetary imp l i c a t i on ” ,
1047 ylab = ”Predicted cohe s i v ene s s ” ,
1048 main = ”Simulated e f f e c t s f o r b i l l s without d e f e c t i o n ”
1049 )
1050 dev . of f ( )
1051
1052
1053 ######## MISC #################
1054
1055 data [which (data$budget == 1 & data$d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp == 1) , ]
1056 class (data$ s i z e . winning . coa l )
1057
1058 poisson . WinningCoal <− glm(
1059 s i z e . winning . coa l ˜ budget + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
1060 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy,
1061 data = data ,
1062 family = poisson
1063 )
1064 summary(poisson . WinningCoal )
1065
1066
1067 poisson . WinningCoal . interaction <− glm(
1068 s i z e . winning . coa l ˜ budget + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
1069 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp * budget ,
1070 data = data ,
1071 family = poisson
1072 )
1073 summary(poisson . WinningCoal . interaction )
1074
1075 poisson . AIn . WinningCoal <− glm(
1076 s i z e . winning . coa l ˜ budget + AIn + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
1077 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp * budget ,
1078 data = data ,
1079 family = poisson
1080 )
1081 summary(poisson . AIn . WinningCoal )
1082
1083 poisson .RICE . WinningCoal <− glm(
1084 s i z e . winning . coa l ˜ budget + abs (RICE) + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
1085 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy,
1086 data = data ,
1087 family = poisson
1088 )
1089 summary(poisson .RICE . WinningCoal )
1090
1091 poisson . RICEabs . WinningCoal <− glm(
1092 s i z e . winning . coa l ˜ budget + abs (RICEabs ) + Procedure . . 1 . l e g i s l a t i v e . . 0 . r e s o l u t i o n . + No . . Terms
1093 + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp + EPPdummy + d e f e c t i o n .by . party . o f . rapp * budget ,
1094 data = data ,
1095 family = poisson
1096 )
1097 summary(poisson . RICEabs . WinningCoal )
1098
1099 s t a r ga z e r (poisson . WinningCoal , poisson . WinningCoal . interaction )
1100
1101 save . image ( ”2Mai . Rdata ”)
